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This thesis offers a comprehensive view of Thai Buddhist constitutionalism, the fundamental 
theory on state, governance, and law in Buddhist-majority Thailand. Despite a major 
modernization reform over a century ago, Buddhism remains a powerful ideology of the Thai 
state. This thesis discusses also how Buddhist constitutionalism interacts with the modern 
norms of liberal democratic constitutionalism. It discovers two important features of the Thai 
legal system regarding religions. First, the constitutional system guarantees religious freedom 
but not religious equality. Second, state accommodation of a religion leads to a loss of 
autonomy. Thus, although Buddhism is the dominant religion, it is subject to a heavy 
monitoring scheme that hinders its freedom to operate. The Thai legal system shows that its 
understanding of human rights is different from the universal standard. This thesis argues that 
such arrangements are the result of Buddhist constitutionalism. Looking at various sources of 
contemporary Buddhism debates, the dissertation considers Buddhism’s hierarchical socio-
political structure with the sacred king at the zenith, Buddhist-infused justice system and the 
emphasis on the Buddhist-style rule of law, as well as a notion of duty over rights. These 
traditional ideas clash with liberal democratic constitutionalism, which is characterized by an 
egalitarian political culture, the sanctity of written law, and the respect of rights and liberties. 
This dissonance brings tensions and conflicts, both within the religion and with other religious 
minorities.  By exposing these difficulties, the thesis clears the way and makes suggestions for 
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I. Introduction: A Crossroads between Buddhism and Constitutional Law 
 
A. Research Question: An absence of Buddhist constitutionalism  
 
The assumption that in a modern state religion will eventually retreat into the private sphere or 
disappear altogether is disproved by the emergence of de-secularization in which religion is 
regaining its once important role in public life.1 Across the world, there are increasing numbers 
of countries that embrace religion as part of public discussion, and several political changes 
are religiously-inspired. Religion is not always considered an obstruction to the making of the 
free society, but a commonly held value vital to building one. Thus, the understanding of 
religion and law at the beginning of the new millennium differs from what had been 
conventionally held in the second half of the twentieth century.  
 
Thailand is a good example of a modern state that challenges the secularization assumption. 
Although it has embraced Western political ideas e.g. a nation-state, a written constitution, a 
democratic form of government and a parliamentary legislative process, the country has 
heavily engaged Buddhism in its path to modernity. Modern Thailand is, as a result, shaped by 
two tectonic forces: the universal idea of liberal democratic constitutionalism, and its 
traditional Buddhist political thought. That is how the Thai legal system has developed – not 
simply as the result of Western ideas of legal reform adopted over a century ago, but rather as 
an amalgamation of the new and the old. This is the focus of this study.  
 
This dissertation stands at the crossroads between the field of law and religion and that of 
comparative constitutional law. It identifies a knowledge gap in the two fields, which it 
endeavours to fill.  
 
Religion influences law, and different religions influence law in different ways. But the subject 
of Buddhism and law is significantly understudied in comparison with other major religions. 
Andrew Huxley once likened the degree of importance of Buddhism to Asian legal cultures to 
that of the Roman contribution to European legal cultures, yet discussion of the Buddhist legal 
                                               




tradition, especially in contemporary terms, is notably absent.2 The topic of Buddhism and 
politics has been extensively studied but how do current Buddhist political rulers exercise their 
authority to promulgate and use the law? Existing scholarship on Buddhism and law is 
insufficient to answer the question. Buddhism is the river less travelled in the field of law and 
religion.3 
 
One explanation for such absence is that scholars might be looking in the wrong place. In his 
study on the major legal traditions of the world, H. Patrick Glenn acknowledges that the 
Buddhist legal tradition has been re-absorbed into the larger, more versatile, Hindu legal 
tradition, while Confucian legal thinking limits the role of Buddhism in the development of 
Chinese legal traditions.4 It is likely that Buddhism’s absence in these two large geographies 
has led to the conventional misunderstanding that it is an ascetic religion; that it has nothing to 
do with governance and law.5 
 
An increasing number of scholars have become less convinced that is the case. How can we 
explain the failure of liberal democracy on mainland Southeast Asia, the heartland of 
Theravada Buddhism? Thailand and her Buddhist neighbours have failed to transplant liberal 
democratic constitutionalism. This is where Buddhism occupies a prominent presence in the 
public sphere and where there are violations of rights, systematic discrimination against non-
Buddhist minorities as well as a local-style rather authoritarian, rule of law. Surely, there must 
be an indigenous force at work, resisting and adapting the Western ideals into the local context. 
This study identifies Buddhism as such a force. This phenomenon contradicts the conventional 
belief that Buddhism is peaceful, escapist, and ascetic. The conventional view of Buddhist legal 
theology thus merits reassessment. The void in our knowledge of this subject frustrates some 
scholars who propose that the study of Buddhist constitutionalism is long overdue.6 
 
From the comparative constitutional law point of view, the study of Buddhist constitutionalism 
offers an opportunity to broaden horizons, by learning about constitutional law beyond just 
                                               
2 Andrew Huxley, ‘Buddhist Law’ in Herbet M. Kritzer et al (eds) Legal systems of the World: A Political, 
Social, and Cultural Encyclopedia (ABC-CLIO 2002) 205-206.  
3 Rex Ahdar, ‘Navigating law and religion: familiar waterways, rivers less travelled, and uncharted seas’ in Rex 
Ahdar (ed) Research Handbook on Law and Religion (Edward Elgar 2018) 6. 
4 H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World (Oxford University Press, 5th edn. 2014) 289 & 330-332.  
5  Frank Reynolds, ‘Buddhism and Law – Preface’ (1995) 18 Journal of the International Association of 
Buddhist Studies 1, 3-4.  
6 Benjamin Schonthal & Tom Ginsburg, ‘Setting an Agenda for the Socio-Legal Study of Contemporary 




legal theories and interpretation techniques.7 Thailand’s liberal democratic failure is a classic 
East-meets-West story where the two worlds collide and ideas are only partially adopted. While 
the influence of Buddhism in shaping Thai politics is well studied, that of law has long been 
neglected. The multidisciplinary approach of this dissertation to Thai constitutional law will 
offer an insight into why Thailand repeatedly fails to implement liberal democratic 
constitutionalism. It looks at the cultural factors that obstruct the successful transition to 
democracy. This point has recently gained attention not from law scholars but from a small 
number of political scientists. Thongchai Winichakul criticizes legal scholars who ignore this 
problem, that they tend to understand the problem as merely technical, the discrepancy between 
Common and Civil Law interpretation techniques. Following a very rigid positivistic approach, 
they simplify the problem while failing to see the cultural problem of a legal transplant.8 
Thongchai suspects that the real culprit is the rarely mentioned problem of how aspects of 
traditional culture such as Buddhism affect the application of law. This view is reflected in 
other socio-political works too.9 Ignorance of such dimensions prevents Thailand from 
overcoming the chronic problem of democratic transition.  
 
This thesis asks two questions. First, what is Buddhist constitutionalism? To ignore the 
Buddhist influence on Thai legal development is to ignore the elephant in the room. The bigger 
problem is that no one is certain what that elephant looks like. This is the most fundamental 
problem that one must address before other questions can be asked. This question responds to 
the void in the field of Buddhism and law by tracing all relevant accounts of how Thai 
Buddhism interprets the concept of law, the hierarchy of norms, the relationship between law 
and public institutions, as well as rights. Secondly, what happens when the traditional notion 
of Buddhist constitutionalism meets the modern norm of liberal democratic constitutionalism? 
Clearly, they are incompatible – but how? An answer to the second question may enable us to 
construct a more democratic synthesis of the two sets of values where Buddhist legal thought 
welcomes liberal ideas.  
                                               
7 Ran Hirschl, Comparative Matters: The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University 
Press 2014) 152-154.  
8 Thongchai Winichakul, ‘บททดลองเสนอ: อภิสิทธิ- ปลอดความผิด (impunity) และความเขา้ใจสิทธิมนุษยชนในนิติรัฐแบบไทยๆ’ [Proposing 
Experiment: Impunity Privilege and the Understanding of Human Rights in Thai-Style Legal State] (2016) 14 
Same Sky Book 191, 205-207. 
9 David Streckfuss, Truth on Trial in Thailand: Defamation, treason, and lese-majeste (Routledge 2011); Björn 
Dressel (2018) Thailand's Traditional Trinity and the Rule of Law: Can They Coexist? (2018) 42 Asian Studies 
Review 268; Eugénie Mérieau, ‘Buddhist Constitutionalism in Thailand: When Rājadhammā Supersedes the 





B. Methodology, Scope, and Limit 
 
This thesis sets out to inquire into Thai Buddhist constitutionalism; therefore, it studies 
Buddhism in its role as a political ideology, which differs from the classical study of canonical 
Buddhism. It is concerned less with what is written in the Pali canon, the authoritative source, 
than with what people believe constitutes Buddhism. As a result, it omits some canonical 
passages which are irrelevant to the purpose of the study but gives more weight to local lore 
and contemporary sources, which influence Thai perceptions of Buddhism more strongly.  
 
The Kingdom of Thailand is chosen as the prototypical case study for a Buddhist polity, where 
Buddhism and the monarchy, the two essential elements of political Buddhism, still survive to 
the present day.10 Other Theravada countries have faced colonization, military dictatorship, 
and communism, which have radically and irrevocably altered the nature of their Buddhism 
and monarchs so much that they are not as suitable for such study.   
 
The limits of this study should be explained beforehand. A common reaction when a Buddhist 
encounters an unfavorable mention of Buddhism is to label it false. This dissertation will not 
engage in a debate on the true form of Thai Buddhism. Instead, it adopts a sociological 
definition. Two elements commonly cited are the Theravada tradition and the official order.    
 
Thai Buddhism belongs to the Southern School of Theravada, which refers to the lineages and 
traditions that identify themselves as the descendants of the Sri Lankan lineage. Theravada 
Buddhism is usually presented as the original form compared to the Mahayana and Vajarayana 
traditions of Buddhism of eastern and central Asia respectively. However, it is doubtful if such 
a pure form really exists. Theravada conveys the idea of adhering to the Pali canon, in contrast 
with the Sanskrit canon of Mahayana. But there is little agreement on the actual substance.11 
Apart from the historical common root, Thai Buddhism still differs greatly from other 
Theravada traditions and also within itself since it has mixed with Hindu and local animism. 
Moreover, many Thais freely visit Mahayana temples, and some teachings of these ‘Theravada’ 
                                               
10 See Hirschl, Comparative Matters 256-260. 




monks contain Mahayana elements too. It seems that most Thais do not have a clear idea of 
what is Theravada about Theravada Buddhism.  
 
Nidhi Eowseewong, a distinguished Thai historian, suggests that a unique feature of Thai 
Buddhism is its long history under the state’s control.12 At present, Sangha law constitutes the 
official order and the Sangha Council governs it. A term “sangha” is a generic reference to any 
gathering of monks. But Thai Sangha hereby specifically means the official monastic order of 
Thai monks.  The order has annexed a number of local variants without creating a single distinct 
orthodoxy. There was a short period of suppression but subsequently these variants flourished 
again. Practices vary from one individual and temple to another. Besides, Thai Sangha and 
Thai Buddhism are not the same. There are movements outside the order that must still be 
considered parts of Thai Buddhism. A considerable portion of Thais follow these movements 
regardless of their official status, or lack of it.   
 
It is evident that Thai Buddhism is in reality a very complex system of inexplicably great 
diversity, within which complicated relationships, both friendly and adversarial, are 
maintained.13 Its borders are porous and exchanges with other religious traditions, e.g. 
Mahayana Buddhism, Hinduism, and animism, occur constantly. Because of such difficulties, 
Thai Buddhism is best understood as whatever the majority of Thais regard as ‘proper’ 
Buddhism, residing within a confined geographical space called Thailand, regardless of the 
lack of consensus on the substance of that term.  
 
Often, the study of Thai Buddhism encounters two ‘families’ that shape the general 
understanding of Thai Buddhism.14 The first family is ‘canonical’ Buddhism which emphasizes 
the canonical sources. It rejects the animistic and Hindu elements in the religion and adopts a 
more rationalistic doctrinal approach. This is the product of Bangkok’s religious reform over a 
hundred years ago and so became the Buddhism, first, of Bangkokians, originating in the 
                                               
12 Interview with Nidhi Eowseewong, Historian (Chiang Mai, 8 April 2019).  
13 See Francisca Cho & Richard K. Squier, ‘Religion as a Complex and Dynamic System’ (2013) 81 Journal of 
the American Academy of Religion 357.  
14 Barend Jan Terwiel, Monks and Magic (Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 4th edn, 2012) 2-5; Patrick Jory, 
‘Thai and Western Buddhist Scholarship in the Age of Colonization: King Chulalongkorn Redefines the 
Jatakas’ (2002) 61 The Journal of Asian Studies 891; Peter Jackson, Buddhism, Legitimation, and Conflicts: the 
Political Functions of Urban Thai Buddhism (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 1989) chapter 3; Charles F. 
Keyes, Helen Hardacre, & Laurel Kendall ‘Introduction: Contested Visions of Community in East and 
Southeast Asia’ in Charles F. Keyes et al (eds), Asian Visions of Authority: Religion and the Modern States in 




capital before being disseminated to the rest of the country via state mechanisms. Those most 
interested in it are the literate upper classes. It is inspired by Western interest in Buddhism, 
which approaches the subject as a philosophy for life and, therefore, focuses mainly on the text, 
which from this perspective is considered the true source of Buddhism. Presently, this is the 
version of Buddhism taught in school. Dhamma which is relevant to daily life is selected, 
simplified, and incorporated into the curriculum. Most contemporary Buddhist scholars belong 
to this family.  
 
On the contrary, vernacular Buddhism is the religion of lay people, of plebeian Thais. The main 
sources of vernacular Buddhism are secondary literature and folklore, which are excluded from 
the official orthodoxy. These include some well-known literature such as Trai Phum Phra 
Ruang, Malai Klon Suad, and many Jatakas containing the stories of Buddha’s past 
incarnations. Vernacular Buddhism is syncretic and communal. Locals tend not to practise or 
observe their faith privately. Their religion was to be told in public, in ceremonial events 
throughout the year. This was fit for the conditions of ancient Siam where the majority were 
illiterate. Tipitaka was inscribed into palm leaves and kept in a beautifully decorated sack, and 
worshipped inside the sacred vihara. It was not meant to be read. The main theme was that of 
kamma; that bad deeds bring negative consequences and vice versa. Vernacular Buddhism is 
sometimes looked down upon by the more literate classes, calling it ‘false’ Buddhism. 
However, it is not an either-or situation, but a matter of degree. Religious reforms did not 
eradicate vernacular Buddhism, and the development of Thai Buddhism has not occurred in a 
linear manner, from vernacular to rationalistic forms, from traditional to secular, or ‘ancient’ 
to ‘modern’. These ancient thoughts are deeply rooted in the mind of Thais. Those who 
condemn false Buddhism often unconsciously adopt it too. A study of Thai Buddhism must 
examine both families of Thai Buddhism.   
 
Constitutionalism is another ambiguous term. This dissertation narrows it to only liberal 
democratic constitutionalism. Liberalism in this context implies respect for rights and 
liberties.15 Democracy basically requires periodic elections which allow the people to choose 
and recall their leaders.16 Lastly, constitutionalism implies respect for law and of the legal order 
over human arbitrariness.17 Thus, liberal democratic constitutionalism can be characterised by 
                                               
15 Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Autocratic Legalism’ (2018) 85 The University of Chicago Law Review 545, 557-558. 
16 Ibid 558-559. 




three criteria: first, the country is governed by a government by popular consensus; second, it 
shows respect for the supremacy of the constitution and other laws; and third, it adopts the 
belief in universal human rights.18     
 
The thesis is divided into two main parts. The first concentrates on the constitutional 
arrangement of Thailand. The second chapter is an introduction to the development of Thai 
Buddhism. It tracks how over 700 years Buddhism has fostered and become integral to the 
identity of Thainess. It also traces how the modern Thai state has shaped contemporary Thai 
Buddhism. In addition to the socio-political context under which Thai Buddhism operates, it 
introduces some basic concepts of teaching as well as vocabulary. The third and fourth chapters 
examine religions in the Thai legal system: constitutions, statutes, regulations, and actual 
policies through the multi-tiered regulatory scheme. It hopes to detect any notable patterns in 
Thailand’s public policies on religions. The following fifth chapter assesses such an 
arrangement through the lens of public international human rights. It asks whether Thailand’s 
constitutional arrangements for religions is compatible with universal norms. If not, why and 
how? 
 
The second part is more normative. It looks into the theology behind the three basic ideas of 
constitutionalism: politics, law, and human rights, which are discussed in the sixth, seventh, 
and eighth chapters respectively. The objective is to cover all the ideas within Thai Buddhism 
for and against these concepts. By identifying the role of these ideas in the modern Thai 
political and legal situation, it hopes to be able to deconstruct conventional beliefs about Thai 
Buddhism’s compatibility with liberal democratic constitutionalism. The final chapter projects 
forward toward the possibility of creating a new Buddhist constitutionalism that is universal 
and democratic.  
 
This is a document-based research project. The primary source on Buddhism is the Pali canon, 
known as Tipitaka. However, the Pali canon is not definitive. Few Thais can read the original 
text, with most digesting passages that have been selected, abridged, and translated into Thai. 
Thai Buddhism also involves many commentaries and much local lore, which have survived 
reform and remain influential, for example, Trai Phum Phra Ruang. The writings of selected 
                                               
18 Other law and religion scholars seem to converge on this criterion, see Khaled Abou El Fadl, 





contemporary thinkers whose voices are considered representative of Thai Buddhism are those 
of Buddhadasa, P. A. Payutto, and Sulak Sivaraksa, among others. Another important source 
that reveals the thinking of Thai Buddhism can be found in academic papers: dissertations and 
individual studies from the monastic universities. This will, of course, be supplemented by 
academic articles and books both in Buddhist ethics and law. Because of the dynamic nature 
of the topic, for recent developments and the most updated opinions, this research relies 
significantly on informal platforms such as academic blog posts and newspapers. On law, this 
research draws its source from constitutions, statutes, and regulations; the Sangha Council’s 
regulations and resolutions are included. Minutes of drafting, especially that of constitutions, 
and the House Committee report on Buddhist reform provide important insight. Constitutional 
and criminal cases help us to understand how these laws work. One note is that there is no 
official translation of Thai laws into English, although the Council of State sometimes provide 
‘unofficial’ ones. This research prioritizes these ‘unofficial’ translation by the Council of State 
unless there is a better alternative.  
 
The topic of Buddhism and the law is highly dynamic. The recent rise of Buddhist 
fundamentalism in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Thailand has revived academic interest. Shortly 
after this Ph.D. research commenced, new articles were and are still being published, pushing 
the boundaries and offering new readings on the subject. Another reason is due to Thailand’s 
volatile politics where hyper-conservatism has surged since 2006 resulting in high 
constitutional turnover. Since politics is shaped greatly by hyper-moralism, each constitutional 
change takes the state-Buddhism relationship to a more radical path. Lastly, King Bhumibol, 
regarded by many as the great Buddhist king, passed away in 2016. The ascension of his son, 
King Vajiralongkorn, has taken Buddhist policies in a new, rather unexpected, direction. There 
are now several changes being implemented in the Thai Buddhist community after decades of 
hiatus. New laws and policies are being made at a faster pace. This means that tracking the 
development of Thai Buddhism from 2015 to 2019 has been very challenging. Finally, in terms 
of dates, this research focuses on the development of Thai Buddhism since the birth of the 
modern Thai state in the early 20th century right up to early 2019.      
 





Buddhism is often portrayed as the religion of renouncers, encouraging men to abandon 
worldly possessions to live in a secluded monastic community. However, Buddha also taught 
about the good political life and political order. Max Weber’s description of Buddhism as a 
mythical religion that concerns only personal salvation but not good political order is not 
correct.19 With political order must come a legal system, however primitive it might be. Also, 
the history of Thailand suggests that Buddhism has been integrated into every aspect of Thai 
life. Political leaders always take Buddhism into consideration before formulating public 
policies. The role of Buddhism in Thai society is, therefore, not only cultural or religious, but 
also legal and political.  
 
A survey of the key literature reveals significant shortcomings in the knowledge about 
Buddhism and law. Depending on context, law is an ambiguous word as it can refer to either: 
(1) the monastic law or vinaya, which is an internal code of conduct for monks, (2) the 
Buddhism-inspired ancient law of Southeast Asia known as dhammasastra, or (3) modern 
secular law. The study of vinaya is excluded from the discussion here because of its distance 
from our interest.20 This shortcoming is especially acute in the area of Buddhism and modern 
state law compared to the area of Buddhism and ancient law. It seems that many legal scholars 
are convinced that the role of Buddhism in law-making is a thing of the past that ceased with 
the introduction of western concepts of law, and they leave such studies to historians. This 
explains why Buddhism and law is assigned to the branch of legal history, implying its 
irrelevance to present day business. Besides, from a normative perspective, others consider 
dhamma the higher, more proper form of law than human-made law, so law is considered a 
symptom of social illness.21 As a consequence, the topic of Buddhism’s relationship to modern 
law never receives the attention it merits. 
 
Robert Lingat was one of the earliest scholars to argue that Siam’s dhammasastra, the ancient 
legal code, is not the same as the original Hindu Law of Manu but the Mon’s adaptation 
encompassing Buddhist elements to impose limits upon the king. Thus, the Siamese legal 
                                               
19 Frank E. Reynolds, ‘The Two Wheels of Dhamma’ in Gananath Obeyesekere et al. (eds.) The Two Wheels of 
Dhamma: Essays on the Theravada Tradition in India and Ceylon (American Academy of Religion 1972) 6-7.  
20 See Petra Keefer-Pulz, ‘What the Vinayas Can Tell Us about Law’ in Rebecca French and Mark Nathan (eds), 
Buddhism and Law: An Introduction (Cambridge University Press 2014); Christine Lammerts, ‘Genres and 
Jurisdictions: Law governing Monastic Inheritance in Seventeenth-Century Burma’ in French and Nathan (eds), 
Buddhism and Law. 




system was influenced more by Buddhism than by Hinduism.22 This view is widely accepted. 
However, since Lingat, there has been little development within the Thai legal community 
building upon his work. Most works by Thai legal historians tend to be descriptive and 
overlook the Buddhist aspect of the Siamese legal code.23 Often, their achievements in 
connecting Buddhism and modern law are limited to only a small area of family and inheritance 
law.24 
 
Andrew Huxley writes extensively about the ancient Buddhist law of Southeast Asia, 
particularly Myanmar. He tries to answer more clearly the same question of what is Buddhist 
about Buddhist law. His works reveal that, contrary to other religiously-inspired laws, these 
Buddhist laws derive little from the canonical sources; but Buddhism provides the Southeast 
Asian legal tradition with the inspiration, structure, formula of adjudication, as well as training 
for lawyers.25 One of his most comprehensive works identifies three sub-groups of 
Dhammasastra and surmises that the Siamese genre is actually overcome by the royally 
promulgated law, despite the Buddhist title.26 Similar to other scholars, he is convinced that 
the Buddhist law tradition has already been lost.27   
 
In recent years, there are signs of growing interest in the study of Buddhism and modern law. 
Here, law is understood as state legislation. Concern regarding a gap in the study of Buddhism 
and modern state law has been voiced by Rebecca French,28 and also Benjamin Schonthal and 
Tom Ginsburg. They agree that the field is much underdeveloped compared to similar fields 
concerning Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Judaism. Ginsburg and Schonthal, in particular, 
identify the formation of Buddhist constitutionalism as one of the four research agendas for the 
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socio-legal study of Buddhism.29 There are signs that scholars are now turning attention to this 
topic.  
 
The primary concern is the constitutional relationship between the state and Buddhism. In 
Rebecca French and Mark Nathan’s Buddhism and Law: An Introduction, although the 
majority of essays focus on premodern and monastic laws, Whitecross studies Buddhism in the 
modern constitution of Bhutan.30 He shows how a Buddhist understanding of state and law as 
well as its long history in this Himalayan country help shaped the 2008 Constitution in both 
symbolic and substantial ways. He notes the changing state-monastic relationship in the 
transformative period. In his study of Sri Lanka constitutional law, Benjamin Schonthal himself 
offers his view of the underlying problem of Buddhist influence on the Sri Lankan Constitution, 
which has led to religious tension and conflicts.31 
 
Schonthal further posits his views on Buddhist constitutionalism that the Buddhist countries of 
South and Southeast Asia have displayed a tendency to protect the Buddhist heritage in their 
constitutions.32 However, his work limits itself to only the state-sangha mutual relationship, 
which is only a part of the whole of Buddhist constitutionalism. Yet there unquestionably 
remains more to say about the subject.  
 
Other studies focus not upon the constitution but upon specific laws. Tomas Larsson has 
worked on the election laws of Myanmar, Cambodia, and Thailand to study the 
disenfranchisement of Buddhist monks.33 In another work he questions the discrepancy of Thai 
law in separating the secular and sectarian worlds, which, as a result, bars monks from politics 
but not from commercial activities.34 These works are important, but still piecemeal. 
 
Thus, the older form of Buddhist law is dead, according to legal historians, and little do we 
know about the current form of Buddhist constitutionalism. It is said to rely on different aspects 
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of Buddhism. There is no longer a Buddhist legal code inspired by monastic legal training or 
canonical scriptures, but rather it is influenced by Buddhist political and legal ideas. Attempts 
have been made to learn about the state-sangha relationship in constitutional law as well as the 
sangha laws, but there remains much to be explored. Hence, the objective of this research: to 
conduct a systematic, comprehensive, study of Buddhist constitutionalism.  
 
Contrary to the field of Buddhism and law, research on Buddhism and politics is proliferating. 
There are several studies on the influence of Buddhism on the political arrangement of Thailand 
and its Theravada neighbours. These studies can be placed into three categories. The first group 
concerns the philosophical foundations of Buddhist thought on the state. This group usually 
focuses on canonical and post-canonical Buddhist texts. One of the earliest works is by 
Balkrishna Govind Gokhale, who examined the development of the state in Buddhist thought, 
from a contract-like arrangement to one in which the ruling monarch has to subject itself to the 
guidance of Dhamma.35 According to Gokhale, this development arises from the paradoxical 
role of the king, who has to strike a delicate balance between observing the Dhamma and 
exercising his authority to keep peace and order in his kingdom.36 Although Gokhale’s work 
is on ancient India, the idea is applicable to other Buddhist kingdoms, including Thailand.  
 
One of the most foundational studies on the relationship between Buddhism and the state is 
that of Frank E. Reynolds, who proposes the Two Wheels of Dhamma theory.37 His two wheels 
of Dhamma theory separates the world into the spiritual and temporal realms. He argues that 
Buddhism concerns both realms: personal salvation and good political order. Buddhism, 
therefore, describes its ideal kingship, dhammaraja, which drives the temporal wheel in order 
to advance the spiritual wheel. His account is influential and subsequent studies follow this 
dichotomy.  
 
The second group of studies explores Buddhism’s role in Thailand’s socio-political 
developments. They are often structured in a more or less similar manner. They begin with 
examining the social and political functions of Buddhism in Thai society before looking more 
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closely at changes in the lay-monastic relationship from the Sukhothai period to around the 
liberalization period in the 1980s. 
 
Tambiah’s classic, World Conqueror and World Renouncer, is one of the earliest studies of 
this kind.38 He follows the classic two-realm dichotomy to look into the interaction between 
the two. He argues that Weber’s understanding of Buddhism is not right and describes how 
Buddhism, its text and legends, inspires the concept of kingship and political legitimacy in 
Thailand’s history. More interestingly, although he finds that the two realms support each 
other, there are dialectical tensions and paradoxes within the doctrines with which political 
leaders have to deal.  
 
The monograph of Yoneo Ishii provides a similar account of Buddhism in the light of political 
changes in Thai history.39 However, he emphasizes the greater monarchical control of the 
monastic order, which, as he discovers, evolves as Thailand moves from absolute monarchy to 
democracy to authoritarianism. He describes how Buddhism is used to integrate and build 
modern Thailand, but he points out the reactionary movement that employed a regional version 
of Buddhism as an inspiration too.  
 
Peter A. Jackson identifies two strains of Buddhism: traditional Buddhism that believes in a 
spiritual cult and determinative karmic system; and reformist-rationalist Buddhism that tries to 
explain the religion in a modern way.40 According to Jackson, the former legitimizes absolute 
monarchy while the latter justifies democratic processes.41 He traces the interplay and 
competition between the two in interpreting the teaching and administration of the monastic 
order through the state’s control of the Sangha, the Sangha laws and amendments, as well as 
the state’s response to the emergence of various schools of Buddhism in Thailand.  
 
Somboon Suksamran is another scholar who has produced a series of works on Thai Buddhism 
and its socio-political function. Somboon first describes several concepts of Buddhist kingship 
and the mutual relationship between the political and Buddhist authorities. He then looks at 
Thailand’s policies on Buddhism from the Sukhothai era to modern Bangkok. His works 
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comprise some of the most comprehensive accounts of the political function of Thai 
Buddhism.42  
 
The above studies examine the role of Buddhism in nation-building, and ultimately, in 
democratizing Thailand. Two themes emerge closely intertwined: the making of political 
hegemony and the control over the sangha, reflecting the ideal mutual relationship many 
Buddhists firmly believe. However, not all scholars are supportive of such positive 
perspectives. Duncan McCargo sees Thai Buddhism as an obstruction to democratization. 
Tracing the political ideology of famous Thai Buddhist philosophers, he concludes that 
Buddhism has a view of particularism making it the tool for the Thai state to oppress its people 
and back authoritarian ideas of government.43 His view is in direct contrast with Charles Keys, 
who argues that Thai Buddhism has a revolutionary significance that helped shape Thai 
politics.44 
 
The third group of writing focuses on political legitimacy, more specifically on the concept of 
kingship. Drawing from Buddhist canons, legends, myths, and historical evidence, they are 
quite diverse in their methodology. They explain how the concept of kingship is understood in 
Southeast Asia. This group might sound historical and outdated in concept. However, as will 
be shown below, there is on a subconscious level historical continuity to the modern 
administration.   
 
Barbara Watson Andaya recounts the life of Li Tai, the ancient Siamese king, who successfully 
reigned over Sukhothai through his Buddhist-inspired policies.45 He displayed personal ethics 
as well as employed Buddhist diplomacy to win over the people and his neighbours. Li Tai 
came to be known as the first Siamese Dhammaraja, setting an example for others.  
 
Rituals constitute parts of ancient political process. Peter Skilling examines the various 
concepts of Buddhist kingship in legal and other historical documents as well as in Buddhist 
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and Brahmanic rituals.46 Christine Gray explores how the royal Kathin ceremony was used to 
convey the new values from the centre, the King, the military, and Chinese businessmen, to 
rural Thailand in modern times.47 Finally, Patrick Jory studies the concept of barami, or 
perfection, through the cult of the Vessantara legend. Vessantara is the incarnation of Buddha. 
Jory specifically studies the rituals associated with Vessantara that shape Thais’ understanding 
of monarchy.48 
 
The work of Donald Swearer takes a different direction because his study begins with an 
examination of the myths and legends surrounding Buddhist kingship, supplemented by 
archaeological evidences from several ancient Southeast Asian empires. He then shows the 
continuity of the kingship idea by concluding with examples of modern Southeast Asian 
nations after WWII. The comparative perspective of his work convinces readers that Buddhist 
kingship is a regional phenomenon.49 All of these studies show the complex making of the 
rightful ruler in the Southeast Asian context. There are rituals, architectures, as well as local 
literatures that inculcate the Buddhist kingship idea.  
 
Through the work on Buddhism and politics, one can learn much about Buddhism and law. 
Buddhist politics and law overlap. Political institutions comprise the law-makers and enforcers. 
Political ideas become the substance of law. Still, there remains much to be researched. Apart 
from kingship and sangha governance, few studies discuss other important topics, e.g. violence. 
In recent years, as religious tension in Thailand has risen, Michael K. Jerryson asserts that 
Buddhism’s dominance has helped escalate the conflict in the Muslim-populated Deep South 
region. Buddhism can act as a symbol of the state’s suppression of ethnic difference.50 
However, his ethnographic work records the reality of the Deep South without providing any 
theological explanation. Meanwhile, Schonthal’s work on Buddhism’s intolerance offers a new 
reading for the canon.51 This research would like to push the boundary by addressing these oft-
overlooked topics too.  
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This research project, the first comprehensive study of Buddhist constitutionalism, can help 
towards a more complete understanding of law and politics in the Buddhist kingdom. It is also 
part of the growing movement to ‘update’ the field of political Buddhism following the 
publication of the most foundational works in the 1970s and 1980s. It analyses them in the new 
environment, the more democratic yet also more authoritarian Thailand. Liberal democracy in 
Thailand has advanced much. More people than ever advocate constitutionalism. Yet 
fundamentalism has also become more radical. This research will introduce recent Thai 
scholarship, adding more depth to our current understanding.           
 
D. Research Contribution: Understanding Southeast Asia and its Violence 
 
Without separation of the state and religion, Buddhism remains one of the most powerful 
political institutions in Thailand. In recent years, Thailand has witnessed Buddhism’s growing 
influence in law and politics. Buddhist monks have led political demonstrations and 
government-initiated public policies that favour Buddhist values. This trend has worried 
religious minorities as well as moderate Buddhists as the state seems to be becoming less 
tolerant. 
 
Thailand’s experience is not unique. Other Buddhist-dominant countries, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, 
and Cambodia, have seen the rise of Buddhist fundamentalism too.52 Buddhism then incites, 
or aggravates, religious tensions in these states, sometimes resulting in violence. Myanmar is 
the extreme example where the Buddhist-majority government endorses atrocities upon 
Rohingya Muslim in Rakhine. In Sri Lanka, Buddhist national identity helps exclude the Tamil, 
who are Hindu, from politics. Thailand also faces a Buddhist-Muslim conflict in the Deep 
South region, which has claimed thousands of lives. 
 
Without understanding Buddhist constitutionalism, no one can understand how laws and 
politics in these Buddhist-dominant countries are formulated. This research will explain how 
traditional Buddhist thought influences the modern legal and political system and the 
consequences for the rights and liberties of citizens. The case of Thailand can help predict 
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future conflicts as well as provide examples for other Buddhist-countries to avoid the same 
pitfalls. Secularization may be unrealistic, but the hope of a moderate Buddhist liberal 




II. The Development of Thai Buddhism 
 
How does an Indic religion become an integral part of Southeast Asia? The region is known as 
the stronghold of Theravada Buddhism, and Thailand has one of the highest percentages of 
Buddhist population.1 The answer is through much fostering, co-optation, as well as 
suppression. Although the present form of Thai Buddhism is largely the product of the religious 
reform a hundred years ago, its roots go much further beyond the birth of the Thai state. Over 
seven centuries, Buddhism has become integral to Thailand’s identity, distinct and indigenous. 
The objective of this chapter is to trace that development, which is necessary to conceptualise 
how Thais understand Thai Buddhism today. One caveat is that this chapter offers a brief 
outline of a very rich and complex history. It cannot go into the details of some events, which 
will be discussed in much greater length in later chapters. 
 
According to Thai tradition, the arrival of Buddhism in Southeast Asia is often credited to the 
story of two monks, Sona and Uttara, commissioned by King Asoka of India to spread the word 
of Buddha in Suvarnabhumi, as Southeast Asia was then known, in the 3rd century BCE.2 The 
truth is less exciting. Suvarnabhumi had laid down an important trade route that connected 
India and China, so people on both sides of the Gulf of Bengal had been in contact with one 
another from prehistoric times. Buddhism may have arrived as early as during Buddha’s 
lifetime in the 5th century BCE.3 It is possible that waves of Indian merchants introduced Indian 
civilization, both Hinduism and Buddhism, to natives but Buddhism was far more popular for 
it was not tied to the caste system.4 Later, monks would arrive to establish the proper monastic 
order. Although the exact date is still disputable, archaeological evidence suggests that 
Buddhism had been established in Suvarnabhumi no later than the first or second century CE.5 
The western mainland, where the Mon and Pagu Empires were located, was influenced by 
Theravada Buddhism, while the archipelago and eastern mainland, the Sri Vijaya and Khmer 
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Empires, saw Mahayana become the predominant branch.6 In the central plains where Thai 
settlements would emerge, excavation of the Dvaravati civilization around the 6th century CE 
confirms that Buddhism had by then become firmly established.7 The central plains had first 
been influenced by Mahayana forms before Theravada took over as the chief influence.  
 
Tai kingdoms emerged around seventh to eighth century CE.8 Tai-speaking ethnic groups 
spread from north and central Vietnam westwards but they only successfully founded their 
kingdoms, i.e. Lanna, Lanxang, Sukhothai, and Ayutthaya, in what is today Thailand and Laos, 
between the powerful ancient empires of Mon and Pagu in the west and Khmer in the east.9 
They soon learnt about Indian civilization from powerful neighbours and became Indianized, 
a process which thereon distinguished them from their non-Indianized cousins.10 Even their 
name, Tai, was changed into the Pali form of Thai.11 Since then, Buddhism was woven into 
every aspect of Thai life. It was central to the performing of communal rituals and ceremonies 
as well as inspiring art and literature. It guided people’s morality and ethics. More importantly, 
it formed the basis of political thought which continues to the present day.  
 
A. Buddhism of the Ancient Kingdoms 
 
The official history of Siam, as Thailand was then called, began with the Kingdom of 
Sukhothai, which gained independence from the Khmer Empire in the thirteenth century CE. 
The official narrative describes a simplified, linear, story of succession from Sukhothai to 
Ayutthaya to Thonburi to Bangkok. While it makes following the development easier, it tends 
to overlook the more complex and diverse reality of the many other Tai kingdoms that would 
later be subsumed by Bangkok.12  
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Sukhothai was said to be a paternalistic regime where kings ruled in a fatherly manner; it was 
an ideal example to which later generations would aspire. Two Sukhothai kings in particular 
set the standard of the appropriate behaviour for good Buddhist kings for later dynasties to 
follow. King Ramkhamhaeng the Great (c. 1279 CE) invited an erudite monk from the South 
to teach Buddhism to his subjects, thus establishing a relationship that would last over 700 
years.13 According to a stone inscription, the king regularly attended Dhamma sermons. To 
demonstrate his strong faith, he would let a monk preach from his throne, a symbolical gesture 
that connected the monarch and Buddhism.14 However, it was his grandson, Li Tai (1347-1364 
CE) who made serious use of Buddhism in political campaigning. His kingdom was losing 
power to the rising neighbour from the south, the Ayutthaya Kingdom, so he incorporated 
Buddhism as part of his appeal and to consolidate his legitimacy.15 He called himself the first 
Maha Dhamma Raja, that is, the Great Dhamma King. Li Tai was the first king to be ordained, 
a precedent that has been continued up to the present day.16 His most important contribution 
was the book “Trai Phum Phra Ruang” (Three Worlds of King Ruang) which describes the 
world according to Theravada cosmology. Although his foreword dedicates the work to his 
mother, it had a profound political impact.17 According to the Trai Phum universe, gods, men, 
animals, demons, and other spirits are born into their classes as the consequence of their merit.18 
High merit results in high birth and vice versa, confirming the determinative consequences of 
kamma and the stratification of social status.19 Trai Phum thus helped form the patronage 
system where the higher-born patronized the lower-born in exchange for obedience. At the top 
sat the king, the noblest of all.20 Duties were set for each class. Such a belief justified the socio-
political order of Sukhothai, and subsequent kingdoms, as it endorsed the monarchical rule in 
light of Buddhist beliefs.21 Li Tai's strategy worked for a brief period but Sukhothai was 
eventually annexed into Ayutthaya in the fifteenth century CE. These ideals and traditions were 
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then adopted and mixed with the Hindu concept of divine kingship that Ayutthaya adopted 
from the Khmer Empire.22 
 
At the local level, Buddhism relied on nearby lay communities to sustain it. Monks are likened 
to the fertile field where villagers sow their merit and a monastery offered the opportunity for 
those wishing to do so, to leave the mundane world.23 The role of monks went even beyond 
salvation since they often possessed shamanistic knowledge and power on how to deal with 
spirits e.g. making amulets, holy water, and praying through sacred chants.24 This is the basis 
of the monastic-lay mutual relationship. At the top level, Buddhism relied on the patronage of 
the king. 
 
Under the patronage of the Ayutthayan kings, Buddhism prospered. Yet why did Siamese kings 
support Buddhism? Ancient Southeast Asian kingdoms were not defined by a fixed territory 
but were characterized by the concept of mandala, a political entity with fluid territory.25 The 
size of the mandala waxed and waned according to the level of barami, or perfection, of each 
king.26 Barami was not derived from a written law or even bloodline. A king gained barami 
from a religious source of gaining bun, or merit. A king with higher barami would see his 
empire expand and vice versa. Fluidity means that two or more empires might overlap, or a 
vacuum might exist where no king’s barami reached. Barami was not static so it had to be 
maintained constantly.27 He who depleted his barami could be challenged by a more perfect 
candidate. Even wars between Ayutthaya and other empires were ascribed to the contest of two 
kings’ barami, with the loser the less perfect. 
 
As a result, Siamese kings relied heavily on religious legitimacy. They portrayed themselves 
as a patron, supporting and protecting Buddhism. On the individual and personal level, a king 
had to appear guided by Buddhist principles. Particularly important is that he must adhere to 
the ten virtues of the king, dasavidharajadhamma, which would help him rule justly and 
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peacefully.28 He had to care for the sangha. So, temples were built and alms given. Patronage 
also meant intervention. To avoid schism and maintain the purity of the sangha, a king could 
give monks instruction and disrobe monks who failed to learn the dhamma and behave 
accordingly. Buddhism in Ayutthaya prospered so much that a delegation of monks was sent, 
as requested, by King Songtham to restore Buddhism in Sri Lanka after the Hindu destruction 
in 1753 CE.29  
 
A more Machiavellian perspective of the royal patronage of Buddhism is that it was for security 
reasons.30 Another strongman could, at any time, claim religious backing to topple the present 
king because succession was not strictly hereditary. This rule was evident as the Ayutthayan 
throne changed hands, there having been over five different dynasties. Monks had to be 
controlled to ensure that they would not support other lords who may threaten the incumbent 
ruler.  
 
Ayutthaya was also the period when Siam came into contact with Islam and Christianity. Prior 
to this period, Muslim settlements were peripheral, Chinese Muslims in the North and Malay 
in the South.31 Persian merchants then arrived in Ayutthaya around 1595-1602 CE,32 with 
Catholic Europeans arriving soon after in the sixteenth century CE.33 These religious minorities 
were welcomed as the Siamese court found their presence beneficial to its economy.34 They 
were tolerated as a show of the king’s barami. A residential area was assigned to each group, 
which lived under the supervision of its own leader.35 Nonetheless, their stays were welcomed 
only as long as they did not pose a threat to the government. When Ayutthaya aristocrats 
became suspicious of Catholic influence over King Narai, a coup expelled almost all Christians 
in 1688 CE.36 
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The fall of Ayutthaya to the Burmese army in 1767 CE created a brief power vacuum and with 
it ensuing chaos. One warlord was able to defeat other warring groups and crowned himself 
King Taksin of Thonburi, the new capital further south toward the river mouth. Among his 
enemies was the monk-turned-warrior, Phra Fang, who used his spiritual charisma to attract 
followers and who attempted to claim the temporal throne.37 Here was another example of how 
a monk could pursue his own ambitions without control. The end of Taksin illustrated another 
rare example of a temporal king overstepping his authority in the spiritual realm and depleting 
his merit.38 Taksin claimed that he had attained a beginner’s level of enlightenment and so 
demanded monks to treat him as Buddha.39 Those who refused were punished. His behaviour 
was considered to be highly disrespectful of the sangha. Rumours circulated that the king had 
lost his sanity and so a rebellion ensued. Phraya Chakri, his aide, successfully crushed the 
rebellion but executed Taksin, whose merit had allegedly been lost.40 Interestingly, Taksin’s 
background as a Sino-Siamese may have played a critical role in convincing the remaining 
Ayutthaya aristocrats to topple this estranged king.41   
 
B. Revival and Reform in the Early Bangkok Era 
 
When Chakri crowned himself King Rama I of Bangkok in 1782, he publicly set the restoration 
of Buddhism as one of his top priorities.42 During the war, temples were burnt and monks 
misbehaved as authority broke down. Taksin’s assertion of control over the sangha did not help 
either. A new temple was built within the palace to house the Emerald Buddha, which was 
brought from Vientiane in Laos as the token of Siamese victory over Lan Chang and the 
palladium of the newly established Bangkok.43 Monks who gave in to Taksin’s order were 
punished whereas those who resisted were rewarded, correcting the wrongful precedent.44 Most 
importantly, King Rama I convened a council of learned monks and scholars to review the 
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Tipitaka.45 He was personally involved as a patron in the project to rebuild orthodoxy, an act 
of great merit. Once the recension was finished he went on to review the law, signifying the 
nexus between the temporal law and the transcending law of Buddha. Once political hegemony 
was restored, Buddhism prospered once more.  
 
From the second half of the 19th century CE, Thai Buddhism underwent the most significant 
reform, in the formative and defining stage of modern Thai Buddhism. Buddhist kingdoms 
throughout Asia were facing the threat of colonization. Sri Lanka and Myanmar had already 
fallen to the British Empire, while the French approached Laos and Cambodia. In addition to 
the political threat, Siam was intellectually challenged by the arrival once more of Christians 
whose scientific thought and the resulting advanced technologies questioned Siam’s Buddhist 
worldview.46 Hence, the Bangkok ruling class felt the urgent need to modernize Siam and 
transform it into a nation-state.  
 
Modernization changed the traditional cosmic society into a rational scientific one.47 A modern 
monarch no longer relies on a mythical religious source of legitimacy but on law. A new nation-
state would bring all tributary kingdoms under a central authority and bind every subject to a 
common identity.48 A result of this conundrum, of abandoning an obsolete past and building 
the past anew, is the Buddhist reform under three successive kings. Some old incompatible 
elements were to be forsaken while the new ‘traditions’ added. 
 
The religious reforms began with Mongkut, who had been ordained as a monk for 27 years 
prior to his ascension as King Rama IV (1851-1868). Mongkut the monk was dissatisfied with 
syncretism in conventional Buddhism so he founded the orthodox sect of 
Thammayuttikanikaya.49 Thammayutthikanikaya or Thammayut would later help spread 
Mongkut’s reinterpretation of Buddhism which abandoned animistic and Hindu elements while 
insisting on the rationalistic quality of Buddhism.50 Mongkut advocated returning to the canon 
with less focus on rituals. Unfortunately, Mongkut’s intervention also led to an enduring and 
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bitter sectarian fight. Because of its history, the Thammayut sect is always considered elitist, 
with royal affiliations, while the remaining local variants are lumped into Mahanikaya, the 
majority but also the less prestigious sect.51  
 
However, the Buddhist reform did not end with Mongkut. His son, King Chulalongkorn (1868-
1910) continued the reforms. Chulalongkorn’s project was to build a modern state. Local 
power, including religious power, had to be centralized.52 In parallel with establishing the 
central bureaucracy, in 1902, Chulalongkorn passed the sangha law that create the official 
order, the Thai Sangha, under which every monk and temple was brought.53 This was not the 
first time the king’s legislation interfered with the sangha. Rama I had issued kod mai phra 
song [monk law] to regulate the behaviour of monks.54 His successors had repeated such 
efforts, with very limited success. Beyond Bangkok, the local sangha fell under the power of 
local lords so Bangkok’s law was virtually meaningless.55 Chulalongkorn’s law was the first 
intended to be enforced throughout the kingdom. Moreover, it did not in substance concern 
trivialities such as discipline but with restructuring Thai Buddhism itself. His reform helped 
subjugate local resistance. He successfully suppressed millenarian uprisings in Siam’s newly 
annexed territories.56 His policy worked well in the North and Northeast,57 but failed in the 
South where Malay Muslims formed the majority.58 The conflict here continues to the present 
day.        
 
The Sangha employed both carrot and stick to lure, appeal, and coerce local Buddhist offshoots. 
Ordination became tightly controlled. An eligible preceptor had to get a licence from the 
Sangha.59 At the same time, compliant monks were also awarded honorific titles and salaries.60 
However, not all went well. Changes were met with local resistance but eventually the Sangha 
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prevailed. Some unorthodox beliefs persisted but at the very least local monks accepted the 
new hegemony over their local patrons. In this sense, Siam’s behaviour was similar to that of 
other colonial powers in their attempts to control natives.61 The social implications of 
Chulalongkorn and his reforms, nevertheless, were that it transformed monks from members 
of the local community, masters of communal ceremonies, and spiritual advisers into members 
of a highly organized order whose goal was no longer to serve the community but to study the 
canon and gain promotion through the official ranks.62 This weakened the sangha-laity mutual 
relationship.    
 
What was the true extent of Mongkut-Chulalongkorn Reform? Mongkut, a rationalist, on his 
deathbed, refused a visit from Christian doctors and insisted on traditional medicine.63 
Eventually he was convinced that his merit had emptied so he had to depart the world. 
Chulalongkorn, Siam’s first modern king, is honoured as the royal Buddha (Phra Puttha Chao 
Luang) for his majesty’s great service. In this sense, the sangha reform is just another form of 
purification a dhammaraja performs to rescue Buddhism in distress.64 Nidhi concludes that the 
reform has replaced Buddhist explanation of science and experience with western scientific 
rationality. But it does not challenge the religious truth which concerns ideas about authority 
and legitimation.65 Most importantly, the reform’s final achievement is to confirm Buddhism’s 
compatibility, and even superiority, among world religions.66  
 
The final major step in constructing modern Thai Buddhism was that taken by Chulalongkorn’s 
successor, King Vajiravuth. In 1925, the Oxford-educated king adapted the God, Country, and 
Queen motto to that of Nation, Religion, and King, the trilogy of what, according to him, 
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defined Thainess.67 Vajiravuth’s religion referred specifically to Buddhism.68 His definition 
provided Thais with a common identity that bound all to the newly created political unit known 
as the Thai state. It strengthened the sense of belonging to one community, the sentiment 
necessary to unite all against others, in other words, the Christian British and French.  
 
Over the reigns of three able kings, Siam became a modern nation-state bound by a collective 
sense of national identity under a strong centralized government. Most importantly, it was able 
to maintain independence. Clearly, Buddhism played an important role in the process and was 
incorporated into the state’s mechanism. In other words, Thailand underwent modernization 
without secularization.  
 
C. The Revolution and Turbulent Years  
 
Thai Buddhism was greatly challenged in 1932 when absolute monarchy was put to an end by 
a group of democratic revolutionists. However, the 1932 Revolution was not as radical as it 
may sound. The People’s Party, as the group was called, had no plans to secularize or 
republicize Siam. Indeed, they faced the reverse challenge that Mongkut had faced. While 
Mongkut had tried to preserve traditional Siam while appearing modern enough to Western 
eyes, the People’s Party sought to modernize the country without abandoning its traditional 
roots. Still, the Buddhist king had now become a constitutional monarch, and the duties towards 
Buddhism were shared with civilian politicians.  
 
One consequence of the 1932 Revolution was the introduction of a new strain of Buddhism: 
socialist Buddhism. Southeast Asia was then brewing with nationalist movements calling for 
independence from the imperialist powers. These nationalists aspired to a Buddhist nation with 
a socialist economic policy.69 This sentiment greatly influenced the revolutionists in Siam who 
experimented with a new interpretation of Buddhist teachings to justify the new political and 
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economic order.70 Moreover, political liberation inspired liberation within the Sangha. 
Younger monks protested against discrimination against the non-elitist Mahanikai.71 The 
Sangha Act (1902) was replaced by the 1941 law that set a new structure, with the separation 
of power, and fairer treatment of Mahanikai.72 This experiment was, unfortunately, short-lived 
as the Sangha establishment was upset with the innovation.73 Unfortunately, the democratic 
system, which fostered the new administration, was itself made very fragile by the strife among 
factions in the People’s Party. The volatile period effectively ended in 1959 when the military, 
with support from conservatives, staged a coup, ousting Pibun, the last member of the People’s 
Party.74 Thailand was plunged into an authoritarian military dictatorship. Field Marshall Sarit 
Thanarat, the ardent royalist military leader, reintroduced the traditional sangha structure in the 
1962 law.75  
 
Sarit’s Thailand came under the threat of communism. His strategy to counter the movement 
included promoting the monarchy and Buddhism, calling Thais to unite to guard the two 
institutions from the atheistic communists. He portrayed himself as a paternalistic leader, high 
in barami, and the representative of the king.76 Even monks were asked to join the fight and 
non-conformist members were investigated for being communist.77 His carrot and stick 
technique resembled that of the ideal Buddhist ruler. Buddhist involvement in the anti-
communist campaign even went as far as one high-profile abbot urging, publicly, the right-
winged militia to massacre activist students for the good cause.78    
 
With the decline of the threat of communism, the Sangha has also declined. The Sangha’s 
archaic organization and aging members failed to enforce any accountability. Immense wealth, 
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absolute reverence, and weak discipline came with several high-profile scandals.79 Monks were 
reported to be living luxurious lifestyles, breaking vows of celibacy, and committing various 
crimes, from drug abuse to embezzlement to murder.80 One temple was found to be involved 
in the organized crime of wildlife trafficking.81 Public faith in the Sangha dropped. Most Thais 
still remained Buddhist but they did not feel the need to belong to the official order.82 At the 
same time, economic and political liberalization opened up a new space for religious products 
to satisfy the emerging middle-classes whose concerns were more about worldly success than 
salvation.83 Some followed celestial monks who they claimed to have blessed their businesses. 
Others opted for fundamentalist groups that offered an escape from the mundane materialistic 
world. These alternatives inevitably undermined the Sangha’s hegemony. Despite the immense 
power vested in the Sangha, it failed to contain these budding movements as it was shown to 
be too incompetent. The problem of competency was exacerbated by deteriorating health of 
the Sangha Raja, the Supreme Patriarch, since 2004.84 The virtual power vacuum left the 
highly-centralized Sangha in chaos. The sense of crisis would later convince many monks to 
adopt a radical view on the state-sangha relationship; since 1997, they began campaigning for 
Buddhism as a state religion which has continued to the present day.85 
 
Among the new Buddhist movements, the two most outstanding groups which attracted large 
numbers were Santi Asoke and Dhammakaya. Santi Asoke was an anti-materialistic, 
fundamentalist group which was critical of the Sangha’s laxity and wealth.86 Santi Asoke’s 
refusal to accept the Sangha’s hegemony led to its expulsion from the order but it was still 
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allowed to practise. The Sangha tried but failed to eliminate this deviant group.87 Dhammakaya, 
on the contrary, was a pro-materialistic temple which appealed to businesspersons and those 
who sought worldly success.88 Its wealth and rapid expansion provoked a backlash from the 
public which perceived it as being un-Thai.89 This controversial temple was also implicated in 
a high-profile embezzlement case but its political connections, within the Sangha and with 
politicians, enabled it to get out of trouble.90  
 
D. Democratic Backsliding and the Rise of ‘Khon Dee’ Politics  
 
While the Thai Sangha was plunging into crisis, Thai Buddhism did not. Buddhism’s belief in 
social and political hierarchy was reflected in the design of the 1997 Constitution. The 1997 
Political Reform, whose objective was to consolidate democracy in Thailand, designed a 
vibrant electoral process with strong guardianship.91 The 1997 Constitution created the 
Constitutional Court and other independent watchdog agencies to safeguard parliament from 
abuses. This guardianship emphasized the importance of unelected, yet morally superior, 
watchdogs in contrast to the untrustworthy politicians.92 Later, these watchdog agencies would 
contribute to the growth of ‘Good People Politics’ where good people, or khon dee, were 
deemed as being more entitled to rule the uninformed majority.93  
 
The political crisis that triggered khon dee politics began in 2005 with anti-government 
protests. The then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was accused of abuse of power and 
corruption.94 In addition, he sparked the Sangha’s fury when he proposed the introduction of a 
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financial and property audit as well as appointing an acting Supreme Patriarch in place of the 
Head of the Thai Sangha, who had been too ill to perform his duties.95 Like King Taksin, 
Thaksin lacked enough barami to intervene in the Sangha and so faced a severe backlash as 
some monks joined the anti-Thaksin movement, mostly from within the royalist conservative 
upper and middle classes.96 Thaksin was portrayed as a demon whose goal was to destroy 
Thainess: the king and Buddhism. The protest was characterized as a battle between good and 
evil, and so it became a moral fight where the anti-government protesters were convinced that 
they were entitled to violate the law and rights for a greater goal. They became known as the 
Yellow Shirts from their campaign colour.97 Regarding Thaksin’s supporters, the majority 
came from the lower middle classes in the provinces in the North and Northeast, and they 
responded by forming the Red Shirts who argued for equality and self-determination.98 The 
two camps were largely divided along geographical, economic, demographic, as well as 
ideological lines.99 Soon, the Yellow Shirt movement transformed from an anti-Thaksin stance 
to an anti-democratic one. The Yellow Shirts grew more radical, advocating a hierarchical 
regime where emphasis was placed on personal morality; that the morally upright individual 
should enjoy more rights and representation than a corrupt one.100 This idea strongly reflected 
the Buddhist political order of Trai Phum Phra Ruang. 
 
Interestingly, a large number of monks joined both colour camps. The fundamentalist Santi 
Asoke was a key alliance in the anti-Thaksin camp while Dhammakaya, with whom Thaksin 
had forged a good relationship, sided with the Red Shirts.101 However, there were also many 
more monks who shared a similar background to that of Thaksin’s supporters who also joined 
the Red Shirt movement.102 Later, a militant monk, Buddha Isara, entered the scene with an 
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inclination to incite violence that made him notorious.103 For monks to be sympathizers of both 
political camps was an unprecedented phenomenon whereby monks openly participated in 
mundane politics. Monks may have previously been involved in politics but such involvement 
was discreet and indirect, as they were normally supposed to appear neutral and distant from 
conflicts.104  
 
As the conflict progressed, it took a more religious dimension. The 2006 coup was followed 
by the turbulent period of 2008-2011 when politics was taken over by khon dee in the judiciary 
and watchdog agencies. Claiming the need to maintain the rule of law, these guardians 
undermined popular consensus by dismissing politicians and revoking major policies.105 These 
events culminated in the 2014 coup when the military, under the auspices of the National 
Council of Peace and Order (NCPO) ousted the government of Yingluck Shinawatra, the 
youngest sister of Thaksin. The NCPO inherited the beleaguered state of Thai.  
 
In a more recent episode in the development of Thai Buddhism, in 2013, the ailing Supreme 
Patriarch passed away. The lawful candidate to the vacant position was accused of being an 
affiliate of the Dhammakaya, leading to strong disproval from both the anti-Dhammakaya and 
anti-Thaksin groups.106 Within the Sangha, there was a growing strong sense of religious 
nationalism calling for the establishment of Buddhist supremacy, an idea much inspired by the 
Burmese Sangha which was waging war on Muslim Rohingya.107 The NCPO announced that 
it would carry out reforms.108 The policy may partly have been to appease its conservative 
nationalist supporters but it may also have been because the unpopular NCPO felt the serious 
lack of any legitimacy to rule, and so supplemented the democratic deficiency with a religious 
aura. 
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The outcome of the NCPO’s policy on Thai Buddhism was mixed. On the one hand, the 2017 
Constitution109 gave Thai Buddhism special status, bringing it closer to the full 
establishment.110 However, this new status resulted in discontent from other religions.111 It 
successfully blocked the nomination of Phra Somdej Maha Ratcha Mungkalajarn, the Supreme 
Patriarch candidate, and appointed a more neutral Phra Somdej Maha Muneewong. The NCPO 
mobilized forces to crack down on the controversial Dhammakaya, whose abbot had fled to 
avoid arrest. Lastly, it amended the Sangha Law to bring the appointment of Sangha Council 
members under the discretion of the king.112 The change re-strengthened monarchical-monastic 
relations which monks often argued had been weakened since 1932 and the process of 
democratization. The change coincided with the ascension of the new king, King 
Vajiralongkorn, after the passing of his father, King Bhumibol, whom Thais widely regarded 
as the modern Dhammaraja. On the other hand, the NCPO failed to address the chronic problem 
of accountability. The plan to introduce transparency and audits in the Sangha faced strong 
resistance from within, fearing that the lay government was interfering with sacred men’s 
business.113 Again, the NCPO lacked enough barami to intervene in the affairs of the Sangha.  
 
Nevertheless, whereas the NCPO may not be able to introduce accountability for the Sangha, 
it has been able to restore some sense of order. The crackdown on the Dhammakaya was one 
example where it successfully dealt with the rogue temple amidst much condemnation from 
angry monks. More importantly, it made a high-profile arrest of senior abbots for financial 
corruption and another arrest of Buddha Isara, the militant monk, for lèse majesté.114 Other 
lesser-known cases of monks who became too vocal or posed too great a security risk were 
also swiftly dealt with.115 The NCPO appeared to be on good terms with the new Supreme 
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Patriarch who ordered monks to refrain from making political comments, therefore, restoring 
the separation of the mundane from the spiritual.116 At least, at the top, the political leader and 
spiritual leader were working together to move forward the twin traditional wheels of the 
mundane and the Buddhist worlds. Below, monks of lowly status remain defiant, and resentful 
of the government’s attacks on their fellow monks. They are advocating more political 
participation e.g. demanding voting rights and backing a Buddhist political party.117 Most 
importantly, the crisis of the decline in public faith remains a serious issue.  
 
E. Becoming Thai Buddhism  
 
The 700-year development of Thai Buddhism unsurprisingly corresponds to the mainstream 
Thai historiography, which Thongchai Winichakul describes as royalist nationalistic. This 
historiography writes of a nation, with a long line of continuity from Sukhothai to Bangkok, 
which always faced constant threat, from the Burmese, and then the western imperial powers, 
but which is always saved by very able kings.118 Thai Buddhism is understood in the same way, 
always under threat, from invasion, from internal disunity, from Christianity, Communism, 
materialism, Islamic terrorism, and recently, immoral anti-establishment politicians. But it has 
always been saved, at least up to 1932, by benevolent, pious, Buddhist kings. Thus, Thai 
Buddhism cannot survive, many are convinced, without state patronage, making Thailand a 
caesaropapist state.   
 
The notion of barami-based political authority remains very strong. Even after the major 
reforms of over a century ago, traditional political thought remains prevalent among 
conservative factions. So does traditional legal thought. The Mongkut-Chulalongkorn reforms 
touched only upon the private aspects of Thai Buddhism; rejecting or reinterpreting 
supranatural tales; or revising religious ceremonies. The interest in the Pali canon, which 
Mongkut initiated through the Thammayut order, continues up until the present day, offering 
spiritual guidance as regards the personal problems of Thais. However, the reforms, and 
subsequent development, did not modernize the ideas of Thai Buddhism as concern politics 
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and law. The reforms themselves are often described as modern. However, scholars revisiting 
the event now offer a different view. The reforms actually fit the traditional duty of the king to 
protect and rescue the Sangha when crisis strikes.119 In this light, Mongkut and 
Chulalongkorn’s modernizing attempt was also very traditional, enforcing the Buddhist 
kingship ideal.  
 
However, those reforms have had a long-lasting impact. Indeed, they were the birth of modern 
Thai Buddhism. Given its condition at birth, Thai Buddhism is reactive; its identity formed by 
competition with, first, Christian missionaries who questioned its logic, and later, Islam which 
required a considerable level of state accommodation. Thai Buddhism may appear tolerant but 
it will surely ask for the state’s intervention should it feel threatened.  
 
The reform is both the point of pride as well as of painful past. Thai Buddhism managed to 
survive and flourish, but it was forced to embrace new ideas and abandoned the good old time. 
Throughout this dissertation, works from the Buddhist intelligentsia have been cited which 
have tried to battle with, and co-opt western ideas into Thai Buddhism. Regrettably, the reforms 
ossify further development in Thai Buddhism. Much of the present problems with Thai 
Buddhism can be traced to a century ago.  
 
Another event which influenced Thai Buddhism was the 1932 Revolution. As it forever 
changed the system of absolute monarchy, many Buddhists believe that it was the beginning 
of the downfall of Thai Buddhism, regardless of the truth.120 Any democratic experiment within 
the Sangha has thus been seen in a negative light. Socialist Buddhism went extinct as soon as 
the People’s Party collapsed. This resentment contributes significantly to the rise of religious 
nationalism and the traditional legal authority against the modern liberal democratic 
constitutionalism the liberal fraction endeavours to install.121 The interplay between these 
traditional and modern ideas will be laid out in the following chapters.
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III. Religions in the Thai Legal System: Constitutional Arrangements 
 
As the previous chapter shows, Buddhism has become a key part of the Thai state. With no 
concept of separation, and little interruption of traditional political authority, the deep 
entanglement of Buddhism and the state occurs in many areas, including ideology, political 
structure, as well as in the legal system. Yet how does Buddhism influence law? This chapter 
explores Buddhism’s presence in the Thai legal system. It examines Thailand’s legal system in 
order to learn what the Buddhist-influenced law of a modern Theravada Buddhist country is 
like. Thailand might have fended off colonization but in so doing it was pressured to modernize 
the country and its legal system, so this continuity should provide a fine case study of the 
Theravada legal model.  
 
The focus is on religious governance, that is, on how the state regulates religions. There are 
other areas of law where Buddhism is also influential, for example, in criminal law, law on 
gambling, alcohol consumption, or abortion. But the laws governing religious affairs are where 
Buddhist influence is most conspicuous. This study will look not just at the law on Buddhism, 
but also the overall policy on religions, as it presumes that Buddhism influences not only the 
law concerning itself but the law regarding other religions, too.  
 
Benjamin Schonthal recognizes two types of law that concern Buddhists in the Theravada 
countries of Sri Lanka and mainland Southeast Asia, borne out of reciprocity and tension 
between the state and Buddhism; the state is supposed to both provide for and discipline 
Buddhism.1 The law in a Buddhist country must reflect both duties. The first group of law 
requires the state to protect the welfare of Buddhism. The second group authorizes the state to 
oversee monastic issues, such as the administration of organized Buddhist orders, management 
of properties, and monastic conduct. In other words, they are laws on the accommodation and 
regulation of Buddhism. The first group is set at the constitutional level while the second is 
often that of statutes and administrative orders.2 Arguably the hierarchical difference implies 
the priority of the state’s policy. Together, they constitute a huge body of law. Due to its sheer 
size, it is divided into two chapters. 
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This chapter covers the first type of Schonthal’s dichotomy, but with significant modification. 
Support and control often come together so the distinction is less clear-cut than described 
above. This chapter concerns the state’s constitutional obligation to Buddhism. It looks at how 
constitutions design the state’s basic relationship with religions, especially with Buddhism. 
This provides the basis of state accommodation of Buddhism. But the constitution also contains 
the provision on rights and liberties so the chapter includes discussion of the constitutional 
guarantee of individual religious freedom. 
 
The ancient kingdom of Siam was a Buddhist kingdom. The 1932 Revolution ended that 
tradition and replaced the absolute monarchy with a constitutional form of government. Despite 
the change, the belief in Buddhist legitimation did not wither away. The duty to support and 
promote Buddhism was subsequently shared between the king and civilian leaders, and is 
manifested in the Thai constitutional text and political conventions. Another change was that 
Thailand eventually embraced the concept of religious plurality, with the constitution 
acknowledging the existence of religious minorities and guaranteeing them basic freedoms. 
This section thus asks what is the modern-day Thailand’s relationship with Buddhism and other 
religions? How does the state express itself as concerns religion? What role does Buddhism 
play in public life, state symbols, and elsewhere? 
 
Here, constitutional law encompasses constitutions, relevant laws, as well as conventions. As 
of May 2019, Thailand has been through 20 ‘permanent’ constitutions, in addition to a few 
‘interim’ ones. This high level of constitutional turnover is caused by an unfinished, ongoing 
democratic transition where liberal democracy is frequently challenged by traditional 
authority.3 The consequence is common interference from the military, which represents the 
elite establishment. As a result, Thailand has experienced constitutions of varying degrees of 
democracy, interrupted by the interim charters of dictator regimes. This chapter focuses on the 
permanent ones which address the topics of the head of state, policy guidelines, and religious 
freedom; the interim charters are often brief and authoritarian in nature so they do not address 
these concerns. The constitutional changes provide an extremely clear record of the dynamics 
of the liberal-conservative struggle in the area of religious policies. 
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A. Head of State  
 
The heart of the state-religion relationship is the king. The ancient Siamese kings reigned as 
Buddhist kings who provided patronage, support and protection to Buddhism in order to gain 
the spiritual merit vital to maintaining the throne. The 1932 Revolution witnessed the arrest of 
several nobles and declared an end to absolute monarchy. King Prajadhipok, who was 
vacationing at the seaside town of Hua Hin, surrendered. However, the traditional duties of the 
monarch passed on into a new era. The constitutional monarch has since still been expected to 
follow the tradition of supporting and protecting Buddhism. His patronage of Buddhism and 
other religions is not merely symbolic; it has powerful political implications.  
 
The first written constitution was promulgated a few days after the revolution on 27 June 1932. 
It was minimal in its substance. The People’s Party, which drafted the document, did not 
mention Buddhism at all. It drew up a basic charter that announced the end of the absolute 
monarchy and boldly claimed that sovereignty belongs to the people. This laid out the new 
structure of the state according to the principle of the separation of the powers and a bicameral 
parliament. The People’s Party represented a new generation of Thais, technocrats, military 
and civilians, of non-noble backgrounds and western educated. Many had studied abroad, 
notably in France. There was little doubt that their constitutional ideas were influenced by these 
backgrounds and so their regime appeared more secular. As King Prajadhipok felt that his 
traditional authority was undermined, he refused to sign the Constitution into effect. A 
compromise was then reached that the king would sign it as a temporary charter, and the 
People’s Party and the king’s advisors had to jointly draft a new constitution, which was 
awarded by the king to the public on 10 December 1932.4 This incident changed the bottom-
up narrative as described in the previous constitution to a top-down one; the king voluntarily 
bestowed upon the people the royally promulgated constitution upon popular request.5 The 
tone was less radical. On 10 December, the 1932 Constitution recognized that: 
 
“The King is a Buddhist and an Upholder of Religions (sasanuphathamphok).”6 
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Thus, the king must profess Buddhism but he must also uphold religions in general. That he 
must be Buddhist shows the continuity of the dhammaraja tradition.7 More important is the 
second mandate as the upholder of religions. The original English translation of the term 
‘sasanuphathamphok’ was the Defender of the Faith but the Constitution Drafting Committee 
rejected the choice because it would have referred specifically to Buddhism.8 Therefore, it is 
clear that the royal patronage extended beyond Buddhism. The relevant clause is described by 
Kasian Tejapira as the golden compromise that averts religious tension.9 On one hand, it fits 
the traditional role of the king whose dhamma comes with altruism, forbearance, and 
uprightness.10 Since the time of Ayutthaya, these dhammas dictated the kings to allow religious 
minorities to reside in the kingdom, as long as they did not pose a threat to Buddhism’s 
dominance.11 On the other hand, it recognizes religious minorities and guarantees their basic 
freedoms, though not religious equality. This provision has remained in place ever since.    
 
What does it mean to be a Buddhist king? Upon coronation, a new king takes an oath that he 
is a Buddhist before the Emerald Buddha, which is regarded as the palladium of the kingdom. 
By law, he has the full authority to appoint monks to various administrative positions in the 
Sangha, from the Sangha Raja down to local abbots; he grants them honorific titles. Moreover, 
a new temple must acquire his permission, as well as sima to mark the sacred sanctuary. These 
duties connect monks personally to the king. Apart from these two duties, there are no exact 
rules on what a king is obligated to perform. However, precedents abound which he is expected 
to follow. These duties can arguably be considered constitutional conventions. Failing to 
honour them would result in a serious political backlash despite there being no formal legal 
sanctions.  
 
Most important is perhaps ordination. This signifies the rite of passage to adulthood, to become 
a complete man. The long-held tradition since King Li Tai dictates that young princes should 
be ordained. Most princes spend only a brief period in the monkhood but some stayed on for 
years or even for life. The most famous is King Mongkut’s son, Prince Vajirayana, who became 
                                               
7 Ishii, Sangha, State, and Society 153. 
8 Prince Wan Waithayakorn, ประวตัิรัฐธรรมนูญไทย ฉบบัแรก พ.ศ. 2475 ถึงฉบับปัจจุบัน [History of Thai Constitutions, from the 
First 132 to Present] (Prajak, 1972) 30. 
9 Kasian Tejapira, Professor of Political Science, Thammasat University, personal communication, (16 August 
2017).  
10 See Payutto, Royal Virtues (Wat Nyanaves 2017) 27-28 




a prince-monk, or Sangha Raja. King Bhumibol had grown up abroad without the opportunity 
to enter into monkhood and so shortly after his ascension, he took leave to be ordained by the 
Sangha Raja at the Royal Temple of Wat Borwornniwet.12 The then Sangha Raja was his 
preceptor and his mentor later succeeded the supreme patriarchal office.   
 
Beyond ordination, the king may further engage in other activities depending on his personal 
interests. The most basic task is alms donation. He may adopt a temple under his royal 
patronage.13 A more sophisticated aspect is that of the king being personally involved in the 
promotion of Buddhism, for example, by composing Buddhist literature, crafting Buddhist arts, 
ordering a recension of the Tipitaka, or disciplining the sangha.14 While some activities seem 
to reflect the king’s personal interest in arts and literature, others may have a more political 
purpose. Buddhist-related literature teaches public morals to the king’s subjects and justifies 
his absolute rule. Kings Mongkut and Chulalongkorn produced a number of works that 
reinterpreted Buddhist values to conform with the Western worldview as part of their 
modernization plans for Siam.15 Their actions reflected the kings’ dedication to and proficiency 
in Buddhism, which greatly enhanced their political legitimacy. In addition, they set an 
example for ordinary Thais to follow.   
 
As the upholder of religions, the king further engages in supporting and promoting other 
religions. In the main, support and promotion means aid and attendance. For example, King 
Bhumibol ordered the translation of the Koran into Thai, to which he personally donated funds; 
He presided over the Maulid, the celebration of the birth of Prophet Muhammad.16 He also 
attended Christian, Hindu, and Sikh functions.17 However, these functions do not appear 
compulsory as are the king's obligations to Buddhism, and thus might not be considered part 
of Thai constitutional convention. 
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B. Symbolism  
 
Closely related to the Head of State is the topic of symbolism, which is not addressed in the 
constitution but is still a significant constitutional convention. Buddhist symbols are 
represented in the Thai flag, state ceremonies, the official calendar, as well as constitutional 
preambles.  
 
The most notable symbol is the flag. King Vajiravuth replaced the traditional flag of Siam, 
with its white elephant on a plain red background, with a modern tricolour flag. Red, white, 
and blue, he explained, represent the three pillars of Thainess, that is, the nation, religion, and 
the monarchy respectively.18 However, white does not simply mean religion in a generic sense. 
King Vajiravuth interpreted white as representing the purity of Buddhism, which all Thais are 
obligated to uphold.19  
 
Vajiravuth also adopted the Buddhist Era (BE) as Siam’s official calendar, making the country 
one of the very few that do not use the Common Era system. The Buddhist Era commences on 
the year that Prince Siddhartha became enlightened and turned into the Lord Buddha in 543 
BCE. Ancient Siam followed a combination of several different lunar calendars. In 1892, King 
Chulalongkorn modified the BE calendar by adopting the Gregorian calendar for the days and 
the months and moving the new year from the first day of the fifth month of the year in the 
lunar calendar, to the first day of April, which fell roughly around the same period.20 This 
modification demonstrated his ingenuity in localizing a universal idea. As a result, all official 
documents, including constitutions and other laws, are dated in BE.21 PM Field Marshall 
Pibunsongkram would later move the New Year to the 1st January to further conform with the 
universal norm.22 However, he kept the BE system. 
 
Another related topic to the calendar is that of public holidays. Each year, the cabinet 
announces the dates of public holidays. In addition to the New Year, other holidays are to 
honour the trilogy of Thainess. These are Songkran (Thai New Year), the Coronation Day, the 
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Chakri Day (founding of the ruling dynasty), the King’s and Queen’s birthday. Then, there are 
the three Buddhist important days of Visakapuja, Makhapuja, and Asarnhapuja.23 They fall on 
the full moon nights of the third, fifth, and eight months of the lunar calendar respectively. 
Visakapuja is the day of the Lord Buddha’s birth, enlightenment, and death.24 Makhapuja 
marks his sermon of the four noble truths at the core teaching of Buddhism.25 Asarnhapuja 
remembers the Lord Buddha’s first sermon and the acceptance of his first disciple.26 Because 
of the discrepancy between the lunar and solar calendar, the dates are not fixed. The cabinet 
announces the exact dates annually. No important day of other religions, such as Ramadan or 
Christmas, or even Chinese New Year, are recognized as public holidays in Thailand. There is 
an exception, though, in the Deep South where Eid al Fitr and Eid al Adha are extra holidays 
observed to appease the Muslim Malays.27  
 
Most state ceremonies are Buddhist-Brahminical in nature.28 They are the product of 
Mongkut’s reforms when he abandoned those of Brahmanical origins and introduced the 
Buddhist events. At least, every year, there are the celebrations of the king’s and the queen’s 
birthdays, the coronation anniversary, the founding of the Chakri dynasty, the Royal Ploughing 
Ritual, and the three Buddhist important days, among others. The role of Brahmans is minimal 
as Buddhism downgrades their status to the servants of the royal court and masters of 
ceremony, not a superior caste. Some are purely Buddhist, for example, the birthday prayer, or 
the changing of robes for the Emerald Buddha statue.  
 
One area in which Buddhist symbols are most prominent in the constitution is in its preamble. 
The 1932 Constitution praises the king who practices the ten royal virtues. The 2017 
Constitution addresses the king in his full title, which is in Pali, the lingua franca of Theravada 
Buddhist lands, with all the blessings.29 The date is given in the Buddhist Era. These decorative 
features sanctify the document. Other laws are dated in BE and refer to the king’s full name as 
well, but in a less grandiose manner.   
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C. Establishment of Buddhism as State Religion  
 
The topic of establishment is highly dynamic, ever-changing as politics becomes less stable. 
There has always been a call to establish Buddhism as a state religion, but only recently has it 
intensified and resistance has grown significantly weaker. The rise of the Buddhist 
establishment movement indicates that a growing number of Thais feel that the guarantee given 
by the Head of State is no longer adequate. Moreover, as the call coincides with political 
liberalization, it serves as a reminder of the dark side of democracy where interest groups may 
abuse their freedom to pursue dangerous agendas.  
 
A decline of public trust in the Sangha in the late 1980s triggered fear among Thais that 
Buddhism may eventually lose its dominant status, which further developed into the proposal 
that the state is obligated to protect and oversee the religion.30 Basically, the wish was to 
strengthen the state-Buddhism relationship, calling the government to do its duty to maintain 
Buddhism’s social status.31 In April 1997, as Thailand was preparing the 1997 Constitution, 
which for the first time allowed greater public participation, a Buddhist advocate group 
submitted a petition to the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) demanding: (1) the state’s 
promotion and protection of Buddhism as state religion, and other religions; (2) the state’s 
promotion of observance and practice of religious principles; and (3) encouragement of 
religious harmony.32 The group was an ad hoc coalition of several famous monks, some were 
known for being highly intellectual and others for holy celestial power, as well as almost 2,000 
religious and social charity organizations.33 Thus, the controversial petition drew huge media 
attention and put great pressure on the CDC.  
 
The establishment of Buddhism as a national religion, or state religion, is not uncommon. 
Cambodia has declared Buddhism the religion of the state.34 Two other countries acknowledge 
Buddhism’s privileged status and demand state promotion and protection. In 1978, the Sri 
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Lanka Constitution gave Buddhism the foremost place and it bestowed upon the state the duty 
to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana (religion) while assuring all religions religious 
freedom.35 (sec 9). Later in 2008, the Constitution of Myanmar employed the same language 
of recognizing the special position of Buddhism as the faith professed by the great majority of 
the citizens (sec 361).36 The only Theravada country that does not display special favour to 
Buddhism is Laos. Bhutan is another country, of the Mahayana school, that recognizes 
Buddhism as its cultural heritage.37  
 
In 1997, supporters cited the ongoing crisis and the need for state support to reverse the trend. 
They also pointed out that Buddhism was already the de facto state religion so the law should 
finally reflect this political reality.38 Opponents argued that, as the de facto state religion, there 
was no need to legally endorse it and it risked stirring religious tension.39 Four percent of Thais 
are Muslim, with the largest concentration in the Deep South, and significant numbers are 
Christians, Hindus, and Sikhs. According to the opponents of the proposal, although the state 
accommodated all these religions, it had already allocated a considerable portion of resources 
to Buddhism; thus, there was no need to establish a state religion.40 The debate was sensational, 
within as well as outside the constitutional assembly.41 Both sides agreed that Buddhism had 
received special favours but their conclusions diverged. Finally, the CDC decided to adopt the 
three demands except the establishment clause in the Chapter on State Policy Guidelines. 
 
“The state shall support and protect Buddhism and other religions, promote 
good understanding and harmony among followers of every religion, and 
encourage application of religious teaching for improvement of ethics and 
quality of life.”42 
 
                                               
35 The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, art. 9. 
36 The Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, art. 361.  
37 The Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan, art. 3. 
38 Boonlert, Personal Memoir 192-196.  See Payutto, ‘ความสําคัญของพระพุทธศาสนาในฐานะศาสนาประจาํชาต’ิ [Importance of 
Buddhism as the State Religion] (12th edn, Wat Nyanaves, 2010).  
39 Minutes of the Constitution Drafting Assembly, 23rd April 1997, 28-29. 
40 Ibid. 29.  
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According to the policy, the state was supposed to (1) support and protect Buddhism and other 
religions, (2) promote good understanding and religious harmony, and (3) encourage religious 
practices. Every religion was included, though the language was clear in asserting that 
Buddhism was the first among equals. The special status was implicitly acknowledged without 
announcing it. Moreover, the state had to take into account the concern of religious harmony. 
Lastly, the state had to actively accommodate religious belief and practices whenever possible 
because it was beneficial to people’s spiritual and material well-being.  Although the policy 
directive was not legally binding, it was generally considered a fundamental policy with 
persuasive authority. This religious policy guideline implied a significant shift in Thailand’s 
formal relationship with religions. Prior to 1997, the relationship was rather symbolic. The king 
was the only person with the traditional duty to uphold Buddhism. The 1997 Constitution 
officially expanded the duty to the state. It shifted Thailand’s stance on religion from rather 
neutral to very weak establishment.  
 
The 1997 Constitution was abolished by the 2006 coup to oust Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra. The coup marked the rise of moral politics which had an effect on Thailand’s 
religious policies for the next decade. The call for to proclaim Buddhism as the state religion 
returned when the CDC prepared the 2007 Constitution draft. Again, the CDC countered the 
proposal by citing the pluralistic nature of Thai society, the de facto favourable treatment of 
Buddhism, and the fear of religious tension. The CDC had a very valid reason for such fears. 
In 2004, the latest round of Muslim Malay insurgency flared up in the Deep South provinces 
and claimed thousands of lives. The CDC managed to resist the call for a full establishment. 
Only a clarification was added; that Buddhism was a religion which the majority of Thais had 
professed for a long time.43 It justified the patronage on cultural reasons, not religious reasons. 
This elaboration was part of the original demand back in 1997.   
 
“The state shall support and protect Buddhism which the majority of Thais 
have followed for a long time and other religions, promote good understanding 
and harmony among followers of every religion, and encourage application of 
religious teaching for improvement of ethics and quality of life.” 
 
                                               




The 2007 Constitution failed to restore order and democracy. Mass demonstrations kept 
erupting in 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2013-2014. In 2014, another coup toppled the government 
of Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s youngest sister, and ended the 2007 Constitution. Buddhist 
groups once again pressured the CDC to adopt the establishment of Buddhism.  
 
The first draft was released in 2015 and was criticised for being hyper-moralistic.44 Although 
the formal relationship with Buddhism remained unchanged, more religious elements were 
noticeably incorporated throughout the text. The draft required candidates for political office 
to be “benevolent and ethical.”45 Repeatedly, the draft mentioned “benevolent and ethical 
people” as an essential component of Thai politics. The draft planned to set up the National 
Moral Assembly to screen the moral standards of candidates to public posts.46 The draft also 
demanded that the Thai people adhere to righteousness.47 Wording for the policy directive also 
differed slightly. 
 
“The state shall patronize and protect Buddhism, which has long been 
professed by the majority of Thai, and other religions, promote good 
understanding and harmony among followers of every religion, and encourage 
application of religious teaching for improvement of ethics, spirit, and 
wisdom.”48 
 
However, the National Council of Peace and Order (NCPO), as the junta is known, decided to 
reject the draft at the last minute because it believed that the draft was inadequate to transform 
the regime into an elected government. Another CDC was appointed and another draft released 
in early 2016. The requirement for morals or ethics disappeared. Instead, a new duty was 
introduced. 
 
“The state shall support and protect Buddhism and other religions. 
 
                                               
44 Duncan McCargo, ‘Peopling Thailand’s 2015 Draft Constitution’, (2015) 37 Contemporary Southeast Asia 
329, 336-338. 
45 Thai Constitution Draft (2015), art. 73. 
46 Ibid, art 74. 
47 Ibid, art. 26 para 2 




By supporting and protecting Buddhism, which is a religion professed by the 
majority of Thais for a long time, the state shall encourage and promote study 
and dissemination of dhamma of Theravada Buddhism for the development of 
spirit and wisdom, and provide measures and mechanisms to prevent 
desecration of Buddhism in whatever forms, and encourage Buddhists to 
participate in the application of those measures or mechanisms.”49 
 
The new policy focuses on patronizing Buddhism and other religions and abandons two other 
objectives; that of religious harmony and accommodating religious practices. So it appears less 
pluralistic and more Buddhist-centric than its two predecessors. It elaborates at length the 
mandate on Buddhism, which is specific only to Theravada Buddhism. Furthermore, it 
mentions the threat of desecration and the need to prevent it, in whatever form. In general, the 
new policy is both aggressive and confusing; aggressive because the desecration clause appears 
militant; confusing because it contains unclear mandates. Theravada Buddhism is a 
problematic term because the criterion to define Theravada has never been firmly established. 
There are ongoing debates about the Theravada-Mahayana distinction, the results of which 
have proven inconclusive.50 Within the Thai Theravada school, orthodoxy and orthopraxy are 
as much diverse as between the two main schools. Besides, although most Thais would identify 
themselves with Theravada, they find no objection in practicing Mahayana rites. The 
Mahayana school is officially under the Sangha Council’s jurisdiction. It has received support 
and protection similar to Theravada. Lastly, no one is certain what the threat of desecration that 
the CDC mentions is. Many Buddhists agreed that the new provision undermined freedom of 
religion.51 
 
The CDC claimed that the change reflected the desire of the public to safeguard Thai Buddhism 
against desecration.52 The overall tone of the policy guideline was no longer accommodating 
but hostile and protective. The protection is granted only to Theravada school of Buddhism. 
Despite the term’s doctrinal ambiguity, the CDC insisted that Theravada is the most authentic, 
                                               
49 Thai Constitution B.E. 2562 (2017), art. 67.  
50 See Analyo, A Note on the Term Theravada. 
51 ‘Draft Charter Sabotages Right to Freedom of Religion: academics, Buddhist monks’ (Prachatai Online 
Newspaper, 12 Apr 2016) <http://prachatai.org/english/node/6036> accessed by 18 June 2019.  
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un-corrupt, form of Buddhism.53 Although the CDC did not specify any threat, be it Muslim 
insurgency, schism, or secularization, the collateral damage is the heightened religious tension, 
especially in the Deep South where Muslim Malays constitute the majority. They voted en 
masse against the 2017 Constitution and there was a series of coordinated explosions as a 
symbolic rejection of this clause.54 The NCPO quickly issued an announcement confirming 
that the state is still committed to supporting and protecting every religion.55 However, it also 
conceded that Theravada deserves greater attention due to its cultural and historical 
importance. Lastly, it blamed the public discontent on people with ill intentions, distorting the 
law to incite disunity and sabotage the government. It ended with ordering government 
agencies to foster religious harmony and monitor the public’s religious practices. The NCPO 
Order 24/2559 has clearly contradicted the constitutional mandate. It confirmed the state’s 
commitment to religious harmony, which the 2017 Constitution had just dropped.  It is not 
clear which mandate overrides which 
 
The new policy is both a symptom of Thailand’s unhealthy political and religious situation as 
well as a harbinger of change. Shortly after the 2014 coup, the military government, with 
conservative leaning, proposed a reform of the Sangha. The consequence was, in 2015, a new 
Buddhist bill that would engage the state more closely to the control of orthodoxy and 
orthopraxy. The bill criminalizes new acts of desecration such as the ordination of an LGBT 
person or heresy.56 A new tribunal would be set up to settle disputes over the right interpretation 
of dhamma and vinaya.57 It allowed larger funding to Buddhism but also introduced audits of 
monastic finances.58 These new measures are seen as promoting and protecting Buddhism at 
the same time. The downsize of the increase in state’s promotion and protection is the decrease 
in the Sangha’s autonomy. However, the new Buddhist bill is still being considered in the 
National Legislative Assembly with no conclusive result. 
 
D. Guarantee of Freedom 
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The last topic set in the constitution concerns not only Buddhism but also religious freedom. 
In principle, a constitution provides a guarantee to every Thai, Buddhist or not. But the scope 
of the guarantee waxes and wanes. Besides, it is unclear how the mandate is to be implemented. 
This section will trace changes in the text and examine some areas where religious freedom is 
a matter of concern. 
 
(a) Constitutional Guarantees 
 
The first constitution of 17th June 1932 contained no rights provision. This appeared in the next 
charter of 10th December 1932. Interestingly, the 1932 Constitution guaranteed all other rights, 
of body, properties, privacy, assembly, and education, among others, in a single section. 
Freedom of religion was recognized in a separate section, which read as follows: 
 
“A person shall enjoy full liberty to profess a religion or a cult59 and liberty to 
exercise a form of worship in accordance with his belief, provided that it is not 
contrary to his civic duties, public order or good morals.”60 
 
The 1932 Constitution distinguished between the internal freedom of thought and conscience, 
which was absolute, and the external freedom of observing, practicing, and disseminating a 
belief, which was subject to civic duties, public order and good morals. Civic duties were listed 
in the constitution, while public order and good morals was a catch-all phrase. Internal freedom 
was extended to a belief, such as Taoism, the status of which as a religion was debatable.  
 
The 1932 Constitution also guaranteed equality to all Thais regardless of their religion. This 
clause has been incorporated in every constitution.61  
 
The 1949 Constitution amended the Freedom of Religion provision as follows: 
 
                                               
59 In Thai, the word is ลทัธิ which may refer to a non-religious belief system e.g. socialism, nationalism, or 
capitalism. But it can also mean a belief system e.g. Taoism, or a cult. There is no accurate translation. 
Sometimes, it is translated into a creed, which is also inaccurate. Here adopts the term ‘cult’ after the Council of 
State’s choice of word.   
60 Thai Constitution (1932), art. 13. 




“A person shall enjoy full liberty to profess a religion, a sect, or a cult, and 
liberty to exercise a form of worship in accordance to his belief, provided that it 
is not contrary to his civic duties, public order, and good morals.  
 
In exercising the liberty referred to in the previous paragraph, a person shall be 
protected from any act of state, which is derogatory to his rights or detrimental 
to his due benefits on the grounds of professing a religion, a sect, or a cult, or 
exercising a form of worship in accordance to his different belief from that of 
others.”62    
 
In 1968, the Constitution prohibited the exercise of any rights, including freedom of religion, 
to the detriment of the nation, religion, and the monarchy.63 The law reflected the fear of the 
rise of communism in Thailand. But no subsequent constitution ever adopted the same general 
prohibition.  
 
The 2007 Constitution expanded the coverage even further: 
 
“A person shall enjoy full liberty to profess a religion, a sect, or a cult, and 
liberty to exercise a form of worship in accordance to his belief, provided that it 
is not contrary to his civic duties, public order, and good morals. 
 
In exercising the liberty referred to in paragraph one, a person shall be 
protected from any act of the State, which is derogatory to his rights or 
detrimental to his due benefits on the grounds of professing a religion, a sect, or 
a cult or observing religious precepts or commandments or exercising a form of 
worship in accordance with his different belief from that of others.”64 
 
Until then, each new constitution followed its predecessors’ standard. The trajectory was to 
keep expanding the protection, going into finer detail. However, the 2017 Constitution states 
that: 
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“A person shall enjoy full liberty to profess a religion, and shall enjoy the liberty 
to exercise or practice a form of worship in accordance with his religious 
principles, provided that it shall not be adverse to the duties of the Thai people, 
neither shall it endanger the safety of the State, nor shall it be contrary to public 
order or good morals.”65 
 
This is a notable, and questionable, departure from long-standing precedent. The scope 
of protection under the 2017 Constitution is narrower than its predecessors. Internal 
freedom is limited to religion, omitting sect and cult. External freedom is restricted to 
worship so personal or private practice is not acknowledged. Moreover, the safety of 
the state is introduced as another ground for restricting freedom of religion. These 
changes indicate that the Thai state is becoming more orthodox and less tolerant. It is 
less inclined to accept non-mainstream groups. Besides, it probably perceives some 
religious groups as a potential threat and feels the need to control religious activities 
more tightly.  
 
The civic duties of Thais, which provide the grounds for restriction of religious 
freedom, are set out in the 2017 Constitution. First and foremost, a person shall protect 
and uphold the nation, religions, the king and the democratic regime with the king as 
the head of state.66 Thus, the exercise of religious freedom can be compromised if it 
conflicts with the notion of Thainess, which implies Buddhist dominance.  
 
How is the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom implemented? For a 
considerably longer period of time, Thailand has been under military-backed 
authoritarian regimes than civilian democratic ones. Given such a record, it can be 
expected that the protection of rights is not rigorous. The entire chapter of rights and 
liberties has not been fully discussed, let alone adjudicated in the court. Even less 
attention has ever been given to freedom of religion so there is no serious study of scope 
or depth researching it. Some scholars are critical of the clause’s brevity, asserting that 
it fails to conform with international standards, such as that of ICCPR.67 Others point 
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out that the state has relentlessly prosecuted non-conformist religious groups.68 
However, this brevity can be interpreted as providing universal coverage of all 
spiritually-related topics too. For example, atheism or proselytization are not prohibited 
so they can be assumed to be legal under constitutional protection. Below, regulations 
and cases concerning various topics are examined in order to understand the meaning 
of the freedom of the religion clause and how the level of protection has risen and fallen 
over the years.  
 
(b) Ensuring Respect for Religion 
 
Thais feel strongly that it is their duty to protect Buddhism from being abused. Stories 
concerning disrespect for Buddhism make headlines and many Thais react angrily. Buddha 
statues have become used for decoration, sometimes in places considered sinful or dirty by 
Buddhist standards, such as pubs or bars where alcohol is sold; Buddha is printed on 
merchandise, e.g. flip-flops and sneakers69 Often, these cases happen abroad. Still, upset Thais 
pressure the government to act, even beyond its jurisdiction.70 Within Thailand, the Ministry 
of Culture once issued a guide on the dos and don’ts according to Thai culture, including those 
that concern the Buddha image. It asks tourists to refrain from buying products with Buddha 
symbols, especially on ‘inappropriate’ products such as alcohol, underwear, or sexual items.71 
Disrespect of a religious image can lead to prosecution under the Penal Code, although 
enforcement is uncommon.  
 
Despite some attempts to propose it, there is no law on blasphemy. The Penal Code 
criminalizes: (1) an act of desecration of an object or a place of worship,72 (2) a nuisance or 
disturbance in a lawful religious assembly, service, or ritual,73 and (3) an impostor of a monk, 
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Bangkok, 27 April 2018) at <https://coconuts.co/bangkok/features/tattoos-toilet-seats-misused-buddha-images-
make-blood-boil/> accessed by 18 June 2019. 
70 Richard Ehrlich ‘False Idols Upset Crusading Buddhists’ Bangkok Post (24 March 2013) at 
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novice priest, or mendicant.74 The objective of these offences is to protect the enjoyment of 
religious freedom in order to uphold religious harmony.  
 
Formerly, the punishments for these offences were rather light, including imprisonment of no 
more than two years and a maximum fine of 14,000 THB. Recently, the National Council of 
Peace and Order overhauled the Penal Code, updating a punishment scheme as a whole. As a 
result, the fine for religious offences increased ten-fold, to 140,000 THB (3,600 GBP).  
 
Not all inappropriate acts constitute the crime of desecration or nuisance. The revered status of 
Buddhism nonetheless results in self-censorship. Buddhism is considered a sensitive topic that 
many artists avoid. There are, though rare, scandals involving paintings or movies that are 
critical of the Sangha or depict monks in a non-ideal light. In most cases, artists have faced 
strong protest and eventually chosen to tone down their message.75 In the cases of movies, a 
controversial piece is unlikely to be approved by the Censor Committee. According to the 
Movie Act, a producer must not product a film which undermines public order and good 
morals, and which may affect national security or pride.76 
 
(c) Rights to Refuse Medical Treatment  
 
A dispute arose between the Christian denomination of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the 
Medical Council of Thailand. The Jehovah’s Witnesses wished to make a statement denying 
blood transfusions in advance. It claimed that this treatment was contrary to its religious beliefs 
and so would like to exercise its religious freedom within Thailand. The Medical Council, 
which represents Thai medical doctors, saw the exercise of such a right being in conflict with 
a doctor’s professional ethics. Refusal to give blood transfusion to a patient might cause death, 
and prompt a charge of manslaughter. The Council of State advised that, in a case when the 
condition was non-life threatening, the statement of denial could be honoured as the exercise 
of religious freedom. If a condition is life-threatening and blood transfusion might save the 
patient, however, that statement was contrary to public order and good morals. According to 
the CCC (sec 150), this statement was void. A doctor who honours such a statement will face 
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criminal and disciplinary action.77 The case set a boundary for the freedom of religion — that 
the exercise of such freedom must not jeopardize life, even with consent from that person.    
 
However, since 2007, the National Health Act permits a person to express his will to refuse 
medical treatment that will only prolong his death, or his will to terminate his sufferance from 
illness.78 The ‘living will’ clause probably overturned the Council of State’s view on the 
consent for denial of treatment and public order and good morals. Provided that the consent is 
given in advanced and in writing, a person can practise his religious conviction without the 
doctor being held liable.  
 
(d) Non-Disclosure of Religious Identity  
 
Thais are required to register for an ID card that contains the personal information of a holder, 
for example, biometrics, blood type, and residence. This information is compulsory but religion 
is optional. Religious identity was once problematic because during the period of communist 
insurgency, state propaganda associated atheism with communism. Not clearly identifying 
one’s religion was therefore a social taboo; however, this is no longer a stigma. A person may 
now choose to answer his religion on the card or not without any fear of sanctions.79  
 
The ID Card Law also accommodates a person whose religion requires the wearing of a 
headscarf. In such a case, that person need not take it off, but still must reveal the face in a 
clearly identifiable manner.80  
 
(e) Religious Leave  
 
Ordination used to be considered an important rite of passage to adulthood. Traditionally, a 
man turning 20 would be ordained for one vassa, or the monsoon season of three months.81 A 
modern lifestyle means that a three-month absence for spiritual education is no longer feasible. 
Many Thais still follow the tradition but at a more flexible time and age. For example, many 
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Thai university students are ordained during the vacations. For employees, the Labour Code 
provides no ordination leave so they have to use up their annual leave.  
 
However, the Civil Service Act allows a civil servant, which is the largest class of government 
employees, to take ordination leave.82 Subject to the discretion of his superior, a civil servant 
who has never been ordained is eligible for up to 120 days of ordination while being paid.83 He 
may exercise his right once throughout his entire service.  
 
The rule benefits largely Buddhist males. However, a 2007 Cabinet Resolution permits female 
civil servants to apply for dhamma practice leave.84 Dhamma practice is not defined in the 
Tipitaka. In general, the term encompasses various types of act, ranging from observing the 
five or eight precepts, to meditation, to living an ascetic life but not ordination. The Sangha 
does not accept female ordination, known as Bhikkhuni. The cabinet resolution allows female 
civil servants to go to practise dhamma at one of the accredited dhamma centres, which might 
not be an official temple. Accreditation is similar to the process of application to build a temple. 
It is carried out by the National Office of Buddhism (NOB), which makes sure the place is 
suitable for practising, space- and ideology-wise.85 A female civil servant may pick one from 
the list, and she is eligible to practise for no more than 3 but no less than 1 month. 
 
Ordination leave in the Civil Service Act is written in a gender-neutral style, but tradition 
dictates that only men are entitled to the benefit. The Cabinet Resolution confers the benefit 
specifically on female civil servants. The time is more flexible for male employees since there 
are no minimum requirements. Prior to the Cabinet Resolution, there had already been a 
program for civil servants, regardless of gender, to attend a dhamma course for 5 to10 days.86 
The Cabinet wished to lengthen the course so they set the minimum requirement at one month.  
 
In addition to individual-initiated ordination, the government sometimes encourages ordination 
for particular purposes. In 2017, for example, as part of the Cremation of King Bhumibol, the 
Cabinet allowed male civil servants to take an extra 15 days of ordination leave, the merit of 
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which was to be conferred on the late king.87 However, such volunteers had to be ordained in 
one of the organized ceremonies.  
 
Because civil servants comprise the largest class of government employees, this policy has a 
far-reaching impact. That is, other agencies follow. Employees of public universities, armed 
forces, and police are now able to apply for ordination leave.88 
 
The Civil Service Act also permits Hajj leave.89 A Muslim civil servant of either gender may 
request leave to go on Hajj pilgrimage, with the length being subject to their superior’s 
discretion. There is no equivalent provision for Christianity or other religions.  
 
Interestingly, those that hold political office, at the national and local levels, cannot claim 
ordination leave. This discrepancy between political and bureaucratic employees is based on 
the principle that Buddhism should remain distant from politics. A monk is barred from 
standing for office as an MP or senator, and so ordination will automatically disqualify an MP 
or senator. The 1952 Local Administration Act disqualifies a member of the local 
administrative organization (LAO) should he or she become a monk.90 Even a traditional 
funeral ordination, where children of the deceased are ordained for a few hours – a symbolic 
merit-making gesture – will lead to his dismissal. The Local Administration Act very clearly 
and stringently separates such affairs regarding religion and state. The law was challenged in 
the Constitutional Court, but the Court found this restriction did not unduly deprive an 
individual of religious freedom.91 The individual’s freedom in this case remained intact but 
when a citizen joins the government, they have to be subject to the government’s regulations. 
The Court mentioned the same restrictions for Members of the House of Representatives and 
the Senate, both elected by the people. The LAO was also elected, not appointed from the 
Administrative branch. However, a member of the LAO could be ordained under the ordination 
program dedicated to King Bhumibol if the program was approved by the Cabinet.92 
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(f) Religious Dress Code  
 
Dress code is no small issue in Thailand. The country is obsessed with the notion of unity. 
Failing to conform with the dress code and standing out from the mass can cause public uproar 
as the act is perceived as one of disunity. In general, Thailand is moving toward the greater 
accommodation of religious dress codes. However, some controversies persist.  
 
The Land Traffic Act requires every motorcyclist and passenger to wear a helmet. But an 
exemption is made for monks, novices, priests, ascetics, or persons whose religion demands 
head cover.93 In addition to Buddhist monks, the main beneficiaries of this exemption are 
Sikhs, who wear turbans. 
 
The Muslim headscarf is another matter. Many Muslim women choose not to cover their heads 
and usually there is no problem. Disputes, however, arise when a person is required to wear a 
uniform. Historically, the topic generated much resentment, on both sides of Buddhists and 
Muslims. The head scarf can sometimes stir paranoia and anxiety among Buddhists and can be 
considered as un-Thai. When Field Marshall Pibun forced Muslim Malays to remove their 
headscarves as part of his assimilation campaign, the policy understandably upset locals so 
much and fueled separatist sentiments.94  
 
Between 1991-1992, a request from a group of Muslim students at Yala Teacher’s College in 
the Malay Muslim-majority Deep South region, caused a month-long standoff. The students 
insisted on practising their faith while the local government, who ran the premises, and later 
on, the central government denied their rights. The standoff sparked wider protests in Bangkok 
and elsewhere, becoming a proxy battle between Buddhism and Islam.95 The key issue at hand 
was that the headscarf was not part of a uniform. At a deeper level, though, wearing a headscarf 
on a uniform was seen by Buddhists as an invasion into the Thai space as set by the rigid rules 
concerning uniforms.96 This dispute occurred during a previous spate of Deep South violence 
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and so the authority was extra-sensitive. However, the dispute ended amicably with permission 
granted after negotiation by the then Education Minister.97  
 
Relaxation of the uniform rule came in 2010. The Office of the Cabinet Regulation No. 94 
(2553) allows a Muslim civil servant to wear a headscarf of sober colour, long-sleeved shirt, 
and long skirt or trousers.98 Again, the rule had a cascade effect with other agencies following. 
 
Yet the problem has not been fully resolved. There are still sporadic reports of hostility toward 
headscarf-wearing Muslims. This problem is especially acute when a Muslim tries to attend a 
public school that is located in or managed by a Buddhist temple. When modern schooling was 
introduced into Siam, the government was short of teachers. The Sangha helped the 
government implement the universal basic education by running schools on their premises. 
One high-profile incident was when a Muslim girl attended a school run by a Buddhist temple 
in Bangkok’s suburb in 2013. She was ordered to leave the school immediately.99 The Office 
of District Education investigated the incident but the results of its findings were never 
disclosed. More recently, in 2018, a Muslim schoolgirl asked for permission from a 
kindergarten in the Deep South to wear a hijab. The school is publicly-funded but situated on 
the land of a Buddhist temple. The Ministry of Education (MOE) Regulation allowed the 
Muslim student to choose whether to wear a normal uniform or one compatible with Islamic 
requirements.100 It also permitted the school to adjust the uniform requirements, but the 
principal refused to.101 However, the Sangha Council Resolution 2/2554 (2011), from a 
previous case, ruled that Muslim students must comply with tradition, custom, Thai values, 
Buddhist values, and the temple’s decision.102 Initially, the government agreed with the girl’s 
plea, seeing it as an opportunity to promote religious harmony in the precarious region.103 
However, after an angry reaction from many Buddhists, the government wavered. The MOE 
quickly issued a new regulation which prescribed that Muslim uniform can only be worn upon 
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agreement between the school and the temple upon whose land the school is located.104 The 
new MOE regulation dismisses any opportunity for a Muslim girl to wear a hijab. It defers the 
decision to each local temple, many of which display negative attitudes toward the Muslim 
minority. The Muslim student in the case decided to continue wearing the hijab and the 





The next chapter will explore laws on the regulation of organized religions, Buddhism and 
others, in a so-called multi-tier regulatory model. This is where discipline and control take 
place. It provides details of how the state understands and implements the constitutional 
mandate in this chapter. The two parts should complement each other to portray a 
comprehensive picture of Thailand’s legal relationship with Buddhism, through the 
constitutional policy and regulation of organized religions, and individual rights.
                                               




IV. Religions in the Thai Legal System: Regulation of Organized Religions 
 
This section explores the extensive legal scheme that regulates religions in Thailand. Thus, it 
focuses on the government’s measures supporting and controlling religions through statutes 
and by-laws. Mostly, the section deals with five officially recognized religions: Buddhism, 
Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Sikhism. Statistically, these five religions constitute more 
than 99 percent of the population.1 They are placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of 
Religious Affairs (DRA) with the exception of Buddhism which has its own liaison office. 
 
Thailand always pursues a policy of free exercise under Buddhism’s dominance. Since 1932, 
the state has guaranteed freedom of religion and belief in every constitution. The state generally 
shows attempts to accommodate religious beliefs and a report of serious discrimination or 
suppression against a religious minority is rare. Even those of faiths not officially recognized 
are still free to practise. They are simply not included in the official list and so are ineligible to 
access state funding. However, the state sets clear priorities in allocating resources. In other 
words, the state guarantees only religious freedom but not religious equality.2 Only five official 
religions are eligible to receive support and promotion, and of the five, some receive better 
treatment than others. In effect, Thailand’s treatment of religions creates a de facto multi-tier 
regulatory system.3 
 
A multi-tier system is based on how much the state has been engaged in regulating and 
supporting that religion. Naturally, support comes with control.4 The more support a religion 
receives, the more control it is usually under. The four tiers are a response to the different 
historical, ethnic, and political backgrounds of the five religions. Buddhism, the sole contender 
within the first tier, enjoys far superior attention and accommodation from the state. Thus, it is 
the most heavily regulated as well as promoted. Buddhism is regulated by a statute which 
delegates administrative power to the Sangha Council, making it an official order to which all 
Buddhist monks in Thailand are subject. Buddhism also enjoys a variety of subsidies that other 
religions cannot be compared with. Islam is in the second tier. The Central Islamic Committee 
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is also delegated from the Islamic Administrative Act and the state significantly accommodates 
Muslim needs. But still it is incomparable to Buddhism, which is politically and culturally more 
prominent. The third tier contains Christianity, Hinduism, and Sikhism. They are entitled to 
subsidy but not regulated by specific statutes. There is no official order. Their churches may 
register as non-profit legal entities, either as societies or foundations under the Civil and 
Commercial Code. The fourth tier is that of other religions, cults, or creeds, excluded from the 
DRA’s categorization. These include non-mainstream Buddhist and Christian sects as well as 
other religions, for example, Judaism. They are neither controlled or encouraged by the state. 
However, their religious freedom is guaranteed so they can operate freely. 
 
Buddhism and Islam are thus the most heavily controlled while those in the third and fourth 
tiers receive less attention. In this sense, Buddhism and Islam can be considered more ‘public’ 
as the state always regards their management and control as a matter of public affairs, involving 
state agencies. Religions in the remaining two tiers are more ‘private’ because the state tends 
to treat them more like private organizations and rarely do they occupy discussion in the public 
sphere. 
 
A. Department of Religious Affairs  
 
Perhaps one of the oldest departments, the Department of Religious Affairs (DRA) is said to 
be traceable back to King Trailok of Ayutthaya (1448-1488 CE).5 Initially known as the 
Sanghagari Department, it acted as a point of liaison between the sangha and the palace, a 
book-keeper of monastic personnel and properties, a sangha police, and an organizer of state 
ceremonies. When the absolute monarchy ended in 1932, the new government re-assigned the 
policing role to the Sangha Council, and in 1941, the Sanghagari Department was renamed the 
DRA, whose responsibility was expanded to cover other religions.6 Its roles thus became more 
facilitative. The re-assignment reflected liberal ideas of pluralism and equality. Still, priority 
had to be given to Buddhism. In 2002, when the government suggested setting up an inter-
religious body, the National Religious Committee, where representatives of all five official 
religions would convene to make policy on an equal representation basis, Buddhist Thais 
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heavily opposed the proposal for fear that their dominant status might be put at risk.7 To 
appease the anger, the government created the National Office of Buddhism (NOB) which 
undertook the book-keeping and liaison duty of Buddhism. Notwithstanding such change, the 
DRA’s principal focus remains on the promotion of Buddhism. As a result, there are two 
departments overseeing Buddhist affairs.  
 
The DRA’s three main objectives are (1) to support and patronize Buddhism and other religions 
that the government officially recognizes, (2) to promote good understanding and harmony 
among religions, and (3) to encourage Thais to apply religious principles to improve the quality 
of their lives.8 This language echoes the constitutional mandate from 1997 and its structure is 
designed accordingly. The DRA’s structure is divided into four offices: the Secretariat Office, 
the Religious Patronage Office, the Hajj Promotion Office, and the Moral Development 
Office.9 The Religious Patronage Office is responsible for most tasks concerning religious 
affairs. It cooperates with other agencies regarding protocols on royal and state ceremonies, 
provides support and accommodation to officially recognized religions, arranges cooperation 
among religious leaders, and promotes the teaching of Buddhism and other religions. The Hajj 
Promotion Office is authorized by the Hajj Promotion Act to facilitate Muslims who wish to 
attend the Hajj pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia. The new addition is the Moral Development Office 
whose mandate is to prepare a plan to develop people’s moral standards and present it to the 
Prime Minister and the Sangha Council. The first National Master Plan for the Promotion of 
Morals (2016-2021) was introduced in 2016.10   
 
In principle, the DRA must promote, support, and protect Buddhism and the other four 
religions. However, its mission statement shows a subtle bias towards Buddhism’s superiority. 
The DRA aims to encourage people to live according to three norms: kwam-pen-thai 
(Thainess), dhamma, and King Bhumibol’s philosophy of sufficiency economy so the 
underlining mission is to reinforce the notion of Nation, Religion, and the King.11 Because the 
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DRA must make sure that all religious activities must not contradict or undermine this Thainess 
trilogy, in effect, Buddhism is privileged.  The activities of the DRA can be categorized into 
the three main groups of (1) Buddhist-oriented activities such as celebrations of Buddhist 
religious days, the promotion of living according to Buddhist precepts, Buddhist Sunday school 
programs,12 (2) Hajj coordination, and (3) other inter-religious activities to promote religious 
unity, the number and intensity of which are far less superior.13 The DRA unsurprisingly 
allocates the far larger share of its budget to Buddhism, then to Islam.14 Christianity, Hinduism, 
and Sikhism receive an even smaller budget. Buddhism also receives an even larger subsidy 
through the NOB.15 
 
The most important authority of the DRA is the power to recognize a religious organization. 
Without recognition, that religious body will not be able to access governmental assistance, for 
example, in issuing a permit for its missionaries, facilitating their religious ceremonies, 
mediation in internal disputes, and invitation to government meetings.16 To get recognized, a 
religious organization must satisfy the following four criteria: (1) having a completely distinct 
theology from other religions, (2) being practised by no fewer than 5,000 people in the latest 
round of a national census, (3) its teaching not violating constitutions and laws of Thailand, 
and (4) not having any hidden political agenda.17 An application must declare its affiliation 
with its foreign headquarters, names of senior ministers, and the locations of its branches. Once 
recognized, the religious organization is entitled to receive accommodation as part of the 
logistics for its missionaries and invitations to participate in the DRA’s events. At the same 
time, it has the duty to update the DRA of any internal changes and promote morality and Thai 
culture.18 The regulation shows clearly that support and control usually comes in the same 
package.  
 
So far, the DRA recognizes only a handful of religious bodies. Three reasons might play a role 
in limiting the number of recognized religious bodies. First, the recognition process hinders 
newcomers. A newcomer can only be admitted if it gains a unanimous approval from existing 
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organizations. Second, the benefits offered are insignificant. Many religious groups are able to 
practise unhindered without recognition. Lastly, the DRA also seems reluctant. It appears that 
the regulation was promulgated in 1969, at the beginning of the communist scare in Southeast 
Asia, so the government felt the need to register and monitor all types of associations, 
especially foreign ones. This regulation stresses that religion shall not mix with politics and 
shall aim to advance the goal of the regime, not subvert it. Now, the threat has subsided. 
Moreover, the DRA, because of its Buddhist-affiliated history, is not very enthusiastic about 
accepting new non-Buddhist organizations.  
 
There is much confusion about which religious organizations can be recognized. Documents 
and personal inquiry provide different results. In addition to the Sangha Council, which is the 
official body representing the Thai monastic order, the DRA recognizes four Buddhist 
organizations: The World Fellowship of Buddhists, the Buddhist Association of Thailand 
under Royal Patronage, the Young Buddhist Association of Thailand under Royal Patronage, 
and the Pali and the Dhamma Association of Thailand under Royal Patronage of the King’s 
Mother19 Two Islamic organizations that the DRA recognizes are the Office of Chularajmontri 
and the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand. The DRA recognizes five Christian 
organizations: The Catholic Bishop’s Conference of Thailand, the Church of Christ in 
Thailand, the Evangelical Fellowship of Thailand, the Thai Baptist Church, and the Seventh 
Day Adventist Church of Thailand. It recognizes three Hindu bodies: The Hindu Dhamma 
Sabha, The Hindu Samaj Society and the Royal Brahmin Office, and two Sikhs: Sri Guru Singh 
Sabha and the Namdhari Sangat of Thailand. Confusion exists over which organizations are 
recognized by the DRA. For example, in the International Religious Freedom Report, the U.S. 
Department of State notes that there are six Christian organizations without specifying them. 
The Royal Brahmin Office is often not mentioned.  
 
Another role of the DRA is to regulate foreign missionaries.20 The nine-point rule commands 
foreign missionaries to respect Thai laws and customs and refrain from becoming involved in 
politics. They must neither deceive the public nor exaggerate their beliefs. They must not 
confuse the public by imitating a monk’s robes. Also, they must not operate with aggression 
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or contempt leading to religious tension. The DRA sets a quota proportionate to the percentage 
of religious minorities in Thailand. A licensed missionary enjoys benefits such as a longer visa 
period.21 In theory, violation of rules regulating missionary conduct results in revocation of 
that missionary’s license and extradition as well as withdrawal of the state’s support of the 
religious organization to which that missionary belongs. However, there is no record of the 
regulation ever being invoked. Many unlicensed missionaries, for example, those of the 
unrecognized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, continue working under tourist visas, 
and to date there have been no prosecutions.22 Currently, the DRA has issued licenses to 6 
Muslims, 1,560 Christians, 20 Hindus, and 41 Sikhs.23 The figures show that Christianity, 
despite being the third largest religion, has been the most active in missionary activities.  
 
The following section will discuss the government’s handling of the five officially recognized 
religions, which are categorized into four major groups. Discussion begins with a general 
overview of that religion’s history and profile, followed by the central organization, and the 
personnel. 
 
B. Tier One: Buddhism  
 
The most important actor for Thai Buddhism is the Sangha. Sangha is a generic term referring 
to a gathering of four monks or more. The Sangha (Kha-na-song), however, is the official body 
representing Thai Buddhism. Prior to the first Sangha Act (1902), monks had been organized 
according to ordination lineage, with each monk belonging to the group of his preceptor.24 
Control over the Sangha was sporadic and limited to the capital and its adjacent provinces 
where the ruler’s influence was eminent.25 The control was often limited to important or royal 
temples. Beyond the capital’s periphery, the king’s authority faded and so did his control over 
Buddhism. From time to time, he might order purification and recension but there was no 
systematic, universal, control of Buddhism in Siam.26 Elsewhere, local sanghas relied on 
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support from the local lords, with practices and allegiance varying from one temple to another. 
The situation remained so until the religious reforms of King Chulalongkorn. 
 
Early on in his reign, King Chulalongkorn felt mounting pressure to consolidate his power. 
Siam’s loosely organized tributary state system put his kingdom at risk of foreign 
encroachment as well as internal rebellion. The potential was there for a charismatic religious 
leader to mobilize a large mass against the ruler. As he consolidated these tributary kingdoms 
into his provinces, the risk of rebellions became greater, some being inspired by local 
Buddhism.27 These conflicts became of increasing concern since they might bring Bangkok 
into potential conflict with its new neighbours, the British and French Empires. In addition to 
administrative reform, Chulalongkorn wanted these variants of Buddhism to be brought under 
one body that was effectively under his command, and teach only what he deemed to be safe. 
Hence, Thai Buddhism had to justify his rule and serve the state’s goals, not the opposite.28 
The new Sangha had to be united, but not enough to challenge him.29 Under the Sangha Act, 
the government delegates administrative power to govern the Thai Sangha to an assembly of 
senior monks known as mahatherasamakhom, literally meaning the Great Council of Elders 
but more commonly referred to as the Sangha Council. 
 
The first Sangha Act was enacted in 1902 under King Chulalongkorn’s absolute rule. It 
transformed the traditional-based sangha into a law-based body. Similar to the absolute 
monarchy of the time, the Sangha Council had vested in it total control over Thai Buddhism. 
The head was the Sangha Raja, the Supreme Patriarch, who enjoyed, at least in theory, king-
like powers and status.30 The overall administration was top-down in manner, which led to 
complaints by monks of lower ranks that disputes with their superiors were not handled fairly.31 
Especially acute was the sectarian conflict between Thammayut, which received royal favour, 
and Mahanikai, the majority. After the 1932 revolution that ended the absolute monarchy, the 
more progressive wings of the Sangha, mostly young monks who felt injustices had been done 
                                               
27 For general account of rebellions in the newly acquired territories, see Ansil Ramsay, ‘Modernization and 
Reactionary Rebellions in Northern Siam’ (1979) 38 The Journal of Asian Studies 283. For Buddhist-inspired 
rebellion, see Murdoch, Holy Men’s Rebellion. 
28 The process of selecting a new narrative is a regional phenomenon. See Keyes et al, Asian Visions of 
Authority 5. 
29 Nidhi Eowseewong, ‘รัฐกบัองคก์รทางศาสนา’ [The State and Religious Organization] Matichon Online (31 July 
2017) at < https://www.matichon.co.th/news/613711> accessed 1 April 2019. 
30 Ishii, Sangha, State, and Society 69-71. 




to them deriving from the absolute power of the Sangha Council, petitioned the People’s Party 
to amend this dictatorial body.32 The 1942 Sangha Act restructured and divided the Sangha 
Council into three separate bodies.33 The Sangha Assembly possessed the legislative power to 
legislate monastic laws while the Sangha Cabinet implemented them. Disputes were heard by 
the Sangha Tribunal. The three bodies operated under the patriarchy of the Sangha Raja who 
acted as a figurehead with no real power. The new structure was very similar to the 
constitutional monarchy that the People’s Party had tried to establish. 
 
This democratic administration was short-lived as it proved unpopular among senior monks, 
who criticized it as being contradictory to long-held tradition. According to opponents, the 
ancient canon dictated that monks live in a republican-style community where issues are 
collectively discussed, and the 1942 law disrupted such arrangement.34 However, it should be 
noted that, despite the rhetoric of republicanism, the ‘republican’ community was actually very 
hierarchical. Seniority was a serious matter in monastic life, and junior monks were expected 
to defer to more senior colleagues.35 Some critics of the 1942 Act complained that the Sangha 
Raja could no longer exercise absolute power.36 Thus, the system that allowed members to be 
elected and express their opinions freely and equally, upset the upper echelons of the Sangha 
so much so that the senior monks refused to attend meetings and the assembly eventually failed 
to function.37  
 
In 1962 the absolute power model was reintroduced by Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat who was 
Thailand’s authoritarian leader at the time. Sarit was a royalist-nationalist dictator so he 
replaced the democratic administration with an absolute monarchy, Chulalongkorn-style, 
law.38 By reviving the absolute rule of the Sangha Council, Sarit hoped that his government 
and the Sangha could cooperate to fight against the communist insurgency. 
 
In 1992, an amendment tried to distance the Sangha from the monarchy; the Sangha Raja would 
no longer be appointed by the king, instead, His Holiness would be promoted according to 
seniority. This provision was never invoked. In 2016, the appointment was amended back to 
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the royal appointment and in 2017, the whole Sangha Council was placed entirely under the 
king’s discretion.39 In essence, the Sangha has remained almost unchanged for 50 years. The 
development of the Sangha administration reflects the deeper struggle between the liberal and 
conservative forces in Thai politics. 
 
Formerly, like other religions, Buddhism was under the DRA. In 2002, the NOB assumed the 
liaison and book-keeping responsibilities. The NOB is placed under the Office of Prime 
Minister, a ministry-level agency that oversees special missions not covered by a specific 
ministry. The NOB acts as a secretariat office of the Sangha Council, relaying communication 
from the Sangha Council to the cabinet, and the palace if needed. It oversees and maintains 
common properties and promotes the dissemination of Buddhism, both in Thailand and abroad. 
This objective conveys the more ambitious goal of Thailand to be the global centre of 
Buddhism. In addition to policing and book-keeping monks and temples, the NOB carries out 
educational and promoting programs which overlap with those of the DRA.40 
 
 
(a) The Sangha Council 
 
This system is similar to how the government regulates certain professions such as lawyers, 
engineers, medical doctors, nurses, or architects. However, unlike ordinary professional guilds, 
given its political importance, the Sangha Council has strong ties with the government and the 
palace. Another difference is the lack of external oversight. The Sangha Council is not subject 
to judicial review by the Administrative Court.41 
 
i. The Sangha Organization 
   
The Sangha Council is the highest authority over the Thai and other sanghas in Thailand. The 
Thai Sangha refers to the two sects of Thammayut and Mahanikai, both of which identify 
themselves as Theravada. The Sangha Council also recognizes two Mahayana sects: 
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Chinnanikai (the Chinese sect) and Annamnikai (the Vietnamese sect).42 Both orders are under 
the Sangha Council’s jurisdiction, but they cannot join the council.  
 
There are 20 members from the most senior class of abbots sitting in the Sangha Council.43 
Prior to 2017, eight of them were ex officio the heads of the regional administration from the 
Thammayut and Mahanikai sects and twelve appointees were selected by the Sangha Raja. The 
Thai name, meaning the assembly of the elders, was very apt as promotion was usually based 
on seniority and the council members are mostly above their 70s. The Director of the NOB is 
the only lay member acting as the secretary of the Sangha Council. The Sangha Council is 
presided over by the Sangha Raja. At present, the appointment power has now returned to the 
king who may exercise it at will.  
 
Although the Sangha Council is supposed to operate as a collective body, greater focus is 
placed upon the Sangha Raja, who is regarded as the embodiment of the Thai Sangha. He has 
virtually the sole and absolute power to rule over the Sangha in accordance with monastic and 
state laws. The Sangha Raja is the head of Thailand’s spiritual realm as much as the King is 
the head of the temporal state.44 As has been the tradition, therefore, the two leaders enjoy an 
intimate relationship. The first Sangha Raja was appointed by King Chulalongkorn who chose 
his half-brother as the candidate.45 This way, he ensured that the Sangha would share and 
support his vision. This is true concerning the appointments of subsequent Sangha Rajas as 
well. The Sangha Act provides the Sangha Raja with legal protection no other religious head 
enjoys — that he is protected from an attack on his dignity.46 This offense is similar to that of 
lese majeste concerning the Thai king, but is rarely invoked.47 The punishment is also less 
severe. 
 
Originally, the king would appoint a monk whom he trusted. The 1992 amendment changed 
that to the automatic promotion of the most senior member of the Sangha Council. The attempt 
to disentangle royal involvement in sangha politics failed when the 19th Sangha Raja, Somdej 
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Phra Yannasamvara, passed away in 2013. The appointment was delayed because the rightful 
candidate was controversial.48 Somdej Phra Maha Rajjamangalacharn was said to be affiliated 
with the deviant school of Dhammakaya. The controversy convinced the military government 
not to submit the nomination for royal endorsement. The stalemate reached its peak after King 
Bhumibol passed away in October 2016. Then, in February 2017, the appointment power was 
returned to the king and the newly crowned King Vajiralongkorn appointed the less 
controversial, Somdej Phra Mahamuneewong, the third most senior member of the Sangha 
Council.49 
 
The Sangha Council is a closed system. The only outsider is the Director of NOB. In recent 
years, there has been an attempt to add more lay members but the plan has been resisted by the 
Sangha, fearing that an oversight would tamper its autonomy.50 The government decided not 
to proceed with the plan.  
 
Below the Sangha Council, the administration resembles that of the administrative branch, with 
region, province, district, sub-district, and temple abbots. At each level, there are two divisions 
belonging to the Thammayut and Mahanikai sects.51 
 
ii. Objective and Authority   
   
The most important task for which the Sangha Council was created is to take complete control 
of the sangha. The Sangha Council oversees both the Thai Sangha and other sanghas. It aims 
to unify monks and uphold Thai Buddhist orthodoxy and orthopraxy that best serve the state’s 
interest. For this purpose, it is assigned with a list of duties such as to promote Buddhism 
among lay and monastic communities and to preserve dhamma and vinaya.52 The most 
important duty is that ‘to govern the Sangha with peace and order’ which serves as its policy 
statement.53 The Sangha Council is therefore equipped with expansive legislative, executive, 
and judicial powers.  
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First, despite the reputation of Theravada’s strict adherence to the canonical text, in reality, the 
Sangha Council can legislate rules that supplement the Tipitaka. It oversees the appointment, 
transfer, and promotion of monks to various classes of abbotship. Another important role is 
that regarding education. It designs the curriculum and arranges the annual Pali examination.54 
Finally, when a dispute arises, whether a monk is accused of misconduct or his practice is 
considered deviant, if a senior abbot in charge cannot adjudicate on the case, it will be heard 
by the Sangha Council. In the most serious cases, an accused monk if deemed guilty can be 
expelled and defrocked. 
 
All the above powers enable the Sangha Council to monopolize Thai Buddhism. Rules, 
promotion, examination, and prosecution are carrot-and-sticks that shape Thai Buddhist 
orthodoxy and standardize practices. Its total control over how to understand Buddhism and 
the punishment of deviants, means the Sangha Council has become the authority in recognizing 
what is Buddhism and what is not. Monks who refuse to obey the Sangha Council could be 
expelled, which will result in their being deprived of all state benefits. However, expulsion is 
rare. Without the state’s cooperation, it is almost impossible to expel a non-conformist group. 
Since the 1970s, the Sangha Council has faced the emergence of new Buddhist movements that 
have adopted different teachings and practices. Notably, there are the Bhikkhuni (female monk) 
movement,55 the fundamentalistic Santi Asoka,56 and the materialistic Dhammakaya Temple.57 
Only the Santi Asoka was expelled following its criticism of the Sangha Council’s laxity and 
renounced its membership from the Sangha in 1973. Once expelled, the Sangha Council 
pressed criminal charges against the leader of Santi Asoka, Phra Photirak, for dressing in a 
monk’s robes without permission. Photirak relented by changing his robe colour and title, from 
Phra (Buddhist monk) to Samana (generic priest).58 However, Santi Asoka continues to operate 
in Thailand and no further action has been taken against the movement. Elsewhere in Thailand, 
numerous individual monks and temples teach syncretic Buddhism, some of which are quite 
radical. Despite this, the Sangha Council does not prosecute them. 
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A common criticism of the Sangha Council’s authority relates to its composition. The all-male 
gerontocratic body is known for its ultra-conservative stance.59 This conservatism makes the 
Sangha less adaptable to social change, effectively failing to appeal to the younger 




Sangha is one of the three gems of Buddhism, which comprise the Buddha, dhamma, and 
sangha.61 Sangha preserves Buddha’s dhamma through its study, practice, and dissemination. 
Thus, a monk is the personification of Buddhism.62 He is considered a field of merit where 
people sow meritorious deeds and salvage their souls.63 From the political perspective, monks 
are a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they are a crucial tool for communicating with the 
polity and implementing public policies. On the other hand, they are an army of disciplined 
men who could potentially be out of the state’s control and become a threat. As a result, there 
are both religious and political incentives for the government to closely control monks through 
monitoring and various schemes of benefit. 
 
There are five types of Buddhist renunciants in Thailand. A man of able body and mind can be 
ordained upon turning 20. Upon ordination, he is known as Bhikkhu, or a monk, who must 
observe the 227 precepts. An underage male may choose to become Samanen, a novice, the 
requirements for which are less stringent for he observes only 10 precepts. For the female, the 
choice according to Tipitaka is to become Bhikkhuni, a female monk, observing 311 precepts 
or Samanenri, a female novice. The Sangha Council does not accept the existence of the female 
renunciants, arguing that the lineage had long disappeared from Theravada school so both 
Bhikkhuni and Samanenri, who are ordained by the Mahayana school, are neither under the 
Sangha Council nor part of the Thai Sangha.64 Mae chi, however, have an ambiguous status.65 
Unlike the others, mae chi is not formally acknowledged in the Tipitaka but is a local tradition 
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which allows a woman to shave her head and wear a robe of any colour but not saffron. 
Followers of mae chi observe 8-10 precepts and most reside in a separate quarter of a temple. 
Mae chi is a local tradition so there is no canonical provision directly applicable in its case. 
Some of them voluntarily fall under the Sangha Council’s jurisdiction through the Thai Nun 
Institute but others have chosen to establish their own order.66 Strictly speaking, the Sangha 
Council has no authority to govern them except by barring them from entering the temple’s 
premises. A mae chi observant is of a much lower status than a monk but the Council of State 
ruled that they are ascetics under the Thai constitution.67 As a consequence, they are entitled 




Admission to the Sangha is the first step in which the Sangha Council exercises its control.68 
An ordination must be conducted by an Uppajja, or preceptor. According to vinaya, a preceptor 
must have been in the monkhood for more than ten years and be able to guide a newly ordained 
monk through a complicated system of vinaya.69 There is no central authority to certify a 
preceptor. Any monk who satisfies these conditions can ordain another individual. In 
premodern Siam, a monk would identify himself through ordination lineage. But since 
Chulalongkorn’s reforms, the Sangha Council takes control over the ordination. A preceptor is 
required to seek approval by getting appointed from a senior abbot of his sect.70 A quota is set 
at one preceptor per one sub-district.71 Ordination from an unlawful preceptor is void and 
subject to one-year imprisonment.72 In its early years, the Sangha Council put some respected 
monks from the northern ‘Yuan’ tradition on trial for unlawful ordination in order to 
subordinate the northern vernacular Buddhism and display Bangkok’s authority over the 
Northern territories of Lanna.73   
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A person who wishes to ordain must also satisfy both the vinaya and the Sangha Council’s 
rules. Vinaya allows only a free man who is at least 20 years old and of able body and mind to 
be ordained.74 In addition to vinaya requirements, the Sangha Council requires that a person 
must be a resident of that sub-district, literate, and of good behaviour.75 He may be disqualified 
if he is accused of any criminal charges or previously imprisoned for a high crime.76 Once 
ordained, a preceptor will issue a new monk a certificate of identification, which details his 
ordination and records his residency.77 A monk must carry this certificate with him and have it 
ready for inspection. 
 
In recent years, the Sangha Council set the minimum period for ordination at 15 to 30 days, 




Education is an effective measure for controlling the Sangha. For those who wish to remain in 
the monkhood permanently, in addition to attending religious services and meditation, 
preparing oneself for examination is one of the principal activities. Monastic education is based 
on the curriculum designed by Prince Vajirayanna, the first Sangha Raja and King 
Chulalongkorn’s half-brother. He was aware that most monks were not proficient in Pali so 
they could not read the text of Tipitaka.79 He then composed several textbooks in Thai, focusing 
on selected chapters of Tipitaka and the stories of Buddha. In addition to facilitating Thai 
monks to understand the Buddhist canon, the curriculum helped Prince Vajirayanna and the 
Sangha Council to direct monks’ attention and monopolize the understanding of Buddhism.80 
There are two types of examination: Dhamma and Pali proficiency. Once a year, monks may 
take an examination in either dhamma and Pali proficiency. If a monk passes these exams, he 
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will be awarded the title of Parian and a monthly allowance. The ninth level, the highest level, 
is equivalent to a bachelor degree.81 He can get promoted into an administrative rank.  
 
The examination system is not without problems. It is identified as the root of the Sangha’s 
failure to connect to the modern world.82 The curriculum has not been updated since the 
Chulalongkorn’s time. But no reform is taking place in the foreseeable future. 
 
A temple also provides normal education up to secondary school. Then, at the tertiary level, 
the government has established two public universities dedicated to Buddhist study, with each 
one belonging to a different sect. Mahachulalongkorn University, in honor of King 
Chulalongkorn himself, is under the control of the Mahanikai sect and Mahamongkut 
University, named after his father, King Mongkut, is under the control of Thammayut.83 The 
act of founding a Buddhist college indicates the attempt to modernize and rationalize 
Buddhism. A monk who finishes basic education can enroll, but the universities also welcome 
lay students. Currently, the two universities are funded by the state and run by monks. They 
offer several Buddhist-related curricula up to doctoral degree level. 
 
iii. Honorific titles 
 
Another advancement in the monastic life is that of promotion to a higher rank. The rank system 
began as early as the Sukhothai era when the king honored monks with a good knowledge of 
dhamma and exemplary behaviour to be Phra Kru and Sangha Raja. Over time, the rank system 
became more elaborate. With several layers of ranking and sophisticated titles, it resembled 
the rank system of the royal family and courtiers in the absolute monarchy of Siam.84 A monk 
with a title would be assigned an administrative task so the ranking system was developed as 
the Sangha bureaucracy was formed under the 1902 Sangha Act. Promotion was no longer 
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based on knowledge of dhamma, but administrative skills. An award is mainly judged by the 
amount of donation that monk earns for building of infrastructure. The larger, the better. The 
monastic honorific title system persists even though honorific titles in the Siamese court were 
abolished after 1932. A monk with a title will receive state benefits: decorated ceremonial fans, 
a monthly allowance, and assignment to a constituency.85 He can ascend to the level of Sangha 
Raja. 
 
On the one hand, the rank system is a critical component of the Sangha bureaucracy, recruiting 
and rewarding competent monks to run the system.86 On the other hand, it serves as an incentive 
for monks to be cooperative and, consequently, submissive to the establishment. Besides, the 
criteria have shifted from knowledge in dhamma to more materialistic and corporate 
achievements such as the amount of the annual donation or the numbers of new constructions 
under a certain abbot.87 Therefore, it is criticized for distracting monks from their primary duty 
of studying dhamma and seeking nirvana.88 
 
iv. Privileges and limitations 
 
The revered status of a monk confers a number of benefits. Some are unconditional. The 
government-run Sangha Hospital specifically caters for monks whose vinaya restrictions make 
them unsuitable for being hospitalized alongside lay patients. Another subsidy is the discount 
or fee exemption from public transportation for monks, novices, and nuns with a certificate of 
identification.89 On a bus, there are seats reserved for a monk whom is forbidden by vinaya 
from sharing a seat with a woman. No similar favour, however, is given to nuns. 
 
A monk’s right to property remains intact. A monk is expected to renounce his worldly 
possessions, and whatever he earns during his monastic life is supposed to be shared among 
his peers. Yet, the Civil and Commercial Code does not bar him from having possessions. 
                                               
85  The National Office of Buddhism Regulation on Nittayapat Money B.E. 2556 (2013). 
86 Phra Narong Sangkhawichit, ‘การปกครองคณะสงฆ์ไทยในปัจจุบัน: ปัญหาและแนวทางแก้ไข’ [Problems of Thailand’s -Sangha 
Administrative Authority and Suggested Solution] (MA in Buddhist Studies, Thammasat University, Faculty of 
Liberal Art, 2015) 63-64. 
87 Ibid, 94. See ‘สมณศกัดิ-’ [Honorific Title], (Dhamma-Gateway) at <http://www.dharma-
gateway.com/monk/monk-03-01.htm> accessed 22 September 2019. 
88 Ibid, 94-95; Payutto, ‘ตอบเรืHอง พรบ. คณะสงฆ์’ [Answers on the Sangha Law] (Sulak Sivaraksa interviewed, PA 
Payutto for Dhamma Foundation, 3rd edn. 2018) 13-16. 




Moreover, although the Code dictates that his estate goes to the temple, he may dispose of it 
prior to his death at will, or prepare a will.90 This leeway allows a monk to avoid giving up his 
assets and actually accumulate wealth.91  
 
Other benefits are conditioned by a monk’s ranking. There is a monthly allowance for a monk 
who (1) is appointed to the bureaucracy, (2) passes the high-level ecclesiastical examination, 
or (3) is stationed in a hardship area.92 The amount given is not much in comparison with a 
normal salary but is still substantial. Another benefit is exemption from military duty. In 
ancient Siam, lay men were subject to corvée labour, but this was later replaced by King 
Chulalongkorn with the military draft. Able-bodied men must serve two years in armed forces, 
but a senior abbot is exempted from such a duty.93 Notably, conscientious objection in general 
is not allowed.  
 
The above benefits come with a monk’s sacred status, as the holy man who can guide fellow 
humans to enlightenment. There is a cost for maintaining that soteriological state as well. Most 
important is to keep Buddhism untainted; therefore, the political freedom of monks is limited. 
Monks and novices were prohibited from voting in local elections as early as 1914.94 This was 
extended to national elections in 1949 when the conservative was rising to power.95 Monks, 
novices, priests, or ascetics, were made ineligible to vote in a general election. Ineligibility to 
vote further barred them from standing in an election.96 This prohibition covered Christian 
priests, and later was extended to Buddhist nuns.97  
 
Buddhist disenfranchisement is a common characteristic of election laws in Buddhist-dominant 
countries in Southeast Asia.98 It is still in place in Myanmar and Thailand whereas Laos and 
Cambodia removed the ban once they were under communist control. While 
disenfranchisement in general is considered a serious violation of human rights, the exclusion 
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of monks is understood by Buddhist-dominant countries differently. The government is not 
depriving monks of basic human rights or curbing religious freedom. Instead, the government 
is protecting representatives of the spiritual realm from becoming involved with worldly 
politics, which is considered dirty and inferior. Disenfranchisement is, thus, not a sign of anti-
religious hostility but a sign that the government has taken proper care of the Sangha.99 Yet, 
this arrangement does not mean that the Sangha refrains from politics. In fact, the Sangha is 
actively involved in politics through informal means, as the above example of a call for 
Buddhism as the state religion shows. 
 
Recently, younger monks who are dissatisfied with the Sangha Council’s authoritarian 
handling have been advocating for voting rights.100 The movement suggests a significant 
change in the attitude of the future generation of these holy men.   
 
Another sacrifice a monk has to make in order to uphold the purity of the Sangha is his right 
to criminal justice. If a monk is charged with a criminal offence and his bail is denied, he must 
be disrobed before entering a prison.101 He is not presumed guilty, but the purpose of the rule 
is to protect the sanctity of the Sangha.  
  
v. Expulsion  
 
A monk may leave the monkhood any time he wishes by announcing his wish to leave in front 
of fellows.102 He will only be involuntarily removed from the monkhood in the case of (1) 
being declared bankrupt by the court,103 or (2) being expelled by the Sangha Council.104  
 
A monk can be expelled if he violates the vinaya. The vinaya is a monastic legal code 
resembling a modern legal code in having the systemic categorization of offences as well as a 
procedure for hearing and sentencing.105 It governs everything from the minute details of 
etiquette, such as table manners and walking gestures, to the serious crimes of theft and 
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murder.106 A misdemeanour might result in confession, temporary exclusion, or labour service 
depending on the severity of the crime. A more serious crime, parajika, could lead to 
immediate expulsion. The Sangha Council promulgates a rule on disciplinary action to 
supplement the vinaya procedure.107 A convicted monk is entitled to an appeal.108 The Sangha 
Council itself, or any assigned abbot, may act as a tribunal.109  
 
Even if a monk does not commit parajika, or a heinous crime, if he frequently violates the 
vinaya, an abbot of his residential temple may notify him, in writing, to behave. Should he fail 
to do so, an abbot may ask the incumbent abbot of that district administration to order an 
expulsion.110 However, if that monk’s behaviour is more severe, judging from the frequency 
and notoriety of his crime, which could possibly jeopardize Buddhism and the Sangha 
administration, the Sangha Council may order an expulsion.111 Once ordered, the monk must 
resign within three days. If he resists, after three days, the order is deemed to have immediate 
action.112 That monk is no longer considered a monk and so is considered to be liable for his 
action for dressing like a monk, which is punishable by five-year imprisonment.113 The Sangha 
Council’s decision is final, and there is no judicial remedy. 
 
In principle, expulsion is strictly a monastic matter. The state should only be involved if the 
case constitutes a criminal offence. In reality, the state often has to intervene to assist. Police 
are called in to arrest a monk who violates the vinaya. Sometimes, the Sangha Council asks 
law enforcement to help purge rogue applicants, i.e. drug addicts.114   
 
Recently, the military government successfully ‘talked’ an infamous ultra-nationalist monk, 
who advocated violence against Islam, into resigning from the monkhood.115 Phra Maha 
Apichart, whose sermons were similar to that of the controversial anti-Muslim monk Veerathu 
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of Myanmar, was detained when he travelled to the Deep South with an intention to provoke 
religious violence. This example is a good reminder that the state is able to manipulate the 
Sangha in a less legal and more discreet manner, bypassing any of the above procedures. The 
fact that the Sangha Council raised no objections to the government’s tactic implied its 
submission or cooperation in this case. 
 
(c) Temples  
  
Although a monk is supposed to dwell in a village and the wilderness, the vinaya orders every 
monk to make a rain retreat and stay in the same place for three months of the monsoon season. 
The Sangha Act requires every monk to register with a temple where he studies dhamma under 
the supervision of an abbot. Even those who continue the tradition of forest dwelling must obey 
the rule. A monk without a temple is deemed fake and can be forced to disrobe. The temple is 
the smallest unit of the sangha bureaucracy. 
 
i. Establishment of Temples 
 
A proposal to build a temple has to be approved by the local NOB office, an incumbent senior 
abbot of that district, and the provincial governor.116 An application must contain the location, 
size, blueprint, budget, and reason for building a temple.117 Local NOB offices makes sure that 
no monasteries are situated too close to each other. Once approved, the provincial governor 
has to notify the NBO, which informs the Prime Minister and the Sangha Council. In addition, 
building, merging, moving, or dissolving a temple must follow a similar procedure, jointly 
reviewed by representatives of both the Sangha and the government.   
 
To become a temple with full legal status (wat), a place must satisfy the criteria of (1) at least 
five monks stationed there for at least five years, (2) approval from the Sangha Council, and 
(3) the royal sima.118 Sima, according to the vinaya, demarcates an appropriate area where the 
Sangha gathers and conducts rites, such as ordination or recital of teaching. Without sima being 
properly demarcated, any rites are deemed void.119 The royal act of bestowing a sima 
                                               
116 The Ministerial Regulation no. 1 B.E. 2507 (1964), sec. 3. 
117 Ibid, sec. 2. 
118 Ibid, sec. 11. 
119 Petra Kieffer-Pulz, ‘Rules for the Sima Regulation in the Vinaya and its Commentaries and their Application 




strengthens the tie between the palace and the sangha, reaffirming the king’s personal duty of 
patronizing Buddhism. An alternative is to remain a monastic shelter (sam-nak-song) which 
does not enjoy the same capacities as a temple, e.g. to carry out all rituals including ordinations.  
 
ii. Temple Administration  
 
A temple is a legal entity with the capacity to enter into transaction. An abbot, whom the 
Sangha Council appoints, is its representative. He is, by the Penal Code, a government officer, 
a status which confers both privilege and liability. He is authorized to accept, or expel, a monk 
and visitor into his temple.120 His order carries legal authority, but he can face charges if he 
exercises it inappropriately.121  
 
The biggest issue in administering a temple is wealth management. Bhikkhu, as a Buddhist 
monk is called in Pali, literally means he who begs, implying a modest, subsistent, frugal, 
living. Large amounts of wealth contradict the frugal image as well as breed corruption. Still, 
for a large temple, wealth is necessary to provide for monks and disciples a proper residence, 
education, and other welfare.   
 
A temple can own three types of land: ti wat, ti thoranee song, and ti kal-pa-na. Ti Wat, literally 
the temple’s land, is where the actual temple is located.122 Ti thoranee song, the sangha’s land, 
is other land that that temple owns.123 Both of them are protected by the Sangha Act so they 
cannot be transferred unless a transfer is done by a statute.124 Also, the statute of limitations is 
not applicable and the court cannot confiscate and sell them.125 If a temple is abandoned, these 
lands are transferred to the NOB, which will act as a trustee managing them. Ti kal-pa-na is, 
by tradition, donated to the temple to reap its usufruct.126 However, the temple does not own it 
so it is treated as ordinary land. As there is no limit on how much land a temple can own, many 
of them acquire large amounts. These lands, ti thoranee song, and ti kal-pa-na, can be 
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commercialized under the guidelines from the NOB.127 They may generate huge incomes for 
temples. 
 
In addition to land, a temple earns income from donations. Monks are barred from working, 
and donations to temples are tax deductible.128 The Sangha Council requires that an abbot must 
appoint a lay manager (temple warden, or kappiya-karaka) to help run the temple.129 However, 
there is no specific criteria so, in many cases, a lay manager has a personal or familial tie with 
an abbot which leads to the potential for fraud.130 Annually, a lay manager prepares a financial 
report to be submitted to an abbot.131 At present, the NOB does not provide a standardized 
template or require the report to be audited by a third party.132 Thus, there is no oversight 
mechanism over monastic finances. In conclusion, this loophole allows temples to own large 
amounts of property without proper regulation. 
 
Whenever the topic of Buddhist reform is raised, the issue of monastic wealth is almost always 
discussed. Many agree that better auditing and a cap on the amount of wealth are needed. 
However, the Sangha always reacts fiercely against such an idea.133   
 
Thai state confers huge benefits to Buddhism. In exchange of such treatment, it is subject to an 
intensive monitoring scheme which limit an individual’s freedom. The state asks for the 
Sangha’s cooperation. This trade-off leads to a difficult tension as monks wish for more liberty 
but, at the same time, refuse to forego privileges. 
   
C. Tier Two: Islam  
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As the second largest religion after Buddhism, the official figure of Muslims is around four 
percent of the population although some estimates put the actual number to be as high as ten 
percent.134 The Muslim community is by no means monolithic. There are roughly two groups 
of Muslims; those who reside in the upper 74 provinces, and those who live in the 3 
southernmost provinces. The demography and dynamic of these two groups are completely 
different. The first group of Muslims is ethnically diverse. The oldest and most well-known 
group are descendants of Persian merchants who had arrived in Ayutthaya as early as the 15th 
century C.E.135 They were welcomed for their expertise in trade and soon appointed to several 
key posts, especially one overseeing foreign commerce in the western part of the kingdom.136 
Even the governor of Bangkok was at that time a Muslim Turk.137 Some of their descendants 
were converted to Buddhism but many remained Muslim. One of them, Sheikh Ahmad Quomi, 
was appointed the first Sheik al-Islam, the religious advisor to the King of Siam in 1543 CE.138 
His heirs inherited the title until the fall of Ayutthaya. Although the descendants are 
diminishing, the family lineage is still held in high regard. Sheikh Ahmad Quomi’s Buddhist 
descendants became the ancestors of the Bunnags, the most influential family of aristocrats in 
the early Bangkok era.139 In addition to Persians, there are Chinese Muslims from the North, 
Cham Muslims from Cambodia, Pakistani and Indian Muslims from South Asia, and Javan 
Muslims from Indonesia.140 They reside throughout the country and have integrated into the 
local culture well. Except for the Persians, who are Shi’te, the majority of Thai Muslims are 
Sunni. 
 
The second group of Muslims has only recently been incorporated into Thai society. The three 
southernmost provinces of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat, known as the Deep South, used to be 
the Islamic Sultanate of Patani, which identified itself more closely with the Malay kingdom 
than with the Siamese kingdom.141 Indeed, Patani had a turbulent relationship with Siam. 
Whenever Siam was able to assert its might, Patani became a tributary state but was always 
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ready to rebel against once Siam’s control weakened.142 This tributary status ended when the 
Anglo-Siamese treaty demarcated the Malay Peninsular so the Patani Sultanate was fully 
annexed to Siam as provinces in the early 20th century C.E.143 As a result, the Muslims in the 
Deep South have a distinct ethno-religious setting distinguishable from the rest of the country. 
Whereas other Muslim communities are the minority in the overwhelmingly Buddhist-
dominant society, in the deep south, more than 80 percent of the population are Muslims. With 
its Malay ethnicity and culture, locals pride themselves as the descendants of Patani, not Siam, 
who spoke Malay, not Thai, and professed Islam, not Buddhism.144 This Malay Muslim identity 
is so distinct so that the Deep South Muslims distance themselves from even other Sunni 
Muslims elsewhere.145 The Siamese government is fully aware of the dangerous potential, and 
there have been attempts to assimilate them, by force and through accommodation, into the 
mainstream, but these have not been very successful.146 Insurgency keeps flaring up, with 
demands for autonomy of the region. Early resistance was led by Malay aristocrats who wished 
to retain their past glory. Beginning in the 1960s, the resistance took on more religious 
undertones.147 The latest round began in January 2004 and has already claimed more than 7,000 
lives.148 This second group of Muslims is a challenge and also a critical factor in determining 
Thailand’s policies toward Islam. Its policy has shifted from being Persian- to Malay-oriented. 
Here, national security is the main factor in policy-making.  
 
Overall, Muslims, especially those of the first group, have successfully assimilated into Thai 
society. The king accepts them under royal patronage. There are no reports of serious 
discrimination in employment or education. Many Muslims have been appointed into high-
ranking government offices, including an army commander, governor of Bangkok, and a 
university rector.149 Ironically, Sonthi Boonyaratklin, the army commander, who staged the 
2006 coup d’etat against Thaksin in order to protect the trilogy of Thainess was himself a 
Muslim from a prominent old family. Muslim MPs are also present in the Legislative 
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Assembly.150 Rarely has religion been considered an issue. However, Islamophobia is on the 
rise. The recent round of insurgency has infuriated Buddhists as they witness monks being slain 
and temples burned.151 The Global War on Terrorism has fueled further suspicion and fear.152 
Lastly, the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims and their influx as refugees has created more 
animosity toward the faith. As a result, Islam, as a whole, is increasingly being associated with 
terrorism and its adherents categorised as ‘others.’ There is the tendency that such 
discrimination might become even more commonplace in the foreseeable future.153 
 
(a) The Central Islamic Committee  
 
The first regulation of Islam was the issuance of the Royal Decree on the Royal Patronage of 
Islam B.E. 2488 (1945). The Royal Decree was initiated by Pridi Banomyong, the progressive 
civilian leader of the People’s Party and the Regent of young King Ananda. The preamble of 
the Royal Decree states clearly that Pridi envisioned a central authority to govern Islam in 
Thailand, similar to the Sangha Council for Buddhism. By this decree, Pridi hoped to extend 
the king’s support to Muslims in the Deep South, a gesture of amicable coexistence.154 The 
office of Chularajmontri was revived and the Central Islamic Committee (CIC), and the 
Provincial Islamic Committees (PIC), were created. However, Pridi’s plan was thwarted by the 
1947 coup d’etat. The military junta issued the second royal decree (1948) that degraded 
Chularajmontri from the advisor of the king to the representative of Islam to the DRA.155 The 
1948 Royal Decree was replaced by the Islam Administration Act B.E. 2540 (1997) which 
redesigned the administrative structure of the CIC.156 However, the Islamic administration still 
does not receive as much attention as the Sangha Council. 
 
The 1945 Royal Decree on Islam Patronage designed the CIC to be a self-regulated body on 
which the law delegates power to govern Islamic affairs. Muslims are subject to the CIC, but 
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the CIC receives less privilege and recognition than the Sangha Council. There is no national 
office of Islam acting as a liaison between the CIC and the government. Thus, the CIC reports 
and cooperates with the DRA.  
 
The Central Islamic Committee acts as an advisor to the government as well as oversees the 
administration of provincial offices, mosques, and Islamic education.157 It may issue fatwas 
but its disposition does not carry with it legal authority as the Sangha order enjoys. They are 
merely recommendations, and a violation of the CIC order is not a criminal offence. Similar to 
the Sangha Council, the CIC acts as the agent of the state in monitoring and communicating 
with Muslims, though with much greater difficulty given Islam’s ethnically diverse nature.158  
 
i. The Chularajmontri 
 
The Chularajmontri is a local version of the Sheik al-Islam, or the leader of the Muslim 
communities, which originated from Khorasan.159 The Sheik al-Islam acted as the 
representative of the community to the government, giving the ruler advice on Islamic matters. 
The Ayutthaya Court adopted the idea and appointed a prominent Persian, Sheik Ahmad e-
Quomi, to be the first Chularajmontri, overseeing the Muslim community.160  
 
The pre-modern Chularajmontris were Shi’te Persians and appointment was made on a 
hereditary basis. However, the modern Chularajmontri is chosen from a candidate who is Thai 
by birth and who has a profound understanding of Islam. Also, he is required to be a believer 
in democracy with the king as the head of the state.161 He must be royally affirmed. All modern 
Chularajmontris are Sunni. The change of choice also reflected the changing political 
atmosphere. Shi’ites were in the minority but seen as fostering close ties with the royal palace 
while Sunni were the majority. The first modern Chularajmontri was a Sunni senator and also 
a close friend of Pridi, the leader of the People’s Party. Later, he and Pridi had to flee Thailand 
together after the 1947 military coup.162 Prior to 1997, Chularajmontris had been royally 
appointed for life but the 1997 law changed the selection to an election by provincial 
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committees.163 There was an attempt to set the retirement age too but the move was heavily 
opposed.164  
 
Since 1945, most Chularajmontris were selected from prominent Muslim families around 
Bangkok who are well integrated into the Thai society. Their integration into Thai society, 
however, has become an obstacle to the rule over Malay Muslims in the Deep South who wary 
of the government’s involvement in Islam.165 The current Chularajmontri, Aziz Pitakkumpol, 
who assumed his post in 2010, is the first from the southern province of Songkhla.166 Although 
he is not ethnically Malay, the choice reflects the authority’s attempt to bridge the gap between 
the two Muslim communities. Still, he shoulders a herculean task. The Chularajmontri works 
in two ways: first, acting as the guardian of Muslims in Thailand, and second, maintaining 
peace and order for the state.167 As distrust is high on both sides, the Chularajmontri navigates 
dangerous waters. Recently, there were attempts by the NCPO to ‘integrate’ the Chularajmontri 
into the state by appointing Aziz into the National Legislative Assembly (NLA), which is the 
Legislative apparatus of the junta.168 He declined, citing the need to maintain distance from the 
state.169 But later, his son, Zakee, an academic, accepted an appointment to the Senate.170  
 
By law, the major roles of the Chularajmontri are: (1) to provide advice concerning Islamic 
affairs to the government, (2) to appoint a body of experts to provide advice on Islam, (3) to 
announce the date of Ramadan and other religious events, and (4) to issue fatwas to Thai 
Muslims.171 Unlike the Sangha Raja, he is not protected by any special defamation law. 
 
ii. The CIC Organization 
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Both the 1945 and the 1997 Islam administration laws were drafted during democratic periods. 
Perhaps this political background is the reason why the administration is more democratic and 
less top-down than that of the Sangha Council. Also, its non-monastic nature might contribute 
to a simpler design. There are only three levels: the CIC, PICs, and then mosques. The CIC 
members come from two sources; two-thirds comprise delegates from PICs, and another one-
third is appointed by the Chularajmontri.172 Prior to 1997, the PICs were monopolized by 
influential Muslim figures in a dynastic style.173 The 1997 Islam Administration Act introduces 
a more inclusive system by allowing local imams to vote.174  
 
Not every province has a PIC. Only a province with more than three mosques can then establish 
a provincial committee.175 Currently, there are thirteen provinces that are able to establish a 
committee. Where there are fewer Muslims and mosques to be eligible for a PIC, the CIC is in 
charge or assigns a committee of a nearby province to be in charge.176 Under a provincial 
Islamic committee, each mosque forms its mosque committee.177 There is no equivalent of a 
Buddhist abbot for a mosque. There is no division under the CIC. Sunni and Shi’ite are subject 
to their mosque committee. 
 
The election of PIC is not without problems. There are accusations of vote-buying and some 
Muslims see partisan competition as wrong and un-Islamic.178 Inevitably, the PIC election is 
linked to local politics. In the Deep South, there are reports of the military intervening in the 




Similar to a temple, a mosque must obtain permission before building. However, permission is 
given from a PIC and a district officer.180 There is no royal endorsement. A mosque is to be 
run by a committee headed by an imam, whose term is four years but re-election is permitted.181 
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Unlike a temple, a mosque’s property enjoys no legal protection. The statute of limitations 
applies and property can be appropriated by the court’s decision. It can be purchased or 
transferred through a normal business transaction. Still, as a place of worship, a mosque is 
protected from desecration by the Penal Code.182 
 
(c) State Accommodation  
 
Because of its religious practices, Islam, more than others, requires state accommodation on 
various topics. Some accommodations are open for all but others provide only for those with 
certain conditions i.e. a Muslim Malay from the Deep South. While the government does not 
object to accommodating the faith, the list of accommodations can upset Buddhist onlookers, 





The Hajj Promotion Act B.E. 2524 (1981) accommodates the Muslim’s need to go on the 
sacred pilgrimage of Hajj. An individual may arrange his own trip but the government helps 
accredit credible Hajj tour operators.183 A Hajj tour operator must obtain a license or face up 
to five years imprisonment or a 100,000 baht fine.184 Moreover, the DRA offers interest-free 
loans to subsidize Hajj pilgrimages.185 However, some Buddhists are upset by the state’s 
accommodation of Hajj as they regard it unnecessary and unfair to the Buddhist majority.186    
 
ii. Islamic Bank  
   
The government had long been trying to accommodate Islamic financial principles through 
commercial banks, but in 2002, it decided to establish the Islamic Bank of Thailand as a public 
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enterprise under the arm-length oversight of the Ministry of Finance.187 The Islamic Bank of 
Thailand operates with advice from the Islamic advisory board of six experts in Islam.188   
 
The Islamic Bank of Thailand is a flashpoint for religious tension. Many Buddhists resent the 
bank, seeing it as a special accommodation that Buddhism does not receive.189 There were 
attempts to propose a Buddhist Bank which would operate according to Buddhist principles 
and advance Buddhist causes. The proposal clearly showed misunderstanding or ignorance 
about Islam’s necessity for a unique management of finance. So far, the proposal for a Buddhist 
bank has not been successful due to concern about business feasibility, which has angered 
Buddhist advocates.190   
 
The following sub-sections concern Muslim Malays from the Deep South. Only this ethno-
religious minority may enjoy such privileges that other Muslims do not.  
 
iii. Schooling  
 
Due to cultural differences, Muslim Malays often view the national 12-year compulsory 
education with much skepticism, accusing it as a tool to indoctrinate young generations of the 
Deep South with Buddhist and Thai values.191 As a result, many Muslim Malay parents, in 
order to preserve their identity, prefer to send their children to traditional schools, known as 
the pondok.192 
 
A traditional pondok is a religious boarding school where students stay in residence with their 
teachers. There is no formal syllabus but the Koran, as well as the Malayu and Arabic languages 
occupy much of the learning. Sizes vary from a few students to a hundred or thousand. 
Although the pondok helps Malay Muslim preserve their cultural heritage, it hinders them from 
connecting with the rest of the country. The traditional pondok does not offer basic secular 
subjects such as mathematics, Thai, English, or science, and therefore, graduates are unable to 
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continue to higher education or compete in a job market.193 These social and economic 
shortcomings are considered part of what fuels the Deep South violence.194 The region has also 
witnessed a high unemployment rate and severe poverty.195 Worse, there are reports and 
accusations that pondoks are the recruitment and training centres of Muslim insurgents. The 
security forces have raided several pondoks and demanded the closure of some.196      
 
The government has tried to bring pondok schools into the formal system by recognizing them 
as private Islamic schools and offering them aid. If a pondok school registers under the Private 
School Act and adopts a government-approved Islamic curriculum, it is eligible for 
governmental subsidy.197 There are two types of registered private Islamic school. The first is 
a private Islamic school that teaches both national and Islamic curricula.198 It is similar to other 
private schools, only it offers extra courses in religious subjects. The second type is a private 
Islamic school that teaches only a religious curriculum in an informal education program.199 
Both types are entitled subsidies and a government-prepared Islamic curriculum.200  
 
There is the third type of Islamic school called a Tadika, which provides Islamic schooling for 
small children similar to a Christian Sunday school. Usually it is a supplementary to 
compulsory education. A Tadika is provided in a mosque outside normal school time.201 The 
Tadika is local in origin to the Deep South but the government, in 1997, agreed to allow Tadika 
schools in mosques all over the country. A Tadika, officially known as a Centre for Islamic 
Education at a Mosque, requires approval from the DRA and comes under the supervision of 
the central or provincial Tadika committee.202 However, due to its peculiar nature, oversight of 
Tadikas in the deep south is different. Tadika schools are subject to closer scrutiny because 
they are under the regional and district Tadika administrative committees, which, in addition 
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to government agencies, include local representatives.203 Thus, administration of Deep South 
Tadikas is more participatory and heavily monitored. 
 
There are also tertiary Islamic education institutes available too. But all three of them are 
located in the Deep South region.204  
 
iv. Sharia Law 
   
When the Deep South was annexed into Siamese territory, the government realized the need to 
ease the integration of Malay Muslims. In 1901, the government allowed Sharia to be applied 
in cases concerning marriage or inheritance if both parties, or a defendant, were Muslims.205 
The move followed the British policy in the Malay Peninsula.206 The government would enlist 
local experts on Sharia, who would sit alongside judges and be consulted on Islamic legal 
principles in that matter. This rule affected the four provinces of Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat, and 
Satun. Satun might not have been Malay-dominant but it still held large numbers of Thai 
Muslims. The 1901 Rule was revoked in 1943 when the fascist-leaning government of Field 
Marshall Pibun enforced universal application of the Civil and Commercial Code.207 However, 
this period was brief. The government of Pridi, who also revived the Chularajmontri, restored 
the use of Sharia in the 1946 law.  
 
Sharia is applicable in civil cases concerning marriage, family and inheritance disputes which 
normally come under Book 5 and Book 6 of the Civil and Commercial Code. If all parties in a 
dispute are Muslim, an expert in Sharia, known as a Datuk Yuthitham will be assigned as an 
extra judge to the bench.208 A Datuk is a  knowledgeable local Muslim who is voted by imams 
to act as an expert. A Datuk is enlisted and appointed by the Ministry of Justice.209 He provides 
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the bench with an opinion on the applicable Sharia. His legal opinion is final, and it cannot be 
appealed to the appellate court.210    
 
v. Observance of Religious Holidays 
 
In 1974, Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat, and Satun were granted two extra holidays, Eid al-Fitr and 
Eid al-Adha.211 Interestingly, Somgkhla, which is a nearby province and heavily populated by 
Chinese, was also granted these two extra holidays, starting in 2013.212 However, more 
interesting is the addition of Chinese New Year to Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat, and Satun, but 
not Songkhla, in 2012. This policy was seen as an attempt to appease the Chinese minority so 
as not to feel neglected.213    
    
D. Tier 3: Christianity, Hinduism, and Sikhism 
 
Christianity, Hinduism, and Sikhism belong to the third category. The state recognizes them 
but there is no statutory delegation of administrative power to a specific body to regulate them. 
Instead, there are a number of religious organizations that are recognized by the DRA. These 
bodies can be deemed representatives, but not as exclusive as the Sangha Council or the CIC. 
They register as non-profit organizations under the Civil and Commerce Code so their orders 
have no statutory sanction. Of the three, Christianity is the largest with a population slightly 
above one percent. Hindu and Sikh populations are markedly smaller. All of them show no 
signs of an increase in population. Although these religions have been in contact with Thai 
society for a long time, they are viewed with a sense of ‘otherness’. They are the religions of 
foreigners, not Thais. Surprisingly, they actually enjoy better, more amicable, relationships 
with Thais than Islam does. Recognition appears to be symbolic, having no tangible effects on 
the three religions.    
 
(a) Christianity  
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Christianity forms a complicated relationship with Thailand. On the one hand, Christians are 
the purveyors of modernity, technological advancement, and quality education. They have built 
much social capital from offering these services to Thais. On the other hand, their arrival 
signals an existential threat to the survival of Buddhism and Thainess. Many Buddhists still 
see them as an untrustworthy rival.  
 
Christianity in Thailand began in the seventeenth century CE with the arrival of Catholic 
missionaries. Priests came with the Portugal convoys, and, later, the French.214 They were 
welcomed to stay and teach Christianity but they soon suffered from involvement in 
Ayutthaya’s power struggle. As part of the attempts to dominate Siam, French missionaries 
persuaded King Narai to convert to Christianity, an act that upset many Thais who strongly 
believed in the concept of Buddhist kingship.215 Finally, the anti-Western sentiment triggered 
a coup by Siamese aristocrats which expelled almost all foreigners, including missionaries, 
from the kingdom.216 Christianity was almost totally wiped out except a few small communities 
of converts upcountry.217  
 
Christianity’s second wave came in the mid-nineteenth Century when American Protestant 
missionaries arrived in Bangkok. They brought with them new technologies, for example, 
vaccines and printing, as well as the social services of schools and hospitals.218 The government 
welcomed these new technologies but remained sceptical. They were allowed to establish 
churches but their missionary work was discouraged by the Bangkok government as well as 
local rulers in the North.219 At a time when religion and political authority were mixed together, 
converting to Christianity meant that a person was no longer a subject of Buddhist Siam. Thus, 
a Christian Siamese was no longer Thai and, therefore, released from his civic duties, a grave 
concern for local lords who relied on corvée labour.220 In the early days, Christians tended to 
live in their own communities, forbidden by priests from participating in local festivals, which 
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were Buddhist-animistic in nature.221 The fact that Christian missionaries were operating at the 
height of colonization in Far East Asia exacerbated the problem. They were seen as 
accomplices of the Western colonial powers, a fear that has prevailed up until the present day. 
As a result, Christians were harassed by the authorities. At the beginning of WWII, the fascist-
leaning government of Field Marshall Pibun persecuted several Christians on suspicion of 
French espionage.222   
 
Hostility against Christianity persisted well into the 1970s, though mostly in a verbal form. 
Christian priests openly challenged and undermined Buddhism and Lord Buddha, inciting 
strong rebuttals from the Buddhist intelligentsia who tried to prove that Buddhism was on par 
with Christianity.223 The fight subsided after the Vatican Council II when Christians adopted a 
more amicable approach and also Buddhists’ attention was diverted to Islam.224    
 
Despite hostility, Christianity managed to gain a foothold. Their persistence and charity work 
convinced many marginalized people, for example, hill tribes, to accept Christianity.225 
Another group comprises Christians fleeing persecution back home, e.g. Vietnamese and 
Chinese Christians.226 Christians have scattered throughout the country. Although Christianity 
has not been so successful at converting Thai aristocrats, many have been educated by Catholic 
and Protestant schools and have become powerful allies, especially when they are targeted by 
radical Buddhists.227 Discrimination against Christianity appears only in minor forms, such as 
restrictions on using Buddhist terms to describe their rites and dioceses.228 The most recent 
incident was in 2004 when the Christian group tried to promote a Christian-inspired book, The 
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Power of Living, which became a phenomenon. Due to its overwhelming popularity Buddhists 
campaigned for a confiscation of materials.229  
 
There are several Christian groups operating in Thailand. The majority fall under five officially 
recognized churches: The Catholic Bishop’s Conference of Thailand, the Church of Christ in 
Thailand, the Evangelical Fellowship of Thailand, the Thai Baptist Church, and the Seventh 
Day Adventist Church of Thailand. There are independent churches too. There is no law that 
requires all Christians to associate with the five recognized churches.    
 
There have been attempts to promote a Christian administrative bill. A Christian administrative 
bill was introduced twice, once after the 2006 coup d’etat and another after the 2014 coup 
d’etat. Both attempts failed. The failures are not the result of hostility but more of inertia 
because the matter is not prioritized by the authorities. A Christian administrative bill would 
be more complicated than Buddhist or Islamic ones because it would have to recognize all five 
existing churches which could not be placed under a single head.230 Nevertheless, some 
Christians reacted angrily to the attempt, fearing that the law would subject them to the 
Buddhist government.231      
 
(b) Hinduism and Sikhism 
 
Hinduism and Sikhism have the smallest numbers of followers among the five official 
religions. Religions of Indian diasporic communities constitute less than one percent of the 
population, with Hindu and Sikh communities not seeking expansion and preferring to preserve 
their religions within ethnically Indian communities. They enjoy a very peaceful relationship 
with the Thai authorities and their Buddhist neighbours.  
 
Indian civilization arrived in mainland Southeast Asia in ancient times. Buddhism was widely 
adopted while Hinduism was discreetly incorporated into local beliefs, producing syncretic 
Buddhism. Hindu mythology greatly influenced Thai literature, arts, languages, religions, 
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rituals, and politics.232 The Siamese Court always had Brahmans to serve in public and private 
ceremonies. However, the influence of Hinduism discontinued with the arrival of the 
Europeans.  
 
The modern wave of Indians arrived in the early Bangkok era.233 Indians from various part of 
the sub-continent came as the British’s subjects, merchants and employees, and soon dispersed 
throughout the country.234 They then began building Hindu temples and Sikh Gurudwaras as 
their places of worship. In addition to being places of worship, these sites served as their 
cultural and social centres where oversea Indians and their children learned about their culture 
and strengthened their ties with the motherland.235  
 
At present, there are three officially recognized Hindu organizations. They are registered as 
societies under the Civil and Commercial Code. The Hindu Dhamma Sabha oversees the 
Mariamman Shrine. Most members of the Hindu Dhamma Sabha are Shiv’ite Tamil from 
Southern India.236 The Hindu Samaj Society is located at Dev Mondir shrine. Members are 
mainly Vishnu’ite Punjabi.237 Another Hindu body that is recognized by the DRA is the Royal 
Brahmin Office which has served the Royal Palace since King Rama I. There are other Hindu 
societies but their purposes are more for socialization than religious purposes.  
 
Hinduism presents a very interesting case. Due to its long history, the first wave of Hinduism 
was indigenized. Many famous shrines in Bangkok are part of the local syncretic culture. But 
when the second wave of Hinduism arrived, they were deemed foreign. The above-mentioned 
Hindu temples are not Thai, yet Buddhists are receptive of them. They visit these shrines to 
pray and make merit. Thousands attend Nawaratri at Mariamman Shrine as well as other 
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ceremonies held by other Hindu temples. The independent group of Vishva Parichat holds 
Ganesh Jaturathi, which is attended by thousands of Thais.238  
 
There are two recognized Sikh organizations. The larger one is Sri Guru Singh Sabha and the 
smaller one is the Namdhari Sangat of Thailand. Each of them belongs to a different Sikh 
sect.239  
 
E. Tier 4: Other Religions  
 
The constitutional guarantee of religious freedom extends well beyond the official five. A 
potpourri of various faiths is excluded from the DRA. Some of them keep a low profile while 
others can be very visible. There are no exact figures regarding the unrecognized groups but 
some notable examples include Judaism, Taoism, and Confucianism. The latter two are usually 
regarded as parts of Mahayana Buddhism. Judaism, on the other hand, is practised by non-
Thais. There are synagogues in all big cities with sizeable populations of foreigners, for 
example, Bangkok, Chiang Mai, Samui Island, and Phuket.240 The number of resident 
followers may not exceed a few hundred but they claim to serve thousands of tourists every 
year. They might not enjoy any state support but they do not face any hindrances either.   
 
There are also many religious groups that are excluded by co-religionists. The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, or the Mormon Church, has been operating in Thailand for more 
than fifty years and has recruited both Thais and Western followers but is not recognized by 
the DRA.241 So, too, has the Jehovah’s Witness Church. 
 
Other main examples are unconventional Buddhist groups. Soka Gakkai is a Mahayana 
Buddhist cult originating from Japan as a part of the new Buddhist movement which sprang up 
around the 1960s – 1970s in response to the rapid socio-economic transformation of East 
Asia.242 It is highly organized and international, having chapters in many countries including 
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Thailand. However, it differs from the conventional Sangha in being led by lay leaders, not 
monks, and thus does not come under the Sangha Council. It operates as a non-governmental 
organization (NGO). Another new Buddhist cult is Fa Lun Da Fa from mainland China. Some 
domestic Buddhist groups fall into this category as well. The Bhikhuni, or the female monks, 
movement is not recognized by the Sangha Council, and Santi Asoke was expelled decades 
ago for its disobedience.   
 
In general, the Thai government welcomes these religious organizations. They can register as 
private legal entities so they may own property and conduct activities. However, in the case of 
Fa Lun Da Fa, commonly known as Fa Lun Gong, there has been intervention from the 
government of the People’s Republic of China. Although Thailand sees such intervention as 
political, not religious, freedom of religion suffers collateral damage. The Chinese government 
was accused of directing Thai police to arrest and deport protesters.243 When Fa Lun Da Fa 
tried to register an association in 2005, the government of China PRC strongly protested against 
it.244 The Ministry of Interior then refused to grant registration, citing diplomatic concerns. Fa 
Lun Da Fa brought the case to the administrative court, which, in 2015, ruled in their favour. 
Again, China strongly condemned the decision.245 Both Bhikhuni and Santi Asoke are subject 
to legal discrimination. The Bhikhuni are forbidden from holding ordinations within Thailand 
where the Sangha Council’s jurisdiction reigns. Santi Asoke faced several charges but all were 
dropped.  
 
F. Religions in Thailand: Thainess vs. Pluralism 
 
This and the preceeding chapters have shown the complex entanglement of Buddhism and 
other religions in Thailand’s legal system. Religion is a public matter in which the state must 
get involved by promoting, protecting, and, most importantly, regulating. There is an extensive 
legal scheme that fosters, supports, and controls religions. The baseline of Thailand’s religious 
policy is that all religions, regardless of their registration status, are free to practise and 
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disseminate their beliefs. The state accommodates religious belief as appropriate. However, 
they will not receive equal promotion. This ‘free but not equal’ policy has resulted in the multi-
tier regulation of officially recognized religions.  
 
The biggest factor that shapes religious policy is the ideology of Thainess, consisting of the 
nation, religion, and the king. Exercise of religious freedom must not, in any way, jeopardize 
the notion of Thainess, which inevitably leads to Buddhism’s dominance. Despite there being 
no establishment of a state religion, the official narrative is that Thailand is a Buddhist nation. 
The state pays most attention and provides most benefits to Buddhism. The religion also enjoys 
the most special and intimate relationship with the state. It is regarded as the faith professed by 
the overwhelming majority of Thais from time immemorial. Its political and cultural 
importance results in a semi-agency status and a scheme of benefits. Its relationship with the 
state is governed by special administrative law and other complex sets of statutes, regulations, 
and policies. Any religious groups that attempt to compete with, or threaten the status quo of, 
Buddhism can face negative consequences.  
 
However, there is a trade-off for Buddhism. Support and control are sometimes 
undistinguishable. More support naturally means more control. The drive to control Buddhism 
stems from the duty to support Buddhism as well as the need to control Buddhism’s ability to 
legitimize and challenge those in power. As a result, Buddhism is subject to a very extensive 
monitoring scheme of its monks and practices. The state prioritizes the goal of the unity and 
purity of the Sangha and the sacrifice of individual freedom. The Sangha Council monopolizes 
Thai Buddhism, leaving little room for any unconventional interpretation of the Pali canon. As 
long as the Sangha does not challenge the state, it is ensured various privileges and its 
dominance in the political landscape. However, a sect or a monk that threatens the state’s 
interests will be subdued. Buddhism must be separated from politics in the forms of the 
disenfranchisement of monks or disqualification by the ordination of local politicians. The 
purpose of the separation is not to create a secular state, but to honour or highlight Buddhism’s 
moral high ground. Thus, monks are barred from politics only in the narrowest sense, from 
national and local elections, but they remain politically influential.  
 
Ironically, followers of other religions in which the state has less stake, may enjoy greater 
liberty to observe and practise according to their personal conviction. Islam enjoys state-




policy on Islam is influenced by its long history of service to the Siamese court as well as 
political necessity after Siam created the nation-state. The state’s attention is unevenly directed 
towards Islam in the Deep South where violence is a political concern. As a result, many 
benefits are geographically specific. The third tier, Christianity, Hinduism, and Sikhism, as 
well as other unrecognized religions in the fourth tier, receive almost no attention. They are 
considered more foreign so they receive even less promotion. However, their status proves to 
be no hindrance to their practice, proselytization, or observance. The difference between the 
third and the fourth tier is minimal. The further a religion is placed from the state, the more 
flexible it becomes.   
 
Recently, there has been a change at the constitutional level. Formerly, the presence of religion 
in constitutions is rather symbolic. This is evident from the refusal to establish Buddhism as 
the state religion. Drafters and advocates all agree that Buddhism is the de facto state religion. 
Still, constitution drafters have chosen not to manifest it in law. Yet there is a growing demand 
for more substantial recognition, resulting in a new, more obvious, policy directive, which is 
written in a less tolerant manner. This is also not a uniquely Thai phenomenon because the 
trend is also reported in Sri Lanka and Myanmar, and possibly in Laos and Cambodia too. 
Buddhist advocate groups are pushing for Buddhism’s superiority. Is it possible that this 
phenomenon is fuelled by Buddhist ideology? Is Buddhism revealing its tendencies in law and 





V. Thai Law of Religions and International Human Rights 
 
The preceding chapters detailed Thailand’s extensive involvement in religious affairs, 
especially those regarding Buddhism. They explored how law makers and enforcers deal with 
the topic of religions; how they recognize, control, accommodate, utilize, or even ignore, 
different religions in society. This is the product of two major forces that shape Thailand’s 
legal arrangements. Traditional Buddhist belief has always been an important source of 
ideology and inspiration but the system at present is also influenced by modern liberal 
democratic ideas, which has been particularly the case since 1932 when the People’s Party 
installed a democratic form of government. For the first time in Thai political history, the rights 
and liberties of the people were guaranteed in Thailand’s first written constitution and have 
remained so ever since. This chapter, by switching from an exposition to evaluation of the 
subject, evaluates the legal system as it affects religions through the lens of international human 
rights norms. While the law claims to respect international human rights, there are many areas 
where the laws are incompatible with universal standards.  
 
This chapter evaluates international human rights norms in the Thai legal system on two levels: 
the textual and the actual level. Often, an abstract protection does not translate into an actual 
practice. The formal law is sometimes ignored or abandoned. Therefore, it is crucial that human 
rights be considered at both the textual and practical levels.  
 
The chapter begins with establishing what the international human rights regarding religions 
are. Then, it presents an overview of Buddhism and freedom of religion by asking how 
Buddhist-majority states fare in protecting religious freedom. It looks into various reports of 
religious violence and other forms of intolerance in which Buddhists are the actors and the 
victims. This overview portrays Thailand in a broader context, identifying the types of religious 
conflicts Thailand is actually experiencing before probing into the legal arrangements in a later 
section. It then follows the previous two chapters by considering the possibility of human rights 
violations in three sections: Thailand’s constitutional arrangement, the multi-tier system, and 
individual freedom.    
 





The first modern major document from which international human rights norms derive is the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).1 Most articles already indirectly protect a 
person’s right to enjoy his religious choice, for example, freedom from slavery and torture, 
freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly.2 But the two key articles that deal directly 
with religion are Article 2 and Article 18. Article 2 focuses on religious equality; a person is 
entitled to all rights and freedoms set forth in the UDHR, without distinction of any kind 
including religion:3  
 
“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as … religion … or other status.” 
 
Article 18 addresses freedom of religion:4  
 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, 
worship and observance.”  
 
Article 18 recognizes that: First, there is the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion, which is considered an internal aspect, hence forum internum; Second, there is the 
right to manifest such belief, either in public or private, in the form of teaching, practice, 
worship, and observance, which is known as forum externum.  
 
Freedom of religion is not without controversy. Contracting states, the majority of whose 
populations are Muslim, proposed the deletion of the freedom to change religion, reasoning its 
conflict with Islamic principles as well as scepticism over Christian missionary activities.5 
Also, communist countries, led by the Soviet Union, proposed the limitation of freedom of 
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religion subject to domestic law and public morality.6 Both proposals were rejected, which led 
to Saudi Arabia rejecting the entire UDHR. No Buddhist-majority country was involved in the 
drafting and voting.  
 
Intensification of the Cold War delayed further development in human rights treaties until the 
UDHR was implemented by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
in 1966, which provides greater details. So far, the ICCPR is the only treaty with binding effect 
on religious freedom. Its Article 18 confirms that:  
 
“1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This 
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and 
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to 
adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 
 
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 
 
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty 
of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral 
education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.” 
 
Paragraph 1 repeats that of the UDHR, that a person has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion, and the freedom to the manifestation of such belief. The Human Right 
Committee’s General Comment 22 states that freedom of religion must be broadly construed 
so as to mean it shall encompass monotheistic, theistic, non-theistic, as well as atheistic 
beliefs.7 Traditional and newly-established religions are entitled to the same freedom.8 
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Paragraph 2 tries to compromise the longstanding controversy around the right to change 
religion. Originally, the draft ICCPR contained a clause recognizing the right of an individual 
to persuade others, but the Muslim-majority countries strongly resisted, arguing that the right 
to have religion did not include the right to change it, which was perceived as a threat to Islam.9 
Proselytism, in their opinion, put a non-missionary religion like Islam at a disadvantage. Even 
other countries, Sri Lanka and China for example, sympathized and expressed their concerns 
for, in the past, they had suffered political intervention motivated by religious reasons, although 
they did not vote in favour of the deletion of such clause.10 Muslim-majority countries then 
proposed the right to maintain religion and freedom from coercion. As a result, Paragraph 2 of 
Article 18 reads “no one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have 
or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.”11 The explicit clause on the right to change 
religion was dropped. However, subsequently, General Comment 22 confirms that the freedom 
to have or adopt a religion must include the right to change one.12 
 
Unlike the UDHR, where all rights are subject to the same set of grounds for limitation, in the 
ICCPR, each right is subject to specific grounds. As in paragraph 3, internal freedom is deemed 
absolute but the right to manifestation can be limited if that limitation is prescribed by law, and 
is necessary for the protection of public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others.13 While the grounds for limiting the freedom to religious 
manifestation are broad, it must not be interpreted as the destruction of any of the rights and 
freedoms recognized by the ICCPR or greater limitations than that provided in the ICCPR.14 
Notably, limitation on religious manifestation on the grounds of national security is not 
permissible. Even more striking is the fact that freedom of religion is protected from derogation 
even in times of public emergency.15 
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The fourth paragraph encourages states to take into consideration the parental right to ensure 
the religious and moral education of choice for their children.16 This is an area where Thailand 
is often criticized.  
 
The above disagreement on the drafting of Article 18 is reflected in the absence of a subsequent 
convention on religious freedom.17 Only the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief was adopted as late as 1981 (the 
1981 Declaration). The 1981 Declaration encourages the elimination of religious 
discrimination and intolerance, which it defines as any distinction, exclusion, restriction or 
preference based on religion or belief and having as its purpose or as its effect nullification or 
impairment of the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms on an equal basis.18 Its Article 5 reaffirms the right of the parent to provide their 
children religious and moral education according to their conviction.19  
 
Article 6 elaborates upon the scope and meaning of the freedom of religion, by stating it shall 
include the following freedoms: (a) to worship or assemble, and to establish and maintain 
places for these purposes; (b) to establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian 
institutions; (c) to make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and 
materials related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief; (d) to write, issue and 
disseminate relevant publications; (e) to teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these 
purposes; (f) to solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals 
and institutions; (g) to train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders called 
for by the requirements and standards of any religion or belief; (h) to observe days of rest and 
to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of one's religion or belief; 
and (i) to establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in matters 
of religion and belief at the national and international levels. Article 6 demonstrates that 
freedom of religion is to be understood from a broader perspective. In addition to individual 
freedom, freedom of religion concerns the rights of an organized religion. This notion matches 
General Comment 22 which extends the rights of manifestation to acts of religious groups, for 
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example, their right to choose their own religious leader, priests, and teachers, their freedom to 
establish seminaries or religious schools, and their freedom to distribute religious texts and 
publications.20 Thus, in order to successfully maximize the enjoyment of religious freedom, 
freedom of religion goes beyond the protection of an individual to the issue of the state-church 
relationship and the autonomy of organized religions. 
 
Another covenant that was promulgated in 1966 is the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICECSR). The ICECSR concerns the so-called second-generation 
rights that require state intervention. Its main supporters came from the socialist camp while 
the liberal-democratic camp advocated the ICCPR.21 The ICECSR does not add any extra 
guarantee to freedom of religion but it reiterates that rights enunciated by the covenant shall be 
enjoyed in a non-discriminatory manner.22 Individuals can access employment, fair wage, 
education, adequate standard of living, cultural rights and other welfares regardless of one’s 
religious conviction.23 The ICECSR therefore affirms the principle of religious equality as laid 
out by Article 2 of the UDHR.  
 
From the above documents, Tore Lindholm identifies eight principles concerning freedom of 
religion:24  
(1) internal freedom of thought, conscience, and religion,  
(2) external freedom of manifestation, in private and public, individually and 
collectively,  
(3) non-coercion,  
(4) non-discrimination,  
(5) parental right to ensure religious and moral education of choice,  
(6) autonomy of an organized religion,  
(7) limits of permissible restriction on external freedom, and  
(8) non-derogation.  
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In addition to the UDHR and ICCPR, another influential treaty is the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Article 9),25 under which the European Court of Human Rights has produced 
several judgements and decisions concerning freedom of religion. The UDHR and ICCPR have 
later inspired several regional rights documents. These include the American Convention on 
Human Rights,26 the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights,27 and the Final Act of the 
Helsinki Conference.28  
 
Thailand itself is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In 2008, 
this loose regional cooperation that began in 1967 acquired an international juristic personality 
by adopting the ASEAN Charter.29 Article 14 of the Charter mandates that ‘ASEAN shall 
establish an ASEAN human rights body.’30 ‘Body’ is ill-defined31 but, as part of the response 
to that mandate, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Declaration of Human Rights (ADHR) in 2012. 
ADHR contains, in Article 22, the following clause on the freedom of religion: ‘that every 
person has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; that all forms of 
intolerance, discrimination and incitement of hatred based on religion and beliefs shall be 
eliminated.’32  
 
On the one hand, the ADHR is a huge leap forward in the area of human rights in Southeast 
Asia, which is known for human rights abuses.33 Indeed, it is the first regional human rights 
document in Asia.34 ASEAN had previously been reluctant to address human rights issues.35 
On the other hand, human rights activists criticize it because Article 22 shows little 
resemblance to the ICCPR standard. Article 22 notably omits the explicit guarantee of freedom 
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of manifestation. It only states that intolerance, discrimination, and incitement must be 
eliminated, which falls short of the full protection of the external forum. Also, Article 22 does 
not specify the right to change religion, which is one of the most fundamental aspects of the 
internal forum.  
 
Moreover, the grounds for restriction of religious freedom in the ADHR are more extensive 
than in the ICCPR. The exercising of human rights can be limited in order to protect the rights 
of others or to meet the just requirements of national security, public order, public health, public 
safety, public morality, as well as the general welfare of the peoples in a democratic society.36 
As a result, rather than embracing the global norm into a local context, critics see the document 
as selecting and deflecting the norms in order to preserve the region’s status quo. The ADHR 
was not expected to have any real impact other than window-dressing.37 Another observer has 
a kinder view of the ADHR as aspiring, and possibly, initiating a dialogue in a desirable 
direction.38  
 
The shortcomings of Article 22 can be explained by the religious and legal diversity of ASEAN 
members. Southeast Asia is one of the most religiously diverse regions in the world.39 
Demographically, Theravada Buddhism dominates the mainland with the exception of 
Vietnam, which adopts Mahayana Buddhism and Taoism but also comes under communist 
influence. The archipelago is home to Islam, with Indonesia the largest Muslim population in 
the world. The majority of the Philippines is Catholic. All of these countries have tensions, or 
even violent conflicts, concerning the religious minorities of Islam and Christianity, depending 
on the locations.40 Constitutionally, there are all types of constitutional arrangement concerning 
religion, from full establishment in Muslim nations and Cambodia, to a varying degrees of mild 
establishments of Buddhism in Theravada countries, and the officially atheist states of 
Vietnam, the Philippines, and Singapore.41 There is no mutual understanding of what is the 
proper arrangement so finding consensus on religious freedom in ASEAN is difficult. Article 
22 is a compromise accommodating these diversities. This shortcoming is exacerbated by 
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another factor, that of poor human rights records. Countries in Southeast Asia have been, or 
recently were, governed by civilian and military autocratic leaders whose regimes have given 
rise to reports of human rights violations. ASEAN has adopted the convention of strictly 
respecting national sovereignty and not intervening in domestic issues, including human rights 
violations.42 Low interest in human rights results in the fact that, despite the mandate by Article 
14 of the ASEAN Charter, there has not been a body to enforce the document. No human rights 
monitoring body, or a regional court of human rights, has been established. Thus, there is little 
about the ADHR that can contribute to the discussion. We have to rely on global human rights 
norms. 
 
B. Overview: Buddhism and Religious Rights  
 
Before looking specifically at Thailand, this section attempts to provide an overview of the 
relationship of Buddhism and religious rights. Buddhists constitute the majority in a number 
of Asian countries, within which live religious minorities of Islam, Christianity, or even their 
non-conventional compatriots. The question is, how do Buddhist-majority states deal with this 
diversity? Do they incite religious violence or discriminatory treatment? If so, how serious is 
the violation of religious rights? Although Buddhism cannot be pinpointed as the cause of these 
incitements and discrimination, this overview may at least demonstrate an interesting 
correlation, which will be further examined in subsequent parts. In pursuing the objective of 
demonstrating this correlation, religious rights are to be assessed from the perspectives of state 
and non-state actors. Though not being parts of the government, non-state actors are often 
encouraged, directly by the state, or indirectly through the ideology and aided by the legal 
system. Thus, they must be included.   
 
A detailed discussion of Buddhism’s view on human rights will follow in the subsequent 
chapter. Overall, Buddhism is often portrayed as a peace-loving religion so it is assumed to 
embrace the concept of human rights as well. Many Buddhist leaders see no contradiction and 
appreciate the contribution of human rights to human development according to Buddhist 
ideas.43 However, despite the reputation, countries with Buddhist majorities regularly appear 
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at the top of the Pew Research Center's Index of Government Restriction (GRI). The GRI ranks 
countries according to the level of governmental restrictive acts related to religion. Scores are 
calculated from indicators ranging from physical abuses to hostile or discriminatory policies 
from the state, which are collected through the various reports of governments and international 
organizations.44 Very high or high GRI means that citizens probably enjoy less religious 
freedom. Since 2006-2007, the first years during which Pew began analysing data, a group of 
Buddhist-majority countries – Myanmar, Laos, and Sri Lanka – regularly appeared in the very 
high or high groups. In 2013, except Cambodia, countries with significant Buddhist population 
(above 50 percent),45 Myanmar, Laos, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bhutan, had high or very high 
GRI.46 Notably, almost all of them practise Theravada Buddhism except Bhutan which abides 
by Vajirayana Buddhism. In 2015, GRI remained very high or high for Bhutan, Myanmar, and 
Laos. Sri Lanka’s, and Thailand’s GRI dropped to moderate.47 The only Buddhist-majority 
country that defied the trend is Cambodia, which always scores very low. 
 
A more specific study is Fox’s empirical study of religious freedom in ASEAN, which he 
compares with some other major religions in the world. He discovered no discernible pattern 
among Southeast Asia’s Buddhist-majority countries.48 The level of discrimination and 
hostility has remained unchanged since 1990. Myanmar and Laos have always been ranked 
very high, among the highest in the world.49 Laos has adopted communist ideology, which is 
against religion in general.50 Myanmar, in contrast, has switched from military dictatorship to 
democratic civilian rule, yet it remains hostile and discriminatory. Thus, the type of regime can 
be discarded as a factor. It is more likely that religion, which the two share in common, plays 
the contributing role. According to the research conducted by Pew and Fox, although it is rarely 
mentioned, Buddhist-majority countries witness higher-than-standard hostility. Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, Buddhism is probably the second most hostile religion in Southeast 
Asia, and possibly, Asia-Pacific. 
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As religious restrictions are often committed by non-state actors as well, sometimes with the 
blessing of the state, Pew also devised the Social Hostility Index (SHI) which focuses on the 
hostility of non-state actors. The SHI tracks hostility, ranging from armed conflict, to sectarian 
violence, to intimidation, committed by private individuals and groups.51 Here, Buddhist-
majority countries can be grouped into two. Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Thailand are in the ‘high’ 
group. In 2009, Sri Lanka’s SHI was very high. Myanmar’s was high and Thailand moderate. 
However, in 2014, the SHI score for all three showed an increase to very high. In 2017, they 
all returned to high.52 These are countries which abide by Theravada Buddhism with a strong 
preference for Buddhism in their constitutions. The ‘low’ group consists of Laos, Cambodia, 
and Bhutan. Cambodia has remained low since 2009. Laos and Bhutan have fluctuated between 
medium and low. Overall, their SHI is lower than their GRI. Still, the same set of Buddhist-
majority countries, except for Cambodia, shows very high, high, or moderate SHI, which is 
higher than the global average SHI score.53 
 
Of these Buddhist-majority countries, Myanmar and Sri Lanka were specifically mentioned in 
reports from Freedom of the World 2015 and the International Religious Freedom Report 
(IRFR) which noted the rise of religion-related conflicts.54 The two countries showed signs of 
religious extremism and growing intolerance. Later, Myanmar, in particular, was put under the 
global spotlight following the Rohingya crisis where Buddhist monks openly incited violence 
against the Muslim Rohingya in Rakhine province, which justified and encouraged systematic 
ethnic cleansing by the Buddhist-centric Burmese Army.55 Myanmar recently passed a series 
of laws on family that effectively prohibited inter-religious marriage. These laws attempt to 
preserve Buddhist dominance.56 In Sri Lanka, there have been reports of attacks on Christian 
churches, personnel, and services.57 Also, there are reports of hate speech and the desecration 
of Muslim sites of worship.58 Violations of religious freedoms in other Buddhist-majority 
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countries are less serious or at least non-violent. Policies favour Buddhism, which receives 
more funding and attention. Even in Cambodia, there are reports of delay in the registration of 
religious organizations, confiscation of materials, or interruption of the dissemination of non-
Buddhist religions.59 Hostility is often directed toward Christians but Muslims suffer too. 
 
The situation in Thailand is unique. Although it is not leading the group in terms of the SHI 
and GRI, its record shows both inter-religious and intra-religious hostility. There are reports of 
Buddhist-Muslim conflicts as well as sectarian disputes within Buddhism. Although its GRI is 
not ranked as high as Myanmar, Sri Lanka, or Laos, disputes sometimes turn deadly. 
 
The most serious case of inter-religious violence is the Buddhist-Muslim conflict in the Deep 
South. The ethnoreligious conflict has resulted in Muslims being profiled by the Thai armed 
forces who have invaded their places of worship, and intervened in restricted practices for 
national security reasons. Muslim Malays have been on the receiving end of mistreatment 
through such acts as unwarranted detention, torture, or forced disappearance.60 In retaliation, 
Muslim insurgents have attacked Buddhists, monks, and temples. Other religions have been 
caught in the crossfire too, for example, the burning of a historical Chinese shrine was reported 
by the Special Rapporteur, probably as the result of military operations at the nearby mosque.61 
Elsewhere, there have been other examples too, though less systematic. In 1991, the 
government raided the office of the Unification Church, known as the Moonies.62 More 
recently, there have also been reports of the Thai government attempting to expel Falun Gong 
members and fleeing Rohingya Muslims.63  
 
The sectarian dispute within the Thai Sangha is unique as no other Buddhist country has 
reported similar incidents. When the Sangha is a part of the state, with monopoly power backed 
by law, conflicts with non-conformist groups are inevitable. Harassment of non-mainstream 
schools of Buddhism goes back as far as in 1991, when the Special Rapporteur reported that 
the combined force of police, local officials, the National Buddhist Office, and senior abbots 
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raided the radical Temple of Hoopa Sawan (Heaven Valley Temple).64 Furthermore, there have 
recently been reports of other more well-known groups experiencing discrimination and 
harassment by the state. These include members of non-mainstream Buddhism such as the 
female monk movement, the Santi Asoke, and Dhammakaya.65 Harassment comes in the form 
of excommunication, denial of registration, or legal action. In the case of the Dhammakaya, 
the state ultimately used violent force to take over control of the controversial temple resulting 
in a few deaths. 
 
In all these cases, the laws contribute, either directly or indirectly, to the infringement of 
religious freedom. Some laws, for example, Myanmar’s inter-religious marriage law, amount 
to outright discrimination against religious minorities. In other cases, the laws provide the 
government the authority to violate freedoms. Emergency law in the Deep South of Thailand 
allows security forces to intimidate Muslims while the Sangha Law enables the state to crack 
down on dissident groups. Even in the case of social hostilities, an anti-minority sentiment may 
be fostered by one religion’s dominance, which is crafted through a complex web of laws and 
regulations. The rest of the chapter will analyse the Thai laws asking how they promote, 
protect, or conflict with the international human rights standards.  
 
C. Constitutional Relationship 
 
First and foremost, there is a question of whether Thailand’s constitutional relationship with 
Buddhism itself violates international human rights standards. As has already been shown, 
indicators of the presence of Buddhism are few but important. The Thai constitutional system 
embraces Buddhism as part of its identity, and the head of state must practise Buddhism. 
Buddhist symbolism is incorporated into the language, calendar, national flag, and state 
ceremonies. Most importantly, the Constitution contains a provision that recognizes Buddhism 
as being under the state’s support and protection. Is this constitutional arrangement permissible 
under international human rights norms?   
 
The main concern, from the human rights perspective, is the establishment of a state religion. 
Although the number of countries with an established state religion has gradually decreased 
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since when the ICCPR was signed, a significant number still retain some form of religious 
establishment.66 The UDHR, the two covenants, as well as the 1981 Convention, all concern 
only the guarantee of the individual and group rights. They focus primarily on equality, internal 
and external freedom, and extend their scope to the autonomy of organized religions. They 
neither outlaw nor recommend a particular model of religion-state relationship. Thus, the 
conventional opinion is that an establishment is not a violation of religious freedom. 
 
There are two arguments that support this widespread opinion. The first is historical.67 During 
the drafting of the ICCPR, the idea of prohibiting an establishment had been proposed, debated, 
and ultimately rejected.68 This rejection confirms that the form of state-religion relationship is 
irrelevant to human rights. Nonetheless, this idea has been criticized for it relies on the drafting 
history and, as a consequence, fails to take into account subsequent developments in the field. 
 
The second argument examines the nature of establishment and argues that an establishment, 
in itself, does not present a human rights problem. In General Comment 22, the Human Rights 
Committee concludes that the fact that a religion is recognized as the state religion, or labelled 
as an official or traditional religion, or followed by the majority, does not impair enjoyment of 
any rights in the ICCPR.69 This comment seems to resonate with the opinion provided by the 
Krishnaswami report. Commissioned to study discrimination in the matter of religious rights 
and practices, Krishnaswami cautiously approached the question, admitting that establishment 
had once been linked to the exclusion or subordination of other religions. However, he 
concluded that, at the time of his research, establishment did not necessarily lead to human 
rights violations. Some states with established religions were able to produce good records of 
religious freedom. Krishnaswami differentiated the latter from the former because their 
establishment survived as “a mere historical relic.”70 The European Court of Human Rights 
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finds that the state church system does not violate Article 9 of the ECHR as long as the state 
provides sufficient safeguards for the rights of individuals.71  
 
This dichotomy of establishment as a mandatory belief system and as cultural heritage, which 
differentiates a repressive from an acceptable form of establishment, appears to be 
acknowledged by other scholars. De Jong notes that some states with an established church 
eventually undergo the process of secularization while others tighten their relationship with the 
dominant religions.72 Laborde distinguishes a full establishment from a modest one. A full 
establishment is characterized by the official support of one belief and inadequate respect of 
religious freedom while a modest establishment, despite the official support of a religion, 
provides religious freedom to other religious groups.73 Ahdar and Leigh identify theocracy, de 
facto, and de jure establishments. A state may have a deep and complex relationship with a 
religion, guided by moral commitment, or it may have only a symbolic one.74 They argue that 
de jure establishment, a mild form often found in western liberal democratic states, is not 
incompatible with religious freedom.75 Brugger is less certain in his analysis of the six forms 
of relationship. The most extreme, the formal and material unity of church and state, is a clear 
violation of religious freedom. However, even when that unity is only formal, that in practice 
the state and the church are kept separate, this formal unity still presents a possible breach of 
international norms.76 
 
When assessing the state-religion relationship, the above studies show that simply a 
constitutional provision is insufficient to determine the actual relationship. Fox finds little 
correlation between particular constitutional clauses and the level of religious hostility.77 
 
In contrast, while the text of human rights documents says nothing about the form of the state-
religion relationship, there is a shift in the opinions of Special Rapporteurs on the freedom of 
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religion or belief. In 1987, the Special Rapporteur warned that an establishment may not 
constitute intolerance but that it could lead to one.78 In 2007, the Special Rapporteur report 
asserted that the legal distinction between religions carries the seed of discrimination.79 Finally, 
in 2011, the Special Rapporteur admitted that the concept of a state religion could not be 
reconciled with the idea of human rights as it was almost impossible to avoid discrimination.80  
   
Opposition to the idea of establishment of a state religion focuses more on the practical effect. 
At the very least, an establishment, according to De Jong, creates a psychological 
discriminatory effect.81 The law will cease to reflect the diversity of that state and certainly 
invite discriminatory actions.82 Temperman argues that the establishment of a state religion is 
per se problematic. The presence of an establishment already has a coercive effect on internal 
freedom, as well as a violation of religious equality. It also leads to restrictions in manifestation. 
Temperman criticizes arguments in favour of establishment as being based upon legal theory 
and principle.83 He points out that there needs to be the empirical socio-legal support of such a 
claim.84 Martin and Finke identified a strong correlation between government favouritism and 
persecution.85 Another work by Kettel confirms that correlation.86 
 
In conclusion, there seems to be consensus that a full establishment, of a constitutional 
endorsement of one religion, and actual policies favouring that particular faith, violates 
international human rights norms. However, a milder form of establishment, which can appear 
in various shades of favouritism, is inconclusive. Serious establishment often displays an 
official announcement in a constitution, recognizes the religion as a source of law, and shows 
explicit disregard for religious freedom. Mild establishment takes many forms, varying across 
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Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist, and even some Muslim countries. Nevertheless, in general, the 
closer a country moves toward a positive relationship with one particular religion, the more 
cause there is for concern.  
 
The next question addresses Thailand’s constitutional arrangement. Although Thailand has not 
established Buddhism as its state religion, its constitution is not secular. Buddhism is not a 
source of law and non-Buddhists are not deprived of basic rights, the two features that 
Temperman identifies with a full religious establishment.87 However, surely Buddhism is 
treated differently. The head of state must profess Buddhism, while also patronizing other 
major religions. Symbolism, in the forms of calendar, flag, language, and public ceremonies is 
abundant. Most importantly, the state has the duty to protect and support Buddhism and other 
religions. Yet Buddhism receives more attention than others.  
 
Positive identification with a particular religion without formal establishment is not 
uncommon. For example, the Constitution of the Republic of Ireland (1937) prohibits the state 
from endowing any religion but acknowledges that the homage of public worship is due to 
God, whose name is held with reverence.88 It recognizes the special position of the Holy 
Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the Guardian of the Faith professed by the majority 
and the holy trinity is mentioned in the preamble.89 This model is prevalent among Buddhist-
majority countries. Most Theravada countries guarantee religious freedom while displaying 
some forms of favouritism for Buddhism in their constitutions. The group comprising 
Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand designates special status to Buddhism.90 Only Cambodia 
has fully established Buddhism as its religion.91 Bhutan, another Buddhist-majority country of 
Vajirayana branch, refers to Buddhism as cultural and spiritual heritage.92 Only Laos remains 
comparatively secular, although the communist government has recently tried to forge a better 
relationship with Buddhism.93 Temperman would identify these cases as having a positive 
identification with religion.94 They fall short of a full establishment but are positive and, hence, 
likely to violate human rights. 
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When it comes to Thailand’s highly dynamic constitutional arrangement, Krishnaswami’s 
dichotomy of an establishment as a mandatory belief system and as past relic is very helpful. 
Thailand may contain both types of establishment. The king's religious conviction, symbolism, 
and public ceremonies should be viewed as symbols of the past. They are defensible on cultural 
and historical grounds because culture, history, religion, and law are unavoidably entwined in 
the premodern time. Of course, they still present coercion, from the perspective of the 
minorities who historically, ethnically, and religiously share little in common with the 
mainstream Buddhist Thais. However, the effect tends to be less violent. The King is the only 
person who has no real choice of religion. Besides, he must fulfill his role as the patron of all 
faiths, which all kings have honored.  
 
However, more recent developments definitely cannot be considered as mere relics of the past. 
The constitutional changes from 1997 onward are the result of heavy pressure from Buddhist 
nationalists whose wish is to establish Buddhist supremacy. Although they justify the demand 
on the basis of cultural heritage and national identity, it aims to further Buddhism’s dominant 
status and suppress religious minorities. Campaigns have become increasingly aggressive over 
years, weakening the former arrangements. Thus, Thai constitutions contain new symbolic and 
substantial elements regarding Buddhism. As Buddhism continues to expand its influence, 
Thailand is inching toward intolerance.  
 
Still, it is premature to outright condemn this relationship between Thailand and Buddhism. 
Myanmar, Thailand, and Sri Lanka, with their weak establishment, all produce high scores on 
the GRI and SHI. Cambodia defies the dominant trend with its low GRI ad SHI score but is the 
only Buddhist country with full establishment. This case is a reminder that actual policies must 
be assessed in order to determine how much influence the constitutional arrangement has over 
the overall legal design and the respect for human rights. 
 
D. Religious Association Law 
 
The nature of religious freedom is collective as well as individual. Religious freedom can never 
be fully realized unless a person can communicate his thoughts and engage in activities with a 




is entitled must be extended to a group, and that the group be granted a corporate status to 
administer its business properly. Lindholm’s aforementioned eight criteria of the freedom of 
religion, i.e. manifestation, parental right to ensure religious education of choice, and 
autonomy, suggests that freedom of religion must be granted to an individual, a group, and a 
corporate person. Manifestation cannot be done without a group. Education needs a corporate 
body to deliver. This section discusses a corporate religion’s autonomy and equality. The 
collective rights of a group will be treated together with those of an individual in the subsequent 
section.95    
 
As with other forms of groups or organizations, a faith community has the right to assembly 
and association which recognizes the right to peaceful assembly and to form and join an 
association.96 However, a religious association is also protected as part of the freedom of 
religion. UDHR guarantees the right of a person to manifest one’s belief, “either alone or in 
community with others” and “in public or private.”97 The ICCPR follows the UDHR in that 
freedom of religion includes “freedom, either individually or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and 
teaching.” Under Article 18 of the ICCPR, religious organization receives better protection 
than under the provision on the freedom of assembly or association because of narrower, more 
specific, grounds of restriction. The 1981 Declaration is even more explicit about the rights of 
an organized religion. Activities in the list according to Article 6 cannot be done alone.98 
Teaching, studying, celebration, training, and soliciting for contribution can only be carried out 
in a community.    
 
There are three concerns over the right of an organized religion: juristic personality, autonomy 
of a religious organization, and equality.  
 
(a) Juristic Personality   
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Juristic personality is the basic step to enjoying other rights. Without a legal status, that religion 
cannot own property, enter into transactions, run charitable services such as schools or 
hospitals, or communicate effectively with the government as well as other religions.99 Juristic 
personality is not supposed to be compulsory. An individual or a group should be able to 
practise without being required to register with the government. Yet if it wishes to, a group 
shall be granted juristic status without undue delay or hardship.100  
 
Thailand offers a two-step recognition process: first, a juristic person, and second, an officially 
recognized organization under the DRA. A juristic personality can only be created by the Civil 
and Commercial Code (CCC) or other statutes. In general, a juristic person under the CCC is 
considered a juristic person under private law while those created by specific statutes are 
juristic persons under public law.101 Only the Sangha Council and the Central Islamic 
Commission are established by specific statutes. Other religious organizations register under 
the CCC as a non-profit body, either as an association or foundation.102 Any religious group 
can register as a juristic person under this CCC provision. There is no specific prohibition for 
a religious juristic person. Nor is there any particular requirement that would hinder or obstruct 
a registration. Normally, there is no reporting of the government delaying or turning down an 
application except in the case of Falun Gong. Denial of Falun Gong's registration does not stem 
from the Thai authority’s hostility toward its doctrine, but from outside pressure.103 However, 
remedies are available. Falun Gong appealed the denial order at the Administrative Court and 
it was overturned.104 A registered religious organization is able to enter into transactions, 
communicate through its representatives, and own properties.  
 
In contrast, recognition from the Department of Religious Affairs (DRA) is not readily 
available. The criteria are straightforward in that the DRA requires a minimum membership of 
5,000 followers, a distinct religious dogma, and abstinence from political activities. However, 
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there have been no recent admissions. No official reason is given but in one case, the DRA 
rejected an application of the Hope of the Thai People Organization based on the objections of 
other recognized Churches.105 The DRA appears to rely on a consensus of peers in order to 
avoid making decisions on theological questions. In effect, it raises the bar for a new entry and 
helps entrench the status quo of recognized religious organizations. As a result, the figure 
stands at 11 organizations from 5 religions. Their status can, in theory, change but it has never 
done so. The consequence, however, is minimal. Unrecognized organizations are still fully 
protected under the constitutions but they are not entitled to state subsidy and the privilege to 
participate in state functions. 
 
(b) Religious Autonomy 
 
In no circumstances may the state totally disassociate itself from management of religious 
affairs.106 However, unless necessary, the state should respect the autonomy of that religious 
organization. Autonomy safeguards a religion at two levels: faith autonomy, and institutional 
autonomy. Faith autonomy means that the religion is free to interpret its understanding of 
dogma without undue restraints.107 Institutional autonomy allows the organization to manage 
its own internal affairs, for example, appointing leaders and other clergies, providing proper 
religious education to followers, settling internal disputes, or determining membership.108 Of 
course, the two autonomies are closely linked as institutional manipulation will certainly affect 
that institution’s dogmatic understanding.  
 
The relationship between the Sangha and the Thai state has changed very little over the past 
century. The current arrangement is almost identical to that established by King Chulalongkorn 
when he promulgated the Sangha Act in 1902. The traditional model of Buddhist kingship 
dictates that the king take great care of Buddhism and that Buddhism return such hospitality 
by endorsing the absolute rule. The two organizations, the temporal government and the 
Sangha, worked together under the command of the King.109 The 1902 Act allowed the newly 
created Sangha to subjugate all strains of Buddhism, leaving and consolidating only those 
supporting the government. Despite the attempt to allow the Sangha Council to self-regulate, 
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finally, in 2017, the amendment to the Sangha law brought the whole council under the king’s 
prerogative again.110 In addition to the law, the state utilized personal ties to control Buddhism. 
The first Sangha Raja was the king’s half-brother, whom the king could trust to carry out the 
consolidation of religious hegemony.111 This relationship continued into present-day Thailand. 
This archaic institutional arrangement means that there are many areas where the two entities 
of the civil service and monastic realms share their jurisdictions, allowing intervention and 
compromising the autonomy of the Sangha. This mutual relationship makes assessment 
difficult in determining whether the state has influence over the Sangha or vice versa. They 
seem to have a mutual goal in their understanding of Buddhist teachings so as to maintain their 
status quo.  
 
The key questions are: What is the status of the Sangha? And how is it connected to the state? 
The Sangha Council has an ambiguous status. The current Sangha was created by the 1962 
Sangha Act as the sole representative of the official Thai monastic order. In addition to the 
Sangha Council’s absolute and expansive power over the Sangha, it is funded substantially by 
public money. However, each temple also makes a living through alms, donation, merit-
making, and other commercial activities. Orders from the Sangha Council carry legal mandate, 
but it is not subject to the administrative court’s jurisdiction.112 Thus, it acts almost as if it is 
an agency of the administrative branch, albeit an independent one. In sum, while the rest of the 
Thai Sangha may be relatively free to conduct their own business, the uppermost, and most 
critical, level of the Sangha administration faces very intense intervention from the state. The 
most obvious case is the selection of the Sangha Raja, which at times involves drama and 
controversy. The state does not hesitate in intervening to coerce a desirable nomination. Two 
infamous incidents of note here are that of Phra Pimoltham during the Cold War, and, more 
recently, Somdej Phra Maha Rajjamangalacharn.113 Both of them belonged to the unwanted 
section of the Sangha, and so they were falsely charged in order to prevent them from 
nomination. The state went as far as amending the rule of the nomination to retroactively 
disqualify Somdej Phra Maha Rajjamangalacharn in 2017. The decision caused bitter division 
within the Sangha because most members of the Sangha Council, and the majority of monks, 
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supported Somdej Phra Maha Rajjamangalacharn’s candidacy. The event serves as evidence 
of the state’s intervention in the selection of a leader as well as settling internal disputes. 
 
The state also helps discipline the overall Sangha. Any Buddhist groups that advocate 
‘dangerous ideas’ that could undermine the Sangha Council’s and the state’s hegemony will 
face both monastic and legal consequences. In the past, the state pressed various charges 
against the Heaven Valley Temple, Santi Asoke, and Dhammakaya. Notably, these charges 
e.g. forest encroachment, tax evasion, or obstruction of justice, were clearly farcical. The law 
is instrumental in harassing and silencing dissidents for the Sangha’s perceived unity. At the 
individual level, the Sangha Council, from time to time, asks the police or other agencies to 
help monitor the behaviour of monks.114 Expulsion is supposedly an internal procedure caused 
by breaking a serious vinaya offence. In reality, some high-profile disrobing cases are 
politicized. In 1962, Phra Pimoltham, the potential candidate for Sangha Raja, was disciplined 
by the monastic community and, later, trialed for communism, blocking his ascension to the 
Sangha Raja post. Informally, the military ‘invited’ and ‘talked to’ one monk who incited 
violence against southern Muslims to disrobe.115  
 
As a result of heavy intervention, the state ensures that the Sangha will preach only what is 
beneficial to the status quo. The state may request the Sangha Council to order their men to 
select only sermons that align with the state’s goal, e.g. to fight against Communism, to uphold 
Thainess, and to embrace capitalism.  
 
In conclusion, the historical ties as well as the present legal arrangement allow for a significant 
level of state intervention in the administration of the Sangha. The government interferes in 
selecting a leader, formulating policies, disciplining monks, and settling some high-profile 
disputes. This entanglement is to ensure that both the theological interpretation and 
administrative policies of the official Buddhist order align with the state’s interests. Yet this 
interest is also mutually shared as these interventions benefit some monks in their internal 
political struggles. Low autonomy is the price Buddhism is willing to pay for its dominance. 
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Islam, the second largest religion, enjoys greater autonomy. Despite being established by the 
Islamic Act, the Central Islamic Committee (CIC) lacks legal authority so it is closer in 
similarity to the ordinary religious groups of Christianity, Hinduism, and Sikhism. It comes 
under the supervision of the DRA. There is no special agency responsible for Islamic matters 
or that liaises with the CIC and, subsequently, communication is more limited. The selection 
of the Chularajmontri is an internal process, and so is the election of the provincial Islamic 
committee. There are allegations of the state trying to manipulate the results in the Deep South 
but, overall, it is more isolated.116 Other recognized Christian, Hindu, and Sikh organizations 
as well as unrecognized religious organizations are left to manage their own interpretation of 
religious doctrines and internal administration. However, an officially recognized religious 
organization must be subject to the DRA’s regulation, which dictates that an organization 




The third concern is that of equality. Autonomy can be achieved only when the state and the 
religion are institutionally separated. That separation helps maintain distance so the religion 
cannot influence the state in favouring or suppressing its rival. Theoretically, a state shall treat 
all autonomous religious organizations in a non-discriminatory manner. Yet more often than 
not, it is compelled by historical, political, or other reasons, to elevate a certain faith above 
others, ending up with a multi-tier structure as Thailand does. Although no texts ban such 
practices, and the international community seems to accept it as long as the discrepancy is not 
too great, doubt has been expressed as to whether such a pragmatic conclusion really respects 
international human rights norms.118 Thailand’s multi-tier system seems to present a structural 
problem of inequality. It may register five religions but the constitutional arrangement, 
especially the policy guideline, dictates greater attention to Buddhism than to others. This bias 
is reflected in the state’s protection and support of the five religions.  
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The Penal Code provides universal protection to an object and place of worship, rituals and 
ceremonies, and priests of every religion.119 However, only the head of the Buddhist order, the 
Sangha Raja, is granted extra protection from defamation, a charge similar to lèse majesté of 
the temporal monarch.120  
 
Notwithstanding the universal protection in the Penal Code, the level of governmental support 
varies significantly. All recognized organizations are entitled to a list of supports. Some are 
trivial, such as a quota for missionaries and help with dispute settlement. Others are more 
important, for example, public recognition and invitations to participate in state ceremonies. 
The most important support is financial, that is tax exemption and other subsidies.  
 
Different doctrines require different types and levels of support. The same support might not 
be compatible with what another religion needs. For example, there is no Buddhist law to apply 
to Buddhists like the Shariah. No other religions require a pilgrimage except Islam. Yet 
Buddhism does require special hospitals because its vinaya forbids female contact with monks, 
which is not a problem for other faiths.121 Unless the state chooses to strictly separate itself 
from religion, it will remain tangled in the impossible quest to equally provide all faiths with 
support and accommodation. The state also has different motives in deciding whether to 
accommodate a religion or not. Buddhism is the demographically, politically, most important 
faith. Yet Islam garners much of its attention because of security concerns. Of all the five 
religions, Buddhism receives the largest amounts in subsidies. Monks with titles or 
administrative positions are paid monthly allowances.122 Renovation of important temples is 
covered by the government.123 Ceremonies are sponsored and promoted by the state.124 There 
are state-run universities and a state-run hospital specifically for monks. The second largest 
religion, Islam, also receives a considerable amount of subsidy and other supports, but in 
different forms. The state helps facilitate the Hajj pilgrimage and even prepares funding for 
Hajj loans. There is a state-run Islamic bank to offer financial services according to Islamic 
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principles. Islam-oriented curriculum and schooling are allowed. In the Deep South, Sharia is 
applicable in court for personal and family matters. Imams’ salaries, as with senior Buddhist 
monks, are also paid by the state. The list may appear long, but the actual amount is 
considerably less than that of the Sangha.125 Nonetheless, it raises tensions as some Buddhists 
accuse the government of favouring or accommodating Islamic beliefs over Buddhist ones. 
The third and fourth tiers enjoy no special benefits. State support is disproportionately granted 
to Buddhism.  
 
There are benefits to individual priests in general, e.g. free public transport, but it is relatively 
insignificant. More serious benefit, exemption from the military service, is given in a 
discriminatory manner. A monk who has an honorific title or passes the advanced dhamma 
exam will not be enlisted.126 Monks who passes a basic dhamma exam, an officially-appointed 
Imam or an assistant, an abbot and no more than three deputies of a Catholic church or no more 
than three reverends of a Protestant church, may be exempted from service, but shall be enlisted 
as reservists. However, this must be permitted by the governor of that province.127 As a result, 
the Buddhist monk enjoys better treatment. A senior monk is fully exempted, while other entry-
level monks enjoy partial benefits. There is no quota, unlike that imposed on Imams, abbots, 
and ministers. They may not have to serve two years compulsory military training, but they 
can be called upon in times of need. In comparison, the European Court of Human Rights has 
found that the Austrian government’s multi-tier regulatory scheme, which withholds legal 
benefits e.g. military service, inheritance tax exemption, and obtaining a resident permit, of 
smaller or newer religious societies, constitutes discrimination and, therefore, violates the 
religious equality clause.128 The court found no justifiable reason to treat different types of 
religious communities.   
 
E. Individual and Collective Religious Freedom 
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This section looks at the status of freedom of religion in Thailand. A constitutional guarantee 
is brief, yet it encompasses a long list of protection which this section is unable to fully 
examine. Some topics which are points of tension elsewhere, e.g. apostasy, blasphemy, or 
marriage, are absent from Thai law. For example, apostasy and blasphemy are not crimes. 
Marriage is civil in nature, except for the Muslim Malays in the Deep South. Thus, these topics 
are not worth discussing here. This section will focus on topics which are potentially not in 
accordance with international human rights norms regarding religious freedom. First, it 
discusses the freedom of religion clause in the constitution and the state’s stance on religious 
freedom. Then, it moves on to vulnerable groups and areas of controversy. 
 
(a) Freedom of Religion in a Constitution  
 
Freedom of Religion has appeared in the constitution since 1932. It has never been repealed 
but has undergone gradual changes. In its latest form, the 2017 Constitution guarantees that: 
 
A person shall enjoy full liberty to profess a religion, and shall enjoy the liberty 
to exercise or practice a form of worship in accordance with his or her religious 
principles, provided that it shall not be adverse to the duties of the Thai people, 
neither shall it endanger the safety of the State, nor shall it be contrary to public 
order or good morals.129 
 
Article 31 recognizes the internal freedom to profess religion, which is full and unrestricted, 
and the freedom to manifest a belief, which can be restricted according to reasonable grounds. 
Both aspects of religious freedom, internal and external, are essential parts of what the ICCPR 
guarantees. Although the constitution does not specify it, freedom to profess religion is 
generally understood as including freedom to change religion, the key issue of internal 
freedom. Converts and atheists enjoy constitutional protection. Only the king is required to be 
Buddhist, while other Thais are free to choose as they deem suitable. Yet a more critical 
assessment reveals a number of issues with Article 31. 
 
The biggest concern is the ‘trimming’ of ‘religion.’ Previous constitutions recognized that the 
freedom to religion shall include religions, sects, as well as cults. No explanation was ever 
                                               




given on what a sect and cult refers to. Nor was the clause ever invoked. However, Buddhism 
in Thailand consists of the mainstream Theravada, and the lesser popular Mahayana schools. 
Theravada Buddhism contains two sects of Thammayut and Mahanikai, while Mahayana is 
divided into Chinese and Vietnamese sects. Moreover, there are a few other Buddhist 
movements outside the official Sangha. Santi Asoka was expelled from the order and 
Bhikkhuni has never been accepted. Even the Dhammakaya Temple is considered non-
Theravada. These outcasts may consider such wordings of the previous constitutions necessary 
for their survival. Moreover, there are other spiritual beliefs, for example, animism which is 
practised widely in the country. This fuller, inclusive, provision appears more aligned with the 
definition of ‘religion’ as given in General Comment 22, that the term shall be broadly 
construed, covering traditional as well as newly established ones.130 When the 2017 
Constitution reduced the clause to cover only ‘religion’, this change indicates fewer choices of 
beliefs. Non-conventional, unrecognized, and marginalized religious groups have become 
more vulnerable under the new constitution.  
 
More change occurs with the freedom to manifestation. In the 2007 Constitution, freedom to 
manifestation means the freedom to observe religious principles or religious precepts or a form 
of worship in accordance with his or her beliefs,131 while the 2017 Constitution provides the 
freedom to exercise or practise a form of worship in accordance with his or her religious 
principles. The language of 2017 suggests that a person has less discretion because 
manifestation must follow in accordance with orthodoxy.  
 
The ICCPR provides a few grounds to restrict the exercise of religious freedom: (1) public 
safety, (2) order, (3) health, or (4) morals or (5) the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others.132 These terms are broad, but broader still is that in the 2017 Constitution which allows 
restriction on grounds of (1) the duties of Thai people, (2) the safety of the state, (3) public 
order or good morals. Public order or good morals are standard terms of restriction employed 
in law. They are catch-all phrases that are broad and potentially problematic as there are no 
exact definitions.133 The duties of the Thai are redefined and the safety of the state are new 
additions to the category.   
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The duties of the Thai people are described in Article 50, which is more stringent and 
demanding than before. The ten-point duties can be criticized as an expression of hyper-
nationalism. For example, a person must (1) protect and uphold the three pillars of Thainess, 
(2) to defend the country, to protect and uphold the honour and interests of the Nation, and 
public domain of State, as well as to cooperate in preventing and mitigating disasters, (3) to 
strictly observe the law, (4) to enroll in compulsory education, (5) to serve in armed forces as 
provided by law, (6) to respect and not to violate the rights and liberties of other persons and 
not to commit any act which may cause disharmony or hatred in society, and (7) not to 
participate in or support all forms of dishonest act and wrongful conduct.134 The 
aforementioned duties were only added in 2017. The 2007 version is much simpler with only 
the duties of protecting the trinity of Thainess, voting in an election, serving military service, 
conserving the environment, and obeying the law.135 These new duties require a person to 
sacrifice personal freedom for the state’s interest such as national identity, law and order, 
honour, and unity. These terms are broad and problematic as they may disguise an attempt to 
limit religious freedom, especially that of marginalized groups.  
 
The new ground, safety of the state, raises another problem. The ICCPR does not allow national 
security as a justifiable ground for restriction. Even in a time of national emergency, religious 
freedom is not to be derogated.136 Though the wording is different, safety of the state and 
national security are almost identical in meaning. The term further confirms the Thai state’s 
hyper-nationalistic view of how religious freedom should be enjoyed. The violence in the Deep 
South is a case in point where Muslim Malay separatists clash with Buddhist-oriented security 
forces. The problem combines historical, ethnoreligious, and political problems together. The 
religious activities of local Muslims are viewed with suspicion and often interrupted by the 
state, whose ideology is to uphold the integrity of Thainess. Another case is the Dhammakaya 
Temple, whose unorthodox success and affiliation with former PM Thaksin Shinwatra 
convinced policy-makers that the controversial Temple posed a threat to the state’s interests 
and the Sangha Council’s survival.   
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What is absent from the 2017 Constitution is the non-derogatory, or non-discrimination, clause 
of the 2007 Constitution. In 2007, a person exercising his religious freedom is protected from 
“any act of the State, which is derogatory to his or her rights or detrimental to his or her due 
benefits on the grounds of professing a religion, a religious sect or creed or observing religious 
principles or religious precepts or exercising a form of worship in accordance with his or her 
different belief from that of others.” This clause has been removed without any reason being 
given.  
 
Thus, the 2017 Constitution still guarantees the freedom of religion, internal and external 
freedom. However, the scope of religious freedom is noticeably more limited. The term 
‘religion’ is not as broadly construed as it used to be. New grounds of restriction, broad and 
vague, are introduced. All these new developments make religious freedom susceptible to state 
infringement.  
 
Freedom of religion has to be interpreted in light of two other clauses: equality and the state 
policy directive. All men are equal before the law and unjust discrimination on religious 
grounds is not permissible.137 Another clause is the protection and support of Buddhism and 
other religions, as earlier discussed.138 There is no wall separating the state and church in 
Thailand. In contrary, Thailand adopts an accommodating stance toward religious affairs, 
supporting and protecting freedom as mandated by the constitution. Accommodation is 
permissible in internal human rights norms as long as the aids and subsidies to one religion do 
not far outweigh that of others.139 Different accommodation to different religion is also 
permissible if aids and subsidies are justified by objectives or reasonable criteria.140 Therefore, 
accommodation is supposed to be on a, more or less, equal basis, as required by the equality 
clause. In general, the Thai state has long been willing to accommodate varying religious 
practices and beliefs. Legal exemption on religious grounds is not uncommon. Religious 
entities receive tax exemption.141 Traffic rules on helmets is waived for religious headgear, e.g. 
the Sikh’s turban.142 The Gender Equality Act does not consider religious practices to be 
discriminatory, making it in conflict with the Constitution’s equality clause.143 The Anti-
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Animal Cruelty Act excludes a religious act from the definition of cruelty.144 These exemptions 
stir no controversy in Thai society, indicating some level of expectation about the state’s 
respect for religious belief and practices.  
 
Yet ensuring equal accommodation is not easy. As stated earlier, different religions require 
different accommodations. Some need less than others. Buddhism, for example, does not 
demand a special diet, dress code, or daily ritual from its lay followers, while Islam expects all 
Muslims to observe daily prayer, halal food, financial principles, and fasting, and hence is 
naturally more accommodating. At the same time, since 1997, the clause ‘Buddhism and other 
religions’ suggests that the constitution drafters envision Buddhism to be treated more 
specially, particularly after the 2017 Constitution with its even more aggressive, protectionist, 
directive. This juxtaposition means that the state has to tread water very carefully. It is all too 
easy to tilt toward one particular religion and upset the others, to make them feel discriminated 
against. There seems to be no perfect solution. The following will explore how the Thai state 
implements its accommodation policy to different groups. The focus is on the minorities, which 
are more vulnerable to discrimination and intolerance.  
 
(b) Non-Conformist Buddhist Movements 
 
Since Buddha told monks to go forth, his men dispersed and wandered in all directions. Hence, 
there is no central authority, an equivalent of Vatican. Wherever a group of monks settles, a 
newly created sangha community should consult the vinaya as its guidance. As a result, there 
is great diversity within Buddhism. Each temple, each lineage, each senior monk has their own 
understanding of dhamma and vinaya which they pass on to their disciples. The creation of the 
Sangha Council to control this fissiparous tradition undoubtedly causes painful tension. This 
is a clash between an individual’s freedom to interpret his own understanding of teaching and 
the autonomy of the Sangha Council to maintain order. On the one hand, the Sangha should 
not be forced to admit those who hold different views and beliefs. On the other, an individual 
should be free to practice according to his personal belief, even if it is contrary to the 
conventional version. He, or his group, should be able to break away and form a new group.  
 
                                               




When an internal dispute arises, the state is supposed to remain neutral. The state must respect 
the autonomy of the organized religion to settle its own disputes as well as individual freedom. 
A religious dispute should not be decided by the secular body, incapable of capturing all the 
nuances of religion. In other words, heresy should not be a crime. What is problematic in the 
Thai case is that the Sangha has an absolute authority over Buddhism in Thailand. It is inclined 
to seek the state’s assistance and the state is bound by its traditional duty to help sanction those 
who they consider heretic. Some prominent Buddhist scholars argue that by entering into 
monkhood, a person is voluntarily recanting part of his freedom.145 This temporary limitation 
will only be restored when he leaves the monkhood. This view only legitimizes the use of state 
power on a non-conformist.  
 
Sectarian division affects the formal division of Thammayut-Mahanikai less. There is much 
fighting between the two orders but the main concerns are those non-conformist movements 
such as Santi Asoke and Dhammakaya which the Sangha Council tries to suppress, expel, or 
ultimately eliminate. Santi Asoke tried to break away from the official order, and was expelled 
for disobedience. Dhammakaya was not expelled. But the government accused it of being as 
un-Buddhist in character and raided the temple on tax-related charges. The Sangha allegedly 
endorsed the raid by ignoring the incident. In both cases, the Sangha was regarded as being 
entitled to terminate the membership of those holding different understandings of its dogma. 
Also, both sects should be able to practise according to their beliefs and interpretations. 
However, despite the fact that there is no heresy law, Santi Asoke’s leader was charged with 
dressing as a monk. The case served as a reminder that founding a new sect outside the official 
order is no easy task because the law subjects every sangha to the authority of the Sangha 
Council. The Sangha Council’s monopoly over interpretation leaves Buddhists with no real 
choice of personal conviction. If they fail to follow mainstream Buddhism, they face legal 
charges. 
 
Perhaps a more fortunate movement is that of Bhikkhuni, or the female monk movement. The 
Sangha refuses to recognize its existence, citing the fact that the Theravada lineage was long 
lost so women could never restore the ordination ceremony. Bhikkhuni, however, sought 
ordination from the Mahayana lineage.146 It is, again, a dispute over the autonomy of the 
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Sangha and women’s freedom to practice according to their beliefs. Despite calls for the 
Sangha to revisit its interpretation of the vinaya and in fact, to modernize the reading with 
concepts like gender equality and human rights, the Sangha firmly declines to do so, asserting 
its autonomy to regulate membership and orthodoxy.147 The unrecognized Bhikkhuni is 
tolerated but it is ineligible to receive any support from the state and its members are vulnerable 
to criminal charges of imitating monks. However, so far, there have been no serious attempts 
to eradicate the group. 
 
(c) Conscientious Objection  
 
Military conscription does not fall into the category of forced or compulsory labour which is 
prohibited by Article 8 of the ICCPR.148 Article 18 does not directly prescribe the right to 
conscientious objection. Only the subsequent reading of Article 18, especially by the Human 
Rights Committee in General Comment 22, agrees that the right to conscientious objection can 
be derived from it.149 However, conscientious objection is not mandatory and only a number 
of countries grant this right. In some cases, conscientious objectors may serve non-military 
services as alternatives, which may require longer term of service.150 
 
Thailand demands all able-bodied Thai men to serve up to two years in the armed forces. 
Compulsory military service is one of the civil duties in the 2017 Constitution, and so it is one 
of grounds for restriction of freedom of religion.151 Interestingly, to serve as a soldier is to learn 
to kill, which is very much against the first precept of Buddhism, which is to refrain from taking 
life, but there has never been any attempt to challenge the service on religious grounds. Even 
monks have to disrobe in order to enlist in the army and they are not treated any differently 
from others. 
 
The Military Service Act provides exemption for religious men too; for monks, imams, and 
priests. This exemption is based not on conscience, but rank. A quota is imposed which is 
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disproportionately skewed in favour of Buddhism. Any senior abbots are automatically 
exempted from serving in the military.152 Only up to three Imams and Christian priests from 
any district are granted such exemption but they must still be enlisted in the reserve.153 Hindus 
or Sikhs are allowed to avoid the service. Clearly, this is religious discrimination against non-
Buddhist Thais. 
 
(d) The Muslim Minority  
 
Islam deserves special discussion, aside from other religious minorities. First, it is the largest 
religious minority in Thailand. Second, its practices require more accommodation than others. 
Because of their observance of Islam, Muslims are often seen as being different from other 
Thais whose appearance and behaviour are harder to notice. Third, the violence in the deep 
south presents the state with various serious security concerns, requiring careful attention to 
the needs of the Muslim Malay population. As a result, the Muslim minority faces 
accommodation as well as discrimination. In recent years, accommodation for Muslim beliefs 
has advanced greatly. Relaxation of the head veil for government uniforms, Hajj promotion, 
Shariah application, and Islamic banking are four accommodations that the government 
provides. While Muslim uniform, Hajj promotion and Islamic banking are offered to all 
Muslims, Shariah is limited to those who live in the five southernmost provinces where 
Muslims are the majority and which is plagued by ethnoreligious violence. 
 
In reality, despite many accommodating laws, Muslims, especially in the Deep South, are 
subject to hostility from government forces. The above laws on their accommodation are 
respected but their freedom of religion cannot be fully realized. The security situation means 
that Muslims are often profiled by security officers.154 Military operations sometimes raid 
mosques or Islamic schools, desecrating sacred spaces and upsetting local Muslims.155 Well-
known Imams are taken into custody.156 These actions, whether deliberately or not, amount to 
coercive or discriminatory treatment of Muslim Malays. Discrimination happens outside of the 
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Deep South too.157 The state may not be the main actor but it prefers to remain silent on the 
issue.  
 
(e) Religion in Public Education  
 
Religion concerns public education in two aspects. First, it asks how religious education should 
be taught in the classroom. Second, it looks at how students are allowed or prohibited from 
engaging in religious manifestation in school.  
 
The fourth paragraph of Article 18, ICCPR, ensures the right of parents and legal guardians to 
provide their children religious and moral education according to their beliefs.158 However, 
Article 18 does not provide details of how religious education should be delivered. Parents and 
legal guardians are not necessarily providers. They are only entitled to have their children 
educated. In this sense, Article 18 regards children as the younger generation of that family, 
and that religious community, and therefore they ought to learn about their religious and 
cultural heritage. Thus, priority is given to parents and legal guardians to choose a religious 
education of choice.159 
 
Article 13 of the ICESCR also addresses religion and public education, describing the right to 
education as follows:160 
 
“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to 
education. They agree that education shall be directed to the full development 
of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. They further agree that 
education shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, 
promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all 
racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the activities of the United Nations 
for the maintenance of peace.” 
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According to the ICESCR, the goal of education is to develop a child’s personality, sense of 
dignity, respect for human rights, as well as prepare the child to become a good member of a 
free society, in which he participates and shows tolerance to pluralism. The ICESCR therefore 
focuses more on the child’s and the society’s interests.161 A child must be educated for his full 
development and society expects education to produce a desirable citizen. This idea is 
confirmed in Article 29, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC):162 
 
“1. States Parties agree that the education of the child shall be directed to: 
(a) The development of the child's personality, talents and mental and 
physical abilities to their fullest potential; 
(b) The development of respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United 
Nations; 
(c) The development of respect for the child's parents, his or her own 
cultural identity, language and values, for the national values of the 
country in which the child is living, the country from which he or she may 
originate, and for civilizations different from his or her own; 
(d) The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in 
the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and 
friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and 
persons of indigenous origin; 
(e) The development of respect for the natural environment.” 
 
Thus, there is tension in providing education to a child, and three interests must be taken into 
consideration: the parents, society, and the child himself. The latter becomes increasingly 
important as he reaches maturity. A child is entitled to learn about his roots, about his parent’s 
community and cultural roots, but he must be taught about human rights, tolerance, and the 
more pluralistic society, too.163 The question is how should a public institution balance all 
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parties’ interests in designing its curriculum for the maximum benefit of the child, religious 
community, and society as a whole.   
 
There is a wide array of choices for dealing with religious education, from total exclusion, 
meaning only a strictly secular education, to the study of multiple religions, to the teaching of 
a single religion.164 All of these models are permissible as long as they do not amount to 
coercion or indoctrination. Even a curriculum that is tilted toward a particular religion, but 
allows an opt-out, might still be acceptable unless that exemption or opt-out is unreasonably 
impractical.165 
 
Thais feel strongly that Buddhism should be a compulsory subject in education. Any attempt 
to alter this will be seen as an act of sabotage against the nation.166 When modern education 
was introduced, the state lacked enough manpower so the duty to provide basic education 
rested with Buddhist temples all over the country, who had long taught traditional education. 
This arrangement continues to the present day. A large number of schools in Thailand are still 
located on monastic premises. Naturally, Thailand’s national curriculum is Buddhist-oriented, 
with the Special Rapporteur mentioning this concern in 1998.167 There has been an attempt to 
address the problem. Since 2001, the Ministry of Education (MOE) set the new national 
curriculum. Subsequently, each school is free to design its own school curriculum but it must 
meet the standards and objectives set in the national curriculum.168  
 
The national curriculum requires a school to include religion as part of the social studies cluster, 
which covers the topics of civic education, economics, history, and geography.169 The use of 
the term ‘religion’ suggests that a school has freedom to determine how to deliver their 
religious education in a neutral manner. However, the national curriculum also sets the standard 
whereby a student must meet the following qualities: (1) have a love of the nation, religion, 
and king, (2) be honest, (3) have discipline, (4) have passion, (5) be self-sufficient, (6) be 
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hardworking, (7) have a love of Thainess, and (8) be public-minded.170 Clearly, the goal of this 
new curriculum is to reinforce Buddhism’s dominance.  
 
Specifically, for the social studies cluster, the curriculum dictates that the objective of religious 
study is to teach students to learn and appreciate ‘Buddhism or his/her religion’ for peaceful 
coexistence.171 There provides a list of the content for Buddhism, from the life of Lord Buddha, 
to basic Dhamma, to the contribution of Buddhism to Thai society. Students must also be able 
to perform some basic Buddhist rituals and practice meditation.172 The curriculum is less 
specific about non-Buddhist courses, vaguely stating that they must be equivalent to the 
Buddhist one. In reality, most schools provide a class on Buddhism, and not religion as a neutral 
subject.173  
 
There is no opt-out for an individual non-Buddhist student. However, the school may substitute 
the Buddhist-oriented curriculum with a standardised Islamic curriculum if there are sufficient 
numbers of Muslim students.174 There is no standardised curriculum for other religions. Yet 
Christian, Hindu, and Sikh schools are permitted to operate, teaching their religion alongside 
the official curriculum. 
 
Religious education in Thai public schools is an example of a religiously-neutral policy that is 
skewed toward Buddhism in its implementation. The language of the cluster leaves freedom 
for schools to determine their course designs, but the subsequent guideline encourages teachers 
to adopt a Buddhist-oriented approach. 
 
A less frequently discussed topic is religious manifestation. The MOE demands morning prayer 
every morning before class commences.175 Prayer is prepared by the MOE. Non-Buddhist 
students are advised to remain silent but the question of peer pressure and discrimination 
remains. The policy discriminates against non-Buddhist students as well as forces Buddhist 
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ones to practice without their consent. Freedom to manifestation should include the freedom 
not to manifest, which this policy does not take into account.   
 
Overall, Thailand’s public education policy fails to handle the tensions in developing a good 
citizen, who appreciates their own Buddhist roots as well as respects other religions and the 
value of human rights. The national curriculum may allow leeway to provide non-Buddhist 
education, but this alternative is not always possible in every school. 
 
F. Conclusion  
 
Despite Thailand’s commitment to international human rights norms, it becomes clear that 
religious freedom is not always rigorously observed. The themes that come up throughout the 
evaluation of Thailand’s law concerning religions are that (1) the free but not equal treatment 
of religions, and (2) the lack of separation between religions and state. The first theme results 
in a hierarchical regulatory scheme with Buddhism as the foremost faith and systematic 
discriminatory treatment of other religions. This is evident in areas concerning the head of 
state, symbolism, and policy guidelines from the constitutions to DRA’s multi-tier regulations. 
The second theme leads to heavy entanglement in religious affairs. On one hand, the state offers 
accommodation to facilitate religious requirements. On the other hand, accommodation often 
comes with control.  Eventually that means the lack of freedom in an individual and of 
autonomy in an organized religion. The state and the monarch are ready and willing to 
intervene or manipulate a religion in order to preserve the existing political order, for example, 
the appointment of Sangha Raja, its monitoring of monks, as well as its involvement in Islamic 
affairs.  
 
Thailand’s legal relationship with religion is only the tip of the iceberg. It represents a much 
larger system that is imbued with Buddhist traditional thought. Clearly Thailand has not broken 
away from its pre-modern past and Buddhist constitutionalism permeates many other areas of 
law.  
 
In the second part of this thesis, the following three chapters will discuss the idea of Buddhist 
constitutionalism through three topics, of politics, law, and natural rights. Understanding 




current problematic political and legal arrangements. They explain how the state, and its ruler, 
position itself with Buddhism and its representative, the Sangha. They clarify how and why 
Buddhist-majority states justify the violation of norms of human rights in favour of Buddhist 
dominance. These theories are essential to understanding the Thai state’s relationship, not only 




VI. Traditional Buddhist Constitutionalism: Political Order 
 
The previous chapter shows how the Thai state has interpreted and adopted the norms of human 
rights in the area of the state-religion relationship. The universal idea is not translated perfectly 
into the local context. There are discrepancies, for example, regarding religious equality, 
individual freedom and institutional autonomy, and public education. These discrepancies are 
the result of compromises between universal and traditional values. Despite more than a 
hundred years of modernization during which Thailand has experimented with liberal 
democratic values, traditional Buddhist ideas remain strong in the minds of both rulers and the 
populace. They are contested, reinterpreted, yet never fully replaced. Political Buddhist beliefs 
remain a force to be reckoned with. This incompatibility results in the violation of personal 
freedom. 
 
This chapter is the first of three the objective of which is to identify and discuss traditional 
Buddhist values: on political order, law, and natural rights respectively. Their influence shape 
the current constitutional and legal arrangements. This chapter will focus specifically on 
Buddhist political theology that concerns the question of Buddhist views on the state, kingship, 
and the relationship with its representative, the sangha.  
 
For the purpose of identifying political theology, the main concern is which forms or sources 
of Buddhism have political salience; unlike soteriological or canonical Buddhism, what shapes 
Thais’ understanding of Buddhist political and legal order is the popular perception or lived 
reality. Conventional sources, such as the canonical text of Tipitaka, are inadequate. Although 
the tradition regards Tipitaka as the words of Buddha himself,1 generally Thais learn their 
Buddhism from the supplementary materials of local literature, lore, and practices. Even at 
present, the majority study Buddhism from an abridged Thai translation prepared by the Thai 
state as a measure to craft and guard orthodoxy.2 Emphasis on local materials is particularly 
true for Buddhist political theology. Indeed, the rationalist reforms under King Mongkut (1880) 
and Buddhadasa (1950-1960), which disregarded local elements and encouraged the return to 
the canon as the true source of Buddhism in other topics, tend to avoid attacking the local 
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materials when it comes to the topic of political ideology. As a result, when it comes to law 
and politics, non-canonical sources are really influential and more widely disseminated. Thus, 
to find out how Buddhism influences the design of law and politics, focusing on the lived 
reality of Buddhism is more advisable than on the textual sources. 
 
A. The Non-Violence Paradox  
 
Before the chapter delves into the details of Buddhist kingship, sangha, law, and natural rights, 
discussion should begin with the problem of violence. Controlling and channeling violence are 
the raison d’etre of state-building and the construction of political and legal systems. Failure 
to uphold a political order, to observe the rule of law, and respect natural rights often results in 
violence. Despite the reputation of being the religion of peace, Buddhist-majority countries 
have displayed Buddhist-incited violence in many forms, both toward their own people and 
non-Buddhists, as the previous chapter has shown. While Buddhism has produced advocates 
for peace such as Aung San Sui Kyi and Dalai Lama, Tatmadaw (the Burmese Army) and 
Khmer Rouge also claimed inspiration from Buddhism to commit atrocious crimes.3 Perhaps 
the best known case in Thai political history is that of the famous preacher Phra Kittivuttho, 
who incited royalist militias to slaughter left-leaning student activists in the 6 October 1976 
massacre.4 The reputation of peace and the reality of aggression present the tension within 
Buddhist doctrines, both condemning and justifying the use of force. 
 
In principle, Buddhism rejects violence. The first precept is to refrain from the taking of human 
and animal life.5 This respect for every form of life stems from the belief in incarnation that a 
being is reborn in various forms, of high and low status, until it learns the noble truth and leaves 
for nirvana.6 The story of Buddha sets the example. He had been born a white elephant, a deer, 
a monkey, a quail, and even a vulture.7 Thus, all lives have the potential to ascend, be 
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interconnected, and precious. Most precious is a human life because the human has the unique 
ability to attain the noble truth.8 Being a Buddhist means refraining from killing, and also 
avoiding causing others to suffer, both physically and mentally. Kittivuttho subsequently 
struggled to justify his incitement, defending his speech by referring to the Kosi story in which 
a horseman kills his untrainable horse.9 But Kosi is generally understood as a metaphor and 
that Buddha does not approve so literally. This explanation is seen as a flimsy coverup for 
political hate speech. There is no place, it seems, in Tipitaka that justifies killing or the use of 
force. Buddhism is a very tolerant religion. 
 
Buddhism’s tolerance is the result of the middle-path concept; a person should not take 
anything to the extreme. Buddha would defeat a wrongly-held view in a debate but he would 
never physically harm those who held such a view.10 Buddha was critical of the Hindu caste 
system but he avoided confrontation, not demanding radical social or political change. The 
split between Theravada and Mahayana differs from the Catholic-Protestant schism. It 
happened naturally when the two groups moved further apart. Buddhism is willing to 
compromise its viewpoints and actions rather than advocating for them. In other words, 
Buddhism prefers peace to conflict.  
 
This moderate stance is aided by Buddhism’s understanding of life that it spans countless 
millennia. A person has more than one chance, in one of his next lives, so he may err in this 
present life.11 A person is not required to choose the right path. The path to the truth might take 
time but he is approximating the goal.   
 
This tolerant attitude helps explain why, despite the categorial rejection of violence, Buddhists 
often adopt pragmatic positions when dealing with violence. Buddhism accepts violence as 
part of a mundane life. Although the hypothetical king must rule by compassion, Buddha 
analogizes a sinful person’s suffering to a bandit being tortured by the king.12 Apparently, he 
is well aware of such a practice which he is careful to neither endorse nor condemn. Twice, 
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Buddha was able to save his Sakya clan from a massacre by King Viphathaka.13 He failed the 
third time but Buddha accepted it as the karmic consequence from the Sakyans’ past lives.14 
 
More telling is violence in support of the monastic life. While a monk is strictly prohibited 
from even the slightest form of violence, for example, severing part of a plant,15 lay persons 
are not required to do so. The tension lies in the monastic-lay communities relationship. As 
monks are subject to a strict monastic code, they cannot make a living, and therefore rely on 
alms and food from nearby communities. A monastery cannot live in a totally secluded manner. 
As for those whose livelihood is provided by begging, monks cannot be choosy about food. 
Buddha never required vegetarianism. He even once rejected a proposal for such a strict 
practice, reasoning that extremism would cause difficulty for lay supporters.16 This symbiosis 
means that killing is necessary and the first precept cannot always be upheld. At best, Buddha 
allows his disciples to accept a meal if they are not aware that an animal was killed specifically 
for them or witnessed the act of killing.17  
 
When Buddhism is adopted as a state ideology, a pragmatic approach to violence transforms 
into justification. Very notable is the militarized Mahayana.18 In Imperial Japan, soldiers were 
taught to sacrifice for the Emperor who was regarded as the fourth pillar of Buddhism.19 
Selflessness was re-interpreted to devalue human life.20 Lastly, meditation was adopted to help 
soldiers kill tirelessly.21 Overall, this radical version of Buddhism enhanced the brutality of the 
army.   
 
In the Theravada tradition, in the 3rd century BCE, King Asoka of Mauryan India repented of 
his sin of leading a bloody campaign by becoming an ardent Buddhist. He was so devoted that 
he was named Cakkavatti, the ideal wheel-turning conqueror.22 However, Buddhism had not 
tried to justify killing until the Mahavamsa chronicle of Lanka. In the fifth century CE, the 
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Singhalese king, Dutthakamunu, similarly led a campaign killing thousands of Tamil Hindu 
invaders. This terrible act worried the great king. A group of enlightened arahat monks 
consoled the grieving king that his sin only amounted to the killing of one and a half men 
because most of his victims were Hindus whose goal was to eradicate Buddhism.23 Since that 
moment, Theravada Buddhism has provided the state of exception to rulers in Sri Lanka as 
well as Southeast Asia. Violence is acceptable, or even encouraged, should the objective be 
righteous and a victim of a lower status. In other words, if that war is to protect Buddhism and 
the victims are non-Buddhists, then that atrocity is not to be condemned. This exception 
allowed for a century of wars in Southeast Asia where Burmese, Siamese, Laotian, and Khmer 
kings claimed to defend Buddhism from other monarchs with their wrong interpretations of 
Buddhism.24 The rhetoric contrasts with the reality that both armies looted and demolished 
temples as well as captured monks as prisoners. This idea continues in modern Thailand. King 
Vajiravuth justified his decision to join the Allied forces in WWI, by claiming that it was the 
duty to join the right party in the dhammic war of right and wrong.25 Later, Vajiravuth 
composed a poem on dhammic war to commemorate its ending.26 In the Deep South, there are 
reports of ‘soldier monks’, professional soldiers getting ordained as monks but still on active 
duty as bodyguards for other monks.27 This covert operation further blurs the line between 
monasticism and military.  
 
From a critical perspective, Buddhism’s concept of the righteous war, or just war, has never 
been adequately developed into a sound restraint on the monarch’s exercise of power. There is 
no rule of recognition, nor are there rules of war.28 There is no jus in bello nor jus ad bellum 
that can contain violence against the ruler’s arbitariness. Buddhism defers to the king’s 
judgment as to whether violence is legitimate. It is therefore vulnerable to abuse by the 
establishment.  
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When a conflict arises and violence must be committed, the Sangha must co-operate with the 
state. Entering WWI, the Sangha Raja Wachirayana gave speeches justifying the king’s 
decision and encouraging soldiers to serve in the righteous war.29 He also punished an abbot, 
Phra Thep Moli, for preaching an anti-war sermon and condemning the soldier profession.30 
As late as the Thai-Lao conflict at Baan Rom Klao in 1988, Phra Panyananda Bhikhu openly 
supported Thai soldiers in protecting Thai sovereignty. In this sense, Kittivuttho’s incitement 
of the right-winged militias who were clearly connected to the army might not be an anomaly.31 
Thai Buddhism uncritically accepts the use of violence for a just cause.  
 
Buddhism also contributes to the recent political conflict which has been framed by the 
conservative royalist minority as the battle between the good and the demons. The narrative 
dehumanizes the pro-democratic majority to the point that violence of all forms is justified.32 
The goal is righteous and the opponents no longer deserve mercy. In 2010, soldiers shot dead 
six unarmed anti-government protesters who took refuge in Wat Prathum Wanaram Temple.33 
Despite this grave act, the Sangha raised no objections. Later during the 2014 anti-Yingluck 
protest, a violent militant monk, Buddha Isara, led a mob that robbed and assaulted bystanders. 
The goal was to create the sene of anarchy that would eventually delegitimize Yingluck 
Shinawatra and justify the coup.34  
 
In addition to protecting Buddhism against outsiders, violence is invoked to protect Buddhism 
from the enemy within. A purge is common when a king feels that Buddhism is tainted. Monks 
are summarily investigated, often tested on their knowledge in dhamma, before being disrobed 
should they fail to satisfy the king. A precedent of purification was set by King Asoka, with 
other kings following.35 The tradition still lasts in today’s Thailand where deviant sects and 
misbehaving monks face persecution.36 
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Still, Buddhism offers a refuge from violence. In Ayutthaya, many princes who wished not to 
get involved in the power struggle underwent ordination to show their contenders that they no 
longer were threats. However, the gesture is sometimes less than genuine. In one famous case 
in 1548 CE, Prince Thianracha took refuge in a monastery while planning a coup. Once the 
coup succeeded, he disrobed and ascended the throne. In the Bangkok era, Prince Mongkut, 
once his throne was taken by his half-brother, spent two decades in a saffron robe. More 
recently, in 2006, Borwornsak Uwanno, the Secretariat to the cabinet of Thaksin Shinwatra, 
used ordination as an excuse to resign from the scandalous Thaksin cabinet, which marked the 
decline of this authoritarian regime.37 Suthep Taugsuban, who led the 2013-2014 
demonstration, angered the army when he revealed that the demonstration had been 
premeditated in order to condition the 2014 coup. He immediately underwent ordination.38 
Another case is that of Sudarat Keyurapan, the political leader of the pro-democratic camp. 
Being a woman, she could not be ordained, and so she enrolled in the doctoral course on 
Buddhist studies.39       
 
As the chapter discusses further, this use of Buddhism to justify violence occurs repeatedly. 
The principle of non-violence can be circumvented if required. Buddhism has the potential to 
be a religion of peace, but it can also tolerate violence. Philosophically, Buddhism exhibits 
exceptional tolerance to all lives, but it allows political rulers to invoke the religion to deploy 
violence for self-preservation.40 Buddhism has not developed an adequate theory on the just 
invocation of violence and the proper restraint.   
 
B. Images of Kingship  
 
Buddhism recognizes two forms of governance. A monastery is governed in a republican 
manner, where matters are deliberated before the gathering of monks. The model resembles 
the tribal council with which Buddha, born the prince of the Sakya clan, must have been 
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familiar.41 However, Buddha also mentions monarchy, which is a prevalent form of the regime 
of the Indian Subcontinent and Southeast Asia up to the early 20th century CE. Buddhist 
kingship was first formulated in Tipitaka and later supplemented by non-canonical 
commentaries, local literature, and tradition, all of which help create the idea of the 
dhammaraja. The dhammaraja is central to state-building in mainland Southeast Asia. It lays 
the foundations of the regime, legitimizing how one becomes a ruler and setting limits upon 
the exercise of power. From there, it determines its political and legal arrangement as well as 
governing interactions with Buddhist and non-Buddhist communities. It dictates personal 
relationships too. The idea is deeply rooted in the consciousness of Theravada Buddhists. When 
the absolute monarchy of Southeast Asia ended, the dhammaraja did not subside into antiquity. 
The concept was re-interpreted as an ideal political structure and adopted by constitutional 
monarchs and non-monarchical rulers, civilians and military men, democratic as well as 
authoritarian. As a result, it has been discussed extensively in literature on Buddhism and 
politics, and it should get as much attention in Buddhism and law studies.   
 
Buddhist kingship concerns the origin and raison d’etre of the monarch. These views justify 
and dictate the different roles of the king in the polity, but all share one common feature of the 
Buddhist worldview, that the world is interconnected: the body of the king, his virtues, the 
quality of the king’s ruling, the social order, and the natural order. This holistic view means 
there is no private-public separation. A king’s action, even a personal one, will always have 
implication for the larger public, religion, and even to the surrounding nature. Even the spiritual 
realm is only semi-detached from the temporal realm. Although the monastery is self-regulated, 
Buddhism’s survival as a whole heavily depends on the royal patron. Besides, as the king is 
regarded as having been descended from the bloodline of Buddha, the separation between the 
two realms becomes blurred. The king is both the temporal and spiritual leader of his kingdom. 
The Dhammaraja is the sacred king.   
 
Basically, the canonical source portrays the king as a temporal ruler who earns the throne as a 
result of his exemplary observance of dhamma. A temporal ruler must undertake the caring of 
the spiritual world, yet the two realms remain apart. Later, the Theravada tradition in Southeast 
Asia develops the second view which elevates the king to a sacred figure, almost like Buddha 
himself. This regional belief regards the king as the heir of Buddha, therefore, merging the two 
                                               




realms of the temporal and spiritual within one physical, yet sacred, body. There is no conflict 
between the two strains as this dichotomy is not clear-cut. Commentaries and local traditions 
play key roles in supplementing the canonical sources, hence blending them together. Despite 
the ideological difference, the two ideas co-exist, forming the image of the Dhammaraja who 
possesses many images within one body.    
 
Crucial to understanding the following stories is Buddhist cosmology; the knowledge about 
the mythical cycle and reincarnation. Buddhism believes that the world is in a continuous loop 
of rebirth and destruction continuum. An aeon begins with the world in the perfect state before 
gradually devolving into chaos. Ultimately, it is destroyed, into emptiness, followed by a long 
pause before the process repeats again.42 Reincarnation logic applies to life itself, which 
reincarnates in several different forms. According to the principle of cause-and-effect, bad 
deeds lead to low forms of life while good deeds result in higher ones. Life repeats the process 
indefinitely until one learns the truth and reaches salvation. Ignorance prevents life from 
leaving the cycle. 
 
(a) The Great Elect  
 
Buddha tells the origin of kingship in the Agganyasutta chapter when he repudiates the 
Brahmanical belief of caste.43 Brahmins were attacking newly ordained monks for abandoning 
their high caste for the casteless company of Buddha. Buddha then explains to his disciples 
how the world, and the caste system, are created. After the long pause from the previous one, 
the present cosmos was born. From emptiness, with no time nor space and all sentient beings 
having no forms, a milk-like substance emerges. When sentient beings taste the sweet 
substance, they desire for more. As the desire grows, they lose their aura and solid bodies are 
formed. Emptiness is gradually filled with the solar system and time begins to move. 
Eventually, the ideal conditions, i.e. abundance of resources and the perfect body form, keep 
disappearing every time people increase their desires until the society is born.44 From the 
perfect body, people acquire different looks. At first, rice is aplenty so everyone harvests it 
only when hungry. Yet laziness means some members start stocking grain for later meals. Rice 
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stops regenerating so humans learn to plough the field. Others follow and soon they allocate 
the once-collective land to private individuals. This is when the concept of private ownership 
is born. Finally, greed convinces people to steal from their neighbour.45 Initially, members of 
that society issue a warning but ultimately, they persecute those thieves. Violence ensues when 
everyone takes justice into one’s own hands. At this stage, members convene and agree to elect 
one among them, the fairest and most charismatic, to be the king.46 His duty is to settle disputes 
and uphold justice. In exchange for his service, people pay him part of their harvest as tax. His 
title is known as Mahasammata, the Great Elect, because he enjoys the consensus. Other 
terminologies for the king are: Kasatriya, the Lord of Fields, and Raja, the one who pleases 
the public by dhamma.47 The terms are still in use today.   
 
Agganyasutta explains how the world, and the social structure, come into being. It follows a 
certain direction from the void to the tangible world, from no-self to self, and, interestingly, 
not from chaos to cosmos but vice versa. It is a downward path. Desire, laziness, and greed 
lead to inequality, ownership, and violence.48 Kingship is a response to such a chaotic struggle. 
When the first king is elected, violence ceases and order is restored.49 The Great Elect rules by 
adjudicating disputes and punishes those proprietors. Thus, Buddhism sees the state not as a 
necessary evil but a positive development. Under the king, there begins the division of labour 
and castes are born. According to Buddha, the caste is therefore not the deity’s designation, as 
held by Brahmins, but from political and social functions. 
 
Agganyasutta produces an image of an absolute and benevolent king. It upends the 
Brahmanical belief in the caste system. In Hinduism, the god Brahman creates brahmans, 
warriors, merchants, and labourers from his mouth, chest, lap, and feet respectively.50 In 
Buddhism, the king is placed at the zenith of the society, under which other castes develop. 
This is a direct challenge to the brahman’s high status under Hinduism.51 In effect, Buddhism 
enables the king to become an absolute monarch because it frees the king from the control of 
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brahmins, the keepers of Vedic knowledge, whom, according to Hinduism, the kings and 
warriors must serve. In Buddhism, the role is reversed. 
 
When Buddha asserts that the warrior caste, to which the king belongs, is not designated by 
god, he is saying that kingship is not hereditary. Kingship must be earned. The king is elected 
and he remains on the throne as long as he is willing to fulfil his duties of settling disputes and 
keeping peace among the crowd. The sense of duty sets a limit on his absolute power, that it 
be exercised for the good of the public. The king’s sovereignty is the result of a consensus. 
However, this consensus is problematic.  
 
The Great Elect story is sometimes likened to John Locke’s Social Contract but this comparison 
is questionable.52 Despite the name of the Great Elect, the sutta states clearly that people choose 
the fairest and the most charismatic among them, a description that casts doubt on whether this 
is an election in the liberal sense. It is not clear how a person possesses fair appearance and 
charisma, but one subsequent interpretation in the Theravada tradition is that both qualities 
reflect the meritorious quality of that person.53 The result of the Theravada interpretation is that 
kingship is pre-destined to the most dhammic candidate so the act of electing appears pro 
forma. Besides, although the king is said to rule by consensus, it is doubtful if people are really 
free to make a choice. What would happen to the king should he fail to deliver? The sutta is 
silent about the question of recall. The Great Elect is thus more similar to Thomas Hobbes’ 
Leviathan. What Buddha describes resembles the war of all against all driven by greed, fear, 
and pride so people make a covenant that establishes absolute monarchical rule.54 At best, as 
in the Hobbesian theory of kingship, the king owes his responsibility to the higher law of 
dhamma, not the people, but how exactly dhammic consequences fall upon him is difficult to 
tell. 
 
Another implication from Agganyasutta is how the king’s personal behaviour becomes tied to 
the cosmos. The righteous king will maintain the right order of the human society and the 
natural world.55 When the king acts correctly, his kingdom enjoys a good harvest, fair weather, 
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health, and peace. If he misbehaves, disasters befall his kingdom, for example, drought, storm, 
flood, theft, etc. Ancient chronicles from Northern Thailand often tell similar stories of a 
corrupt king whose behaviour brought a great flood upon his kingdom.56  
 
No Buddhist kingdom has ever adopted the Great Elect model in its entirety. Traditionally, 
succession is by hereditary right. In reality, tradition rarely works as planned. Ayutthaya 
witnessed civil wars, murders, and political tensions which made succession violent and 
unpredictable. No consensus was sought. It was not until the House of Chakri founded Bangkok 
that a sort of consensus was obtained. The Bangkok era enjoyed a more stable politics. The 
king was selected by the convention of aristocrats and senior monks, who were regarded as the 
representatives of the ruling classes.57 Getting approval is thus crucial to the survival of the 
throne because the king secures his ascension only after negotiation with powerful courtiers 
and religious representatives, with whom he has to work in the future.58 Still, vassals take no 
part in the process. In practice, a forum of powerful lords means the rule can be broken should 
a better candidate be agreed upon. The most notable example was King Rama III who was born 
from a consort of lower ranking but who was chosen because of his powerful positions in the 
government. The rightful heir, Prince Mongkut, took refuge in a monastery for more than two 
decades until Rama III’s death to reclaim the throne.59  
 
King Rama V intended to solve this chronic issue of succession, issuing the Palace Rule of 
Succession B.E. 2467 (1924) designating the throne to the Crown Prince, appointed upon the 
discretion of the king. The rule signifies the peak of Siam’s absolute monarchy that the king, 
King Rama V, centralized power and became the true absolute sovereign without relying on 
the elites’ consensus. It is also a manifestation of the arrival of the western concept of 
monarchy. The period was short-lived because Thailand became a constitutional monarchy in 
1932 under the reign of King Rama VII. The Palace Law is still in effect but, according to 
constitutions, an heir must be endorsed, albeit only symbolically, by the Parliament.60 Thus, 
Thai kingship often sought some forms of consensus, either by serious negotiation among 
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Siamese patricians or ceremonial parliamentary endorsement. The latter is arguably the closest 
resemblance of the Great Elect but still only vaguely democratic. 
 
(b) The World Conqueror 
 
Cakkavattin, the wheel-turning monarch who conquers the world, is at the heart of the Buddhist 
concept of kingship. Tipitaka mentions Cakkavattin several times but mainly in the 
Cakkavattinasutta chapter.61 Cakkavattinasutta predicts the rise and fall of humanity as well as 
the arrival of the next Buddha, Mettrai. The sutta does not concern the origin of kingship, but 
with how to achieve the status of the excellent king. There are many kings but only the most 
exalted one may rule the world. It may be considered the sequel to Agganyasutta; after the king 
is chosen to rule, he must learn how to rule rightly.  
 
Cakkavattinasutta begins in the ideal era when the lifespan of the human race is over 80,000 
years old. The great king rules his great kingdom, the wealth of which is represented by the 
seven gems of the wheel, the elephant, the horse, the jewel, the wife, the minister, and the 
banker. The most important is the wheel or Cakka, which is the symbol of the right rule. Cakka 
signifies the wheel of a war chariot that helps advance the Aryan conquest of northern India. 
He rules not by force but by dhamma. He rules until the wheel moves from its usual place so 
he realizes that his time has come. The king abdicates to live the life of a sage. His eldest son, 
the successor, discovers with dismay that his father’s wheel disappears shortly afterwards. The 
monarch-sage advises the young king that he must practise the eight precepts of dhamma in 
order to earn the wheel once more, which he obeys.62 With the newly acquired wheel moving 
around every corner of the world, the king together with his great army follow. Wherever the 
wheel reaches, local kings surrender. The king, now the Cakkavattin, or the Wheel-turning 
monarch, spares them, allowing them to keep their kingdoms as his tributary states and teaching 
them to observe the five precepts of dhamma.63 The story repeats itself until one king decides 
not to seek his father’s advice and fails to provide his subjects with generous handouts.64 
Poverty grows so people start to steal, then, to murder, and lie. They lose the grace to tell right 
from wrong. As society moves closer to anarchy, their lifespan gradually shortens to 10 years 
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of age and their diet consists of grass with the onset of a large purge. Survivors, realizing the 
benefit of dhamma, start practising it again and rebuild the society until a prosperous city once 
again stands and the great king earns the magical wheel. This time, the next buddha, Mettrai, 
is born and the king finally leaves the throne to be ordained as a monk.65 Buddha emphasizes, 
at the end of the sutta, the importance of living according to dhamma.      
 
Cakkavattinasutta follows a typical Buddhist deterministic narrative of the world degenerating 
and resurrecting over and over. At the heart of the story is the king, whose behaviour is closely 
associated with the well-being of his subjects. The king’s rightful reign brings prosperity and 
order. The king’s mistakes lead to the decline of human morality, age, physique, and 
conscience. 
 
Contrary to Agganyasutta, Cakkavattinasutta accepts hereditary succession, as each king 
abdicates for his eldest son. Consensus is not discussed. However, Cakkavattin, the status of 
the wheel-turning monarch, is still not hereditary. Each king must earn the mythical wheel, the 
symbol of conquest, by practicing dhamma and ruling accordingly before he can attain such 
status. 
 
Very notable is the king’s avoidance of the use of force. Violence breeds violence as anarchy 
shows. Although he possesses a great army of soldiers, chariots, elephants and horses, that 
accompany him on his journey to conquer the world, he does not deploy it. Lesser monarchs 
surrender peacefully because of the Cakkavattin’s mythical power derived from right 
behaviour. He reciprocates by sparing them and teaching them dhamma. The conquest of the 
world is thus a political as well as a religious mission. Thus, Cakkavattin’s mission is not only 
to restore order, but to restore it without violence. This aversion towards violence will later be 
compromised when the idea is implemented. 
 
Cakkavattinasutta is not the only place where Cakkavatti is discussed. Often, it is in 
Buddhology where Buddha likened himself to Cakkavatti. Buddha is born with the 32 special 
body marks that only Mahapurisa, the Great Man, possesses.66 The Great Man usually refers 
to Cakkavatti. The wise men, upon his father’s request, foretell that the prince is given the 
                                               
65 Ibid, 52. 




choice of either becoming Cakkavatti or Satsada, the founder of the great religion which he 
chooses.67 He even recalls having been born as Cakkavatti several times. Finally, in 
Mahaparinivanasutta, Buddha advises his disciples to prepare his funeral like that of the 
king.68 All this subsequently evolves into the idea that kingship and Buddhahood are two mirror 
images. Known as the two wheels theory, the world consists of the temporal and spiritual 
realms; Cakkavatti rules the first while Buddha rules the latter.69 The two realms are connected 
as Cakkavatti can only move his wheel to conquer the world if he takes good care of the 
spiritual realm. Because his conquest is by dhamma, the Cakkavatti turns both wheels to every 
corner of the world. This theory will later evolve into the cult of the Bodhisatta as discussed 
below.70  
 
The story of the wheel-turning monarch is finally actualized by the historical figure, King 
Asoka of Mauryan India, who lived 200 years after Buddha’s time.71 Asoka was able to conquer 
the subcontinent after several years of bloody campaigns. Saddened by the bloodbath, the 
traumatized king was introduced to Buddhism and converted to become an avowed follower. 
Asoka is the first monarch who demonstrated to the fullest extent what practising dhamma 
really means. Among others, he treated the sangha with great care, providing it with huge 
donations. He hosted the recension of Tipitaka and actively purged monks whose behaviour 
and knowledge were questionable.72 He commanded his subjects to live according to Buddhist 
dhamma. Most importantly, he sent out missionary deployments of monks to disseminate 
Buddhism in all directions.73 Under his patronage, Buddhism grew from a modest movement 
into the de facto state religion, and eventually the world religion.74 In addition to his religious 
missions, Asoka’s other achievements also matched the definition of Cakkavattin. He was a 
successful overlord of ancient India. The transition from violence to benevolence marks a 
similarity between him and Buddha, who transitioned from ignorance, indulging in worldly 
pleasure, to enlightenment.75 Despite violence and authoritarianism in his policies, these 
conditions make him a paternalistic benevolent king, the ideal Cakkavattin as he later came to 
                                               
67 Gethin, The Foundations of Buddhism 20.  
68 Sutta Pitaka Vol 2 : Sutta. Tī. Ma. Mahāparinibbānasuttaṃ. 
69 See Reynolds, The Two Wheels of Dhamma 22-23; Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer 43-44.  
70 Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer 38-39.  
71 See ibid, ch 5; Reynolds, The Two Wheels of Dhamma 23-30; and Swearer, The Buddhist World of Southeast 
Asia 72-75. 
72 Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer 164-178. 
73 Ibid, 54. 
74 Swearer, The Buddhist World of Southeast Asia 73-74. 




be called. Asoka’s legacy encouraged countless kings in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia to 
follow his example. 
 
The actual consequence of the concept of the wheel-turning monarch is not peace. Even King 
Asoka carried out a purge on the sangha. Despite preaching dhamma to subjects, aspiring kings, 
for centuries, waged wars against one another. Those who lost became tributary kingdoms. 
Cakkavattin needs lesser monarchs to confirm his superiority.76 The idea of defeating an enemy 
by dhamma is overlooked. It is generally accepted that Cakkavatti might be too idealistic. The 
ideal thus transforms into Dhammaraja.77 A king might not be able to summon the great seven 
assets but he ascends to the throne because of good merit. He acquires other precious regalia 
and then embarks on the mission to subdue other kings and establish himself above them all.  
 
Siam developed its own understanding of Cakkavattin. Trai Phum Phra Ruang, or the Three 
Worlds of King Ruang, as the name suggests, describes the three worlds, each containing many 
sub-worlds, totaling 36.78 These worlds rank from the lowest to highest class. In the uppermost 
heaven, beings have bodies so fine or no physical bodies at all. Beasts dwell in the lower world. 
Various inhabitants are placed according to their kamma, their deeds, good and bad. Bad deeds 
land a creature in one of many hells, depending on the type and severity, to receive a specific 
punishment for that offence. Good deeds send a being to one of the heavens. Thus, the main 
theme is kamma and its consequences; that all beings are conditioned by their past deeds: rich 
or poor, ugly or fair, smart or stupid.79 Most importantly, the one with much good kamma will 
be born in a noble family, surrounded by servants, and with the potential power to rule the 
universe.80 Obviously, Trai Phum is referring to the ascension of Cakkavattin. It justifies the 
hereditary rule that being born in the royal family is, in itself, evidence of good deeds, of the 
observance of dhamma, of worshiping monks, in the past life.   
 
(c) The Soteriological King  
 
Beginning around the fifth century CE, a new tradition of kingship emerged in Sri Lanka. The 
chronicles of Singhalese kings, namely Mahavamsa, Chulavamsa, and Dipvamsa, tell the 
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history of the island and the Singhalese dynasty.81 These chronicles portray the king in two 
new lights: first, that the king is a descendant of the Buddha’s lineage, and second, that the 
king possesses a soteriological power.82 The king is depicted as an ideal person, the epitome 
of a perfect body and virtue. His meritorious rule leads to the salvation of the people. In 
summary, these Lankan chronicles transform the concept of Buddhist kingship from Cakkavatti 
to Bodhisatta-king.  
 
The idea of Bodhisatta-king does not replace Mahasammata or Cakkavatti. Rather, it 
supplements them. A Bodhisatta is a person who strives for the greater goal of Buddhahood 
than simply becoming enlightened as an Arahat. However, only if a person accumulates the 
highest level of barami, or perfection, can he be born a perfect man, Buddha, the most exalted, 
flawless, human being.83 Those who are on this mission are Boddhisattas. The concept is more 
prevalent in the Mahayana tradition which believes that the world has countless numbers of 
Buddhas, before and after Gothama Buddha, whom we know. While Theravada Buddhism sees 
no different outcomes between Arahat and Buddha, both are to leave the cycle of birth and 
suffering, Mahayana considers Buddhahood more admirable because he could save more 
people.84 Arahat’s goal to escape alone is too individualistic. The name Mahayana means the 
Great Vehicle, a symbol of a compassionate Bodhisatta who forgoes arahatship in order to be 
able to carry more people to nirvana.85  
 
While Mahayana tells stories of countless Bodhissattas striving to be born as Mettrai Buddha 
in the very far future, Theravada focuses only on the saga of Gothama Buddha.86 According to 
the Tipitaka, people are now living in between-time, after Gothama but before Mettrai. 
Buddhism will gradually degenerate so much so that, after 5,000 years, it vanishes.87 Buddhism 
will only be revived when Mettrai is born and the cosmos restored again. The narrative is 
typical of the Buddhist degeneration and regeneration cycle. The saga of Gothama Buddha is 
not about the actual biography of a man who had historically lived 2,500 years ago but about 
his past incarnations, known as Jataka. 
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Jataka had inspired the Theravada’s cult of the Bodhisatta-king. The idea originates from the 
ancient chronicles of Mahavamsa, meaning the Great Lineage, from Sri Lanka. Mahavamsa, 
tells of a Brahmin named Sumedha, who vowed before Dipankara Buddha to become a 
Buddha. Through his mission, he was born in many life forms and faced numerous events while 
perfecting his barami. In this eon, he was first born the first king, the Great Elect, in 
Agganyasutta. After innumerable reincarnations, finally, the perfect Sumedha was born 
Gothama Buddha.88 The story does not end here. The line of succession continues until the 
Singhalese king. Mahavamsa has therefore merged all mythical and historical kings ever 
known into a single continuous lineage.89 It sacralised and justified the dynasty of the Lankan 
king by connecting it to religion. The Mahavamsa chronicle draws much inspiration from 
Jataka, the tales of Buddha’s life story, in which Buddha describes some of his past 
incarnations. There are many but only a few are well-known. Most importantly, the story does 
not end here. The Singhalese king is on the path to be the Mettrai Buddha.  
 
The Bodhisatta-kingship adds another layer of mythical power to the sacred kingship. It glosses 
the Singhalese kings with even more glory for their pure bloodline from Buddha. The 
Bodhisatta-king moves the monarch and Buddha closer, confusing the dichotomy Buddha had 
earlier been given between the choice of Cakkavatti and Satsada. The two roles are rested 
within a single person. These kings are the soteriological Cakkavatti.  
 
The cult of Bodhisatta-king is widely welcomed in ancient mainland Southeast Asia. Local 
kingdoms produce their own chronicles that begin with Buddha’s life story which eventually 
leads to their dynasty.90 Trai Phum confirms that, while the future Buddha Mettrai has not 
arrived, there be born Cakkavatti as his substitute.91 This leads to greater emphasis on the king’s 
personal virtues and the effect of his virtues on the subjects. As a substitute for Buddha, the 
king must personally observe dhamma and teach it to his people. The ultimate goal of the state 
is therefore not peace and order, but salvation.  
 
Not only does the cult provide religious aura to the leaders, but it also connects the hinterland 
of Southeast Asia to the sacred Indian motherland. The Siamese kingdom then becomes part 
                                               
88 Jory, Thailand’s Theory of Monarchy 97-98. 
89 Ibid, 100. 
90 Ibid, 101. 




of a wider world. The cult results in the treatment of the king almost as if Buddha.92 The 
honorific title contains a clause Nor-Phra-Phuttanggoon, literally the stem of the Buddha, or 
Maha-Sommati-Wong, the lineage of the Great Elect.93 King Rama V is called Phra-Phutta-
Chao-Luang, the royal Buddha.  
 
Most importantly, the Bodhisatta cult gave rise to another influential genre of Thai political 
literature, Mahachat or the Great Births, which recounts the last incarnation of Bodhisatta 
Vessantara before he is born the Lord Buddha. As Nidhi argues, prior to the Buddhist reform 
in early twentieth century, Thais focused more on Buddha’s Jataka than on the actual history 
of Buddha.94 Recitation of Vessantara Jataka used to be one of the most popular religious 
ceremonies in Siam.95 It teaches the power of dana, or giving, contributing to perfection. Even 
King Borommatrailokanat (r. 1448-1488) authored a piece, Mahachat Kam Loung, the Royal 
Poem of the Great Births, after he successfully annexed the northern kingdom of Sukhothai. 
He felt the need to strengthen his legitimacy before newly acquiring the territory so he meant 
his work to be on par with Sukhothai’s Trai Phum.96 When the House of Chakri was 
established, King Rama I lacked any continuity from the fallen kingdom of Ayutthaya so he 
employed the Boddhisatta-kingship idea to connect his dynasty to that of Buddha.97 
 
The benefit of the Great Lineage theory is that it overcomes the common problem of the broken 
succession. Leaving Sri Lanka, no Southeast Asian king can claim a hereditary connection to 
Buddha. They, instead, rely on the inspiration to attain Buddhahood.98 By this, a Bodhisatta 
may be born even outside the royal family but he can still claim legitimacy to the throne. This 
is a downside too. When a hereditary claim is not the only criterion, the throne is constantly 
susceptible to outside challengers. An unpopular king faces a contest. A popular rebel leader 
can claim that he is a Bodhisatta too. This has emboldened a number of Buddhist millenarian 
rebels up to the early twentieth century CE.99 There is no hard and fast rule for recognizing a 
Bodhisatta. Indeed, justification is always a posteriori. A successful rebel is a perfect man. A 
failed rebel is a rebel. 
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C. The Modern Dhammaraja  
 
Tai rulers embraced the three images of kingship which cohered well and enhanced their 
paternalistic style of leadership.100 Later, when Sukhothai was annexed to Ayuttaya, Buddhist 
kingship, Dhammaraja, met the Brahmanical concept of Devaraja, the divine kingship, which 
Ayutthaya had adopted from the Khmer Empire.101 Siamese kings then evolved from a father-
figure and idealized Buddha to the demi-god. Both strains of kingship, Buddhism and 
Brahmanism, co-existed but the latter later declined, especially from the early Bangkok era 
onwards. The Chakri kings emphasized being a benevolent ruler. 102  
 
The Dhammaraja has vast implications on statecraft in mainland Southeast Asia. Over several 
hundred years, Buddhist kingship developed a unique political theory of mandala, or a 
sphere.103 The king was the epicentre of the world. His mythical power radiated from his sacred 
body, so his kingdom was constructed accordingly. The palace, where the king lives, is the 
centre of everything, physically and psychologically.104 Unlike the sovereignty, the king’s 
power is not full, absolute, nor eternal. The further the distance is from his body, the less intense 
his control becomes. The capital and adjacent provinces are under his full control, while at the 
peripheries, tributary states are under lesser monarchs whom he defeats. These borderlands are 
where it is possible that two or more spheres overlap; that a tributary state gives its loyalty to 
all rulers.105  
 
A mandala is a very dynamic system because it is closely tied with the personal quality of a 
person. The ancient kingdom therefore expanded and receded depending upon how the 
attributes and condition of the king were regarded. If the king is perceived as accumulating 
enough perfection, or barami, his mandala is intact. If he ages, or is corrupt, the mandala shrinks 
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and an uprising may follow.106 A successful king was required to maintain his kingdom by 
observing dhamma for the king, known as rajdhamma. The most basic rajdhamma is the ten 
royal virtues, that is, dasavidha-rajdhamma or totsapitrājadhammā.107 The king must observe: 
dana (charity), sila (morality), pariccaga (altruism), ajjava (honesty), maddhava (gentleness), 
tapa (self-controlling), akkodha (non-anger), avihimsa (non-violence), khanti (tolerance), and 
avirodhana (uprightness).108  Additionally, there were other lists of dhamma for the king to 
practise and to preach to his subjects too e.g. to refrain from the abuse of taxation, the provision 
of justice, and the patronage of monks .109 The king must continuously make merit as witnessed 
by the public, to constantly remind the people of the king’s barami. Year-round, periodic 
religious ceremonies are scheduled, dictating the pace of life in the kingdom.110  
 
Under the concept of Buddhist kingship, the king is assigned with various tasks to fulfil his 
role in a combination of the Great Elect, the Universal Monarch, and the Bodhisatta. He is a 
judge who upholds justice and order.111 He is the law keeper.112 He even wages wars against 
the neighbouring kings to assert his power over inferior peers. He conducts public religious 
ceremonies and acts as the exemplary Buddhist to guide the people toward the betterment of 
life. 
 
Around the turn of the nineteenth century CE, the traditional theory of kingship in Siam 
encountered a new challenge from the West. Western liberalism defied the very foundations of 
Buddhist kingship by questioning the Buddhist tales of mythical kings which it viewed as 
barbaric and backward.113 Thus, Siamese elites began a modernization process in order to give 
the appearance of being rational and advanced. Existing institutions were adapted for their own 
survival with Siamese elites being forced to abandon the Buddhist king theory, replacing it 
with the concept of sovereignty.114 The king was no longer a mythical Bodhisatta of the Great 
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Lineage, nor the centre of the universe. Instead, he became the sovereign whose power was 
absolute over the defined territory of Siam, a small country in the Far East. The mandala was 
replaced by the nation-state which covered a fixed territory. Moreover, he could no longer 
claim universal wheel-turning status. Burma, Laos, Cambodia, and Malay Peninsula, within a 
very brief period, were all swallowed up by the British or French Empires. The fate of their 
monarchs reminded the Siamese elites of the necessity to westernize the institution, and so it 
was also during this period that Buddhism underwent reforms to rationalize the teaching and 
eradicate the strain of syncretism.115 The Jataka became labelled as old Indian fables.116 
However, the monarchy was unable to keep up with the changes. Finally, in 1932, it was forced 
to end its absolute rule and adopt its new role as a constitutional monarchy.  
 
Yet the 800-year old tradition would not simply vanish. Thailand had not severed ties with its 
past.117 The Dhammaraja was so entrenched in the hearts and minds of Thais regardless of the 
political changes, and the 1932 Revolution did not eradicate kingship. The constitution 
recognized Thailand as a kingdom, a form which was the basic structure and unamendable.118 
With time, Buddhist kingship was able to revive its former glory under King Bhumibol.  
 
In 1946, Prince Dhani Niwat gave a public lecture on Siamese kingship before the young king-
to-be. Prince Dhani asserted Siam had been ruled by the Dhammarajas whose legitimacy 
derived from their observance of ancient laws and traditions, particularly those of Buddhism. 
He pictured a benevolent ruler fulfilling all three images of Buddhist kingship. This influential 
lecture arguably laid the foundation for the modern Dhammaraja.119 
 
Part of the Dhammaraja’s success was due to the short life of democratization. Within 15 years, 
conservatives were able to regain control of Thai politics, once lost to the liberals in 1932.120 
Since then, Thai politics has been plagued with military interference, both directly and 
indirectly.  Failed democratization created a discourse which reduced elections to rituals which 
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only local crime syndicates contested. Hence, violence and corruption were often expected.121 
In contrast, the conservatives campaigned to promote King Bhumibol as the benevolent figure. 
Throughout his long reign, Bhumibol worked tirelessly to rebuild the stature of the monarchy. 
As he no longer had to rule, King Bhumibol could dedicate his life to charity works.122 First, 
amidst the backdrop of the campaign against communist insurgency, Buddhism and the king 
were propagated as the pillars of Thainess.123 He was seen traveling far and wide to the remote 
corners of the country, bringing with him new agricultural technology to transform the 
livelihoods of the local poor. As a result, government propaganda portrayed him as 
accumulating his barami, not just from practising dhamma in the traditional sense, but also 
from working hard to improve the well-being of his subjects. His image as a virtuous leader 
contrasted sharply with that of politicians whose many corruption scandals failed to impress 
the populace. The king became the voice of public morality, preaching to Thais, especially 
politicians, on how to behave.124 There is a large body of writings that confirm Bhumibol’s 
observance of rajdhamma and his status as a Dhammaraja.125 
 
Perhaps, the most influential idea about the modern Dhammaraja was introduced by 
Buddhadasa. The abbot of Wat Suan Moke was known for his radical rationalistic 
interpretation of Theravada Buddhist dhamma which attracted the attention of the urban middle 
class and elites. Despite his cosmopolitan understanding of dhamma, Buddhadasa shared with 
other Buddhist intelligentsias a distrust of the western-introduced political ideologies, both 
communism and democracy.126 According to Buddhadasa, these theories would not lead 
society to peace because they lacked a correct understanding of the nature of Thais.127 
Buddhadasa expressed his dissatisfaction with democracy, that it allowed the masses to rule 
while the masses themselves were still selfish.128 Chaos was thus the foreseeable consequence. 
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Instead, he advocated a dhamma socialist dictatorship model, where the absolute yet 
benevolent ruler acted on behalf of and for the benefit of the people.129 He firmly believed that 
a benevolent socialist dictator would exercise his power with the sense of duty to his people 
without letting the people, who are short-sighted, argue and deliberate.130 Dhamma is the limit 
for his dictatorial power. It is obvious that his idea is taken from the Tipitaka, the Great Elect 
and the World Conqueror regarding the purpose of kingship and dhamma as the component of 
good governance.131 Buddhadasa concluded that Thailand had at least one person who fitted 
his description of the ideal ruler — King Bhumibol.132  
 
Buddhadasa’s benevolent dhamma dictatorship was not without flaws. He did not propose any 
rule of recognition, of how to distinguish a benevolent dictator from an ordinary one. More 
critically, he did not propose what choice the people had should a dictator no longer be 
benevolent. His proposal was based on the ideal Tipitaka model, not actual experience of the 
world.133 Despite its shortcomings, this idea formed the ideological core of the royalist 
conservative faction with which to attack liberal democracy, especially after 2006.134  
 
What is the role of the modern Dhammaraja? Since 1932, it has been commonly agreed that 
the king cannot lead the government. Yet the Dhammaraja may intervene in times of political 
crisis, either in person or by someone on his behalf. The king’s personal charisma drew people 
from a number of circles e.g. judges, military generals, businessmen, and technocrats, to form 
a loose network which is able to influence a normal political process.135 In 1992, King 
Bhumibol summoned the PM and the protest leader to stop the massacre of pro-democratic 
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protesters in the incident known as the Black May Uprising.136 However, in other 
circumstances, coup d’etats were carried out in his name in order to ‘clean up’ dirty electoral 
politics.137 These extra-constitutional acts required a legal basis, which was developed by 
Borwornsak Uwanno.  
 
Borwornsak Uwanno is a royalist public law scholar who incorporates traditional kingship with 
modern democratic thought. His theory of dual sovereignty is based on the belief that 
traditional Buddhist kingship shapes the monarchy into the centre and the source of laws in 
Thailand, a unique quality.138 He proposes that, originally, the king, in 1932, agreed to share 
that power, yet he did not surrender it. He gave his power to the people so they could delegate 
it to politicians139 The evidence of this co-exercise of power is that, when the coup happens, as 
often the case in Thailand, there is no vacuum of power because the sovereign power transfers 
back to the king.140 The junta can rule the country only after it is appointed by the king. Again, 
his systematic explanation convinces Thais that the Thai monarch has a unique status so the 
king can intervene, or even override, normal politics. The monarch’s work helps further the 
glamour of the king, which in turn justifies greater intervention. 
 
Under King Bhumibol’s reign, hyper-royalism as coined by Thongchai Winichakul, increased 
steadily through extensive propaganda and public ceremonies.141 His actions consolidated his 
role as the keeper of order and justice. Hyper-royalism reached its peak in the late Bhumibol 
Era (1997-2016) when the king’s life stories became full of miracles; for example, he 
commanded the weather;142 senior monks insisted the king learned high dhamma;143 even his 
image helped save a policeman from a militia’s ambush.144 In the last decade before his death, 
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from 2006 onward, King Bhumibol had gained the status of a demi-god, as the traditional 
Bodhisatta-king. He is known to all Thais as the Dhammaraja.   
 
The modern Dhammaraja has yet to be challenged. King Bhumibol passed away in October 
2016 and his son, King Vajiralongkorn inherited the throne. Since the beginning of the 
Bangkok era more than 200 years again, the throne has been occupied through the hereditary 
line. No rebel has successfully challenged the House of Chakri. Yet because the idea has been 
so personalized, it remains to be seen whether the new king can inherit his father’s barami, or 
at least build his own, so that he may continue the modern Dhammaraja legacy.  
 
D. Buddhist Organic Society 
 
This chapter focuses primarily on kingship but the Dhammaraja belief has much wider impact 
than just making a sacred king, justifying a coup, or patronizing Buddhism. Buddhist kingship 
shapes Thais’ understanding of social and political structure. The whole polity is constructed 
into what is called the Buddhist organic society.  
 
The Buddhist organic society likens society to one body where an individual act as a part or an 
organ; each assigned a specific place and roles which he or she must serve.145 Each person’s 
importance also varies.146 A body can only work and survive if all components duly fulfil their 
duties. The notion of Buddhist kingship is based on bun. To gain barami, one has to do good 
deeds and collect bun (merit).147 As described in detail in Trai Phum Phra Ruang, the king 
possesses the highest level of bun, hence his high barami status.148 He is therefore at the apex 
of society, while below there are myriads of classes of people with varying levels of bun. The 
higher one acquires bun, the higher his or her place in this pyramidal hierarchy. Because bun 
is encompassing, it determines one’s status, wealth, appearance, as well as other qualities. The 
king lives the most luxurious life which no one dares to imitate.149 He is also believed to be the 
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fairest and wisest. Others belong to the receding strata accordingly and live the life suitable to 
their assigned level.     
 
The result is a very hierarchical and rigid social and political structure where those of high 
status are always deemed superior to those of low status, which makes manifest their low 
barami. Men are not equal. The Buddhist organic society idea is thus contrary to the egalitarian 
notion of a democratic society. Some Buddhists argue that this hierarchy poses no problems as 
long as everyone follows dhamma and treats one another rightly according to one’s status.150 
In reality, the idea seems to only preserve the status quo of those in power.  
 
In ancient times, organic society thinking was manifested through the sakdina system. Sakdina, 
or the field of power, assigned every member of the Thai society, from the king to the courtiers 
of various ranking, to monks of various ranking, to peasants of varying professions, their 
sakdina ranking.151 Sakdina was rooted in the land management system. The king, since he 
owned the whole kingdom, needed no sakdina assignment but his viceroy got the highest 
ranking of symbolic 100,000 rai.152 Even a slave would earn 5 rai. Each individual enjoyed 
entitlements according to their ranking. The higher the rank, the more privileges one would 
get. King Chulalongkorn abolished the system when he established a modern administration. 
Nonetheless, the idea of an organic society persists in the concept of civic duty. Thai 
constitutions require Thai citizens to fulfill their duty as Thais to support the whole body of 
Thailand.    
 
E. Relationship with the Sangha  
 
Buddha may not have envisioned an established order. Each temple was supposed to be self-
regulating. However, as a temple must rely on the alms given by nearby communities, the lay-
sangha relationship was born. At the highest level, the most powerful and wealthiest person in 
the kingdom became the best patron.  
 
The idea of the Dhammaraja dictates that the king be a good Buddhist by observing dhamma 
as well as taking care of a sangha. Cakkavattinasutta is clear that caring for the wellbeing of 
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priests helps a king attain universal monarch status. A healthy Sangha population grows his 
merit. The downfall of a sangha signifies the spiritual downfall of the kingdom as there is no 
salvation available. Buddha’s life story also suggests his inclination to royal patronage. He 
enjoys recognition and donations from rulers and he reciprocates by facilitating their wishes. 
According to the king’s request, Buddha forbade the ordination of the king’s men who sought 
monastic refuge to avoid joining the army.153 He also permitted monks to waive vinaya should 
a king under whose kingdom they are living wishes so.154 This positive relationship laid the 
foundations for the Buddhism-state relationship which King Asoka later completed. 
 
Asoka took patronage to the highest level possible. In addition to material support, he closely 
oversaw monastic affairs. Responding to the growing concern that many men were attracted to 
monkhood because of material benefits, King Asoka conducted a test to expel those who failed 
to show adequate understanding of dhamma.155 Meanwhile, he sent nine envoys of monks to 
disseminate Buddhism throughout Far East Asia.156 As a result of Asoka’s support and 
protection, Buddhism truly became a world religion. His behaviour set a standard which all 
Theravada kings strove to follow. 
 
From Asoka’s story, patronage covers two aspects: support and protection. The term is still 
used in Thai constitutions. Support can be material as well as spiritual. A pious king makes 
donations and presents himself as a faithful follower. Protection initially means protecting the 
Sangha from internal threats of division, disunity, decay, or schism. He orders the recension of 
the Tipitaka and adjudicates on serious monastic disputes. Duty compels the king to use 
violence too, for example, to purge rogue monks or heretic groups. He must also fight against 
non-Buddhist invaders, e.g. Hindus and Muslims, and later, western colonial forces. 
 
Patronizing the Sangha is a precarious business. A monk may abandon his social caste before 
entering into the monkhood, but Theravada tradition regards a monk as belonging to a superior 
class to that of laypeople. Tradition dictates that even the most powerful king must bow to the 
least junior monk, a symbolic gesture of being inferior. Asoka offered his throne as a seat to a 
young monk who was about to teach him dhamma. King Ramkhamhaeng acted similarly.157 
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Thus, if a king oversteps the mark, he can easily be seen as a tyrant. When King Taksin claimed 
that he had attained higher dhamma, he forced monks to bow to him. This blatant act crossed 
the line. He quickly lost legitimacy and a riot erupted.158 However, if a monarch pays 
inadequate attention, he risks losing his throne. In another instance, when King Narai appeared 
to neglect the well-being of the Sangha, the monks participated in the coup that ended Narai’s 
dynasty and expelled Catholic priests from Ayuthaya.159 The question is how can a king, the 
leader of the secular class, order, discipline, or even purge exalted ones while maintaining his 
pious image.  
 
Only the Dhammaraja may overcome this dialectical tension. The Dhammaraja is the head of 
the temporal world, but he must take care of the spiritual world as well. The task is ever more 
important as his mirror image, Lord Buddha, is long gone so the two wheels are imperfect. 
Besides, the king actually possesses the image of the Bodhisatta too. This allows him to be in 
charge of the monks. Any king could try to proclaim himself the Dhammaraja, but no monk 
can claim to be the next Buddha, who will not arrive for several thousand years from now. The 
Sangha Raja, the Supreme Patriarch, is unable to resist the authority of the king who, in reality, 
is more powerful and has better resources. Of course, the king must still be aware of his own 
limits. The status of the Dhammaraja must be earned so the scope of his competence depends 
on the personal charisma of that particular king. Asoka is a fine example of a highly 
accomplished king, militarily and spiritually, one who confidently intervened in monastic 
matters. On the contrary, an unpopular, or less pious, king is more limited in exercising his 
power. A weaker king whose legitimacy has expired may face a backlash as King Taksin did.  
 
King Rama I of the Bangkok era promulgated ten rules to govern the conduct of monks, from 
prohibiting monks from practising the dark arts, to refraining from venturing into inappropriate 
places. The laws, collectively known as Khod Mai Phra Song (Laws of Monks), was an attempt 
to restore the public’s trust in the Sangha after years of war and conflict, when governmental 
oversight was absent and monks were lax. His successors issued similar laws in a piece-meal 
manner until the creation of the official Sangha by King Rama V. Since then, the Sangha 
Council has governed the Sangha with the king controlling the Sangha Council. The Sangha 
creates orthodoxy and orthopraxy and eradicates variants and factions. The king’s patronage 
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thus covers all monks in the kingdom. The Sangha rationalises its obedience to the temporal 
law by admitting the imperfection of the vinaya. The vinaya is a codified judge-made law. 
Buddha was aware that he had not covered every aspect of monastic life, and nor could he 
foresee future problems. He even gave his disciples permission to withdraw some immaterial 
vinayas. Hence, despite the Theravada’s reputation of being an originalist conservative branch 
of Buddhism, the Sangha accepts the king’s law in supplementing its own code of conduct as 
necessary. The 1932 Revolution ended the absolute monarchy, but the constitutional monarchy 
shared the duty of the king toward the Sangha with the newcomers of politicians of civilian 




Notwithstanding monastic republican governance, Buddhist political theology revolves around 
absolute monarchy. The Theravada tradition depicts a king in many roles; as the elected leader, 
the benevolent conqueror, and the sacred heir of Buddha. Deeply entrenched in the 
consciousness of Thais, these concepts still matter in a modern Thailand where the 
Dhammaraja, or Buddhist kingship, has been restored. 
 
To what degree is the Dhammaraja compatible with democracy? On the one hand, the 
Dhammaraja explains the current constitutional arrangement; the king must be Buddhist and 
act as the patron of Buddhism. On the other hand, when electoral politics is undermined, the 
Dhammaraja is employed to justify the use of violence, hierarchical social and political 
stratification, as well as extra-constitutional intervention. All of these have become challenges 
to Thailand’s path to liberal democracy. The next question is how is the concept of law is 




VII. Traditional Buddhist Constitutionalism: The Nature and Sources of Positive Law 
 
Discussion in this chapter takes on the different dimensions from a familiar topic of Buddhism 
and politics into a less familiar topic of the Buddhist idea of positive law. Buddhist law remains 
the path less travelled for the law and religion community. The Buddhist legal tradition is less 
known to the world than that of Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, or Confucianism. 
Conventional wisdom assumes that religion is ascetic in nature and so it distances itself from 
the matter of law and governance. However, if, as the previous chapter shows, Buddhism 
continues to shape Thailand’s political culture, why would Buddhism not also influence the 
legal system?  
 
Buddhism offers very perplexing images regarding law. Buddha never promulgated an 
equivalent of Shariah for Buddhists to follow, yet the sangha is highly legalistic. Monastic life 
is highly legalistic but Buddhism has never produced renowned legal scholars. There has been 
no Aquinas or Bartolus in Buddhism.1 The late Andrew Huxley claimed that, east of the Ural 
Mountains, Buddhist influence on the law of the Orient is no less important than that of Roman 
law on European legal culture.2 However, he himself admits that in India and China, the two 
largest sources of Asian civilization, Buddhism’s influence was obscured by Hindu and 
Confucian legal thought.3 Elsewhere, the Islamic legal tradition has featured more prominently. 
Only in mainland Southeast Asia, the stronghold of Theravada Buddhism, has the Buddhist 
legal tradition flourished. 
 
Yet, most works on Buddhism and law concentrate around the studies of the ancient Buddhist 
law of mainland Southeast Asia. Among Thai legal scholars, no significant studies have been 
conducted beyond the seminal work of Robert Lingat in 1950 CE.4 As if Buddhism’s legal 
influence ceased to exist after the reforms a century ago, there is no systematic, in-depth study 
of Buddhism’s influence on Thailand’s modern positive law despite evidence suggesting 
otherwise. This leaves a big void in the field of law and religion, which this chapter attempts 
to address.   
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This chapter’s objective, thus, is to continue the discussion on Buddhism and law following on 
from Huxley and Lingat. It begins by asking a simple question; what is ‘law’ in Thai 
Buddhism? To answer this question, the chapter explores the many layers of law in the 
Buddhist universe. The Buddhist world has a few different sets of norms which are all called 
law. Each set enjoys different hierarchies and operates in different scenarios applying to 
different groups of people. How these laws are related and interact is little understood. 
Understanding the idea of laws, we can then ask the second question of how the Buddhist legal 
concept is still relevant to the contemporary legal system. 
 
A. Dhamma: The True Law 
 
A survey of Buddhism and law literature usually results in four sub-fields, which represent the 
four types of law in the Thai Buddhist world: dhamma, vinaya, ancient secular law, and modern 
positivist law. The most important is dhamma. The term carries several meanings depending 
on the context. Dhamma may be understood as teaching, truth, nature, and law, among others.5  
 
Throughout his life, Buddha preached dhamma to the world and that is the most common 
understanding of dhamma; that it is Buddha’s teaching.6 Yet what precisely did Buddha 
teach? Prince Siddharta embarked upon a quest to learn about the truth of life, and he became 
Buddha when he understood the dhamma. He became aware of what he claimed to be the 
truth of the world, about the natural state of everything, all beings as well as objects.7 In this 
instance, dhamma is the truth.8 This truth is also the law: the rule of cause and effect, the 
impermanence of things, and suffering, the third meaning of dhamma.9 The last meaning of 
dhamma is something proper.10 A person shall live according to the proper path of dhamma. 
Suffering can be lessened or vanquished entirely if a person understands dhamma, or better 
practises it. On the other hand, ignorance of the dhamma only increases suffering, trapping 
that being in the endless cycle of rebirth. 
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Taking all meanings of dhamma into consideration, dhamma as law is the law of the highest 
order.11 This law is described as constant and eternal, operating independently from time, place, 
or person. Even non-Buddhists face suffering and impermanence and the karmic law. This law 
has no maker. It is the natural law of the world. Buddha never claimed to invent dhamma, but 
that he only learned it through meditation. He revealed this lex aeterna to the world in the form 
of his words, later written into the Tipitaka. This is the truth of the universe and so no living 
creature can escape from it. Things come and go according to dhamma. Although it does not 
have an enforcing mechanism, consequences will befall everyone sooner or later. It is therefore 
the appropriate behaviour, even a duty, to observe dhamma.  
 
Similar to Aquinas’s lex aeterna, dhamma is the perfect law, providing perfect, natural, 
justice.12 But unlike Aquinas’s, dhamma is already revealed to the world as in the Tipitaka; a 
man does not have to discover it through reasoning or inclination. Dhamma becomes the ideal 
model which the laws of the imperfect worlds try to imitate: the canonical law of vinaya of the 
sangha, and the ancient legal code of the temporal world.   
 
Dhamma is associated strongly with natural justice. When a ruler fails to uphold dhamma, the 
punitive consequence is sometimes man-made e.g. a rebellion or a coup, but, at least in folklore, 
the natural disasters of flood and drought often occur.13 The association of dhamma and law is 
evident in Siam’s first textbook for children, the Story of Phra Chai Suriya (BE 2383-2385).14 
The rhyme tells the story of a kingdom where the king failed to prevent corruption among his 
judges. Once justice fails, people do not revolt against the ruler but a natural disaster in the 
form of a huge flood kills all the corrupt. Only the benevolent Prince Chai Suriya and his wife 
survive. They are later rescued by the god Indra. The story vividly depicts the importance of 
justice in upholding not only the political order, but also natural harmony, and the 
interconnectedness of both orders. This is among the first lessons Siamese children learn in 
their early formal education.  
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Dhamma, or tham in Thai, is closely associated with the concept of law and justice. Dhamma 
thus confers a norm higher than a normal man-made rule. Kwam-pen-tham is fairness and 
another similar word, yu-ti-tham, is justice. Another regularly encountered term is nititham 
which is a Thai translation of the rule of law. Niti is law, hence the dhamma of law, and law 
users too.15 Another term coined recently is good governance or Thammapiban.16 In summary, 
the Thai legal mind is heavily influenced by dhamma, in all the senses described above. 
Dhamma is the true, natural, and proper goal that judges must strive to achieve with the right 
procedures to follow. Dhammic law is the ideal after which man-made law must try to mould 
itself.    
 
B. Vinaya: Monastic Derivative of Dhamma 
 
Vinaya is the other half of Buddha’s teaching. Dhamma is Buddha’s revelation of truth and 
vinaya is his law. Vinaya is discipline.17 The Book of Vinaya (Vinaya pitaka) forms one of the 
three Books of Buddha’s Teaching. As a monastic code for the gathering of monks, known as 
the sangha, it resembles modern positive law the most.  
 
Why does a monastic community need vinaya? The rationale of vinaya is that vinaya helps the 
sangha community stay united and appear respectable to outsiders.18 In the early years of 
Buddhism, the sangha was small and no law was needed for this close-knit community.19  Every 
recruit was said to be an Arahat, the enlightened one, so he already knew right from wrong and 
behaved accordingly.20 Vinaya became necessary only after the sangha expanded. Non-arahat 
monks behaved erroneously, leading to disputes and complaints from both within and outside 
the monastery, to which Buddha responded by issuing a rule. Vinaya holds the community 
together. The orderly sangha brings to it respect from the lay communities whose spiritual and 
material supports are vital to the survival of the sangha. Throughout his lifetime, Buddha 
legislated one vinaya after another in a piece-meal manner. One prohibition at a time, vinaya 
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was built in this way. Vinaya is a compilation of case law21 that has helped the sangha to survive 
for more than two millennia. Vinaya is also necessary for practising dhamma. It governs a 
monk’s behaviour even in the very fine details of how to move, to express feeling, to dine, or 
even to use toilet, so that he is alert and mindful, which helps him control his greed, aversion, 
and delusion.  
 
But is vinaya another eternal law? On the one hand, vinaya seems like a response to social 
reality. When the community grows larger and less homogenous, a written rule is necessary. It 
is made by Buddha, responding to a specific circumstance, conflict, or dispute. It is generally 
accepted that Buddha would have laid down more vinaya had he lived longer and faced more 
societal changes.22 Buddha seemed to realize the incompleteness of his vinaya as he gave 
permission to alter some minor points after his death.23 In this sense, vinaya should not be 
understood as a sacred or eternal law.  
 
On the other hand, vinaya refines a person toward enlightenment. Many Buddhists argue that 
vinaya is a derivative of dhamma, the actual implementation of the abstract principle into a 
written rule. Although vinaya is not perfect, it is an essential part of living in the sangha, which 
they regard as the ideal community. Buddha claimed that his religion would survive far longer 
than that of preceding Buddhas because his monks are disciplined by vinaya.24 Even with 
Buddha’s permission for minor alterations, they prefer not to amend it. They would not risk 
amending the rules which might disintegrate the community. Right after Buddha’s death, in 
the first Recension Council, even the enlightened disciples of Buddha could not agree on which 
point was minor, so they decided to maintain all of them as they were.25 They agreed not to 
add or withdraw any vinaya. Later, according to a well-known story, in the Second Recension, 
roughly a century after Buddha’s death, a dispute arose whereby some monks wished to amend 
some vinayas. Those who refused became Theravada, the followers of the word of elders, 
whose lineage Thai monks belong to.26 For many Thais, therefore, vinaya is a sacred positive 
law. 
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Vinaya is comprised of two main parts: substantive and procedural. Offences are ranked from 
the most serious to the lightest crimes. A monk who commits parajika, the most serious, 
automatically has his monkhood invalidated whereas less serious crime results in confinement, 
probation, and penitence.27 Some vinayas, especially those serious ones, overlap with secular 
law, for example, manslaughter or theft but many vinayas prescribe the social manner 
necessary for the sangha’s harmony and integrity, e.g. prohibition to run, toilet manner, or table 
etiquette.28 In each vinaya, the story begins with why Buddha had to prohibit such action. It 
then continues with cases in the same category. Thus, vinaya is organized into a list of rules. 
Due to the different segmentation, all three surviving variants have different numbers. 
Theravada Buddhism has 227 rules for monks and 314 for female monks. Mahayana has 262 
and 371, respectively, while Vajrayana has 219 and 277, respectively.29 However the substance 
is basically the same, concerned with the rules on non-violence, celibacy, property, and 
etiquette.   
 
A list of 227 vinaya rules seems long but some are simply redundant. Quite often vinaya goes 
into minute detail. For example, a series of offences concerns what type of medicine one could 
take for certain illnesses. One by one, Buddha gave rules on animal fat, plant roots, bitter juice, 
fruit, sap, salt, powder, raw meat, eyedroppers, stone grinders, etc. until all were covered.30 
The list seems outdated to the world of modern medicine. Another vivid example is that on 
sexual conduct. When Buddha prohibited sexual intercourse with human genitals, monks 
experimented with other body parts, corpse, animals, and objects. Instead of plainly ruling out 
sexual misconduct, Buddha prohibited one conduct after another until there could be no sexual 
conduct.31 Critics of Theravada Buddhism find such obsession with details ridiculous.32  
 
Notwithstanding the obsession with the details on the substantive side, vinaya is quite advanced 
on procedure. It demonstrates an understanding of fairness and natural justice shared by 
modern legal thought. Disciplinary action must be conducted before the whole community of 
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monks.33 There are rules on the admissibility of witnesses. Vinaya is not applicable to the first 
troublemaking monk; nulla crimen nulla poena sine lege.34 Intentional and negligent acts 
receive different punishments.35 However, mental illness is a legitimate defence.36 The accused 
has the right to defend himself. A certain monk is assigned an investigator, a specialist in 
interpreting and applying vinya, known as Vinyasathara.37 He must consider the facts, relevant 
rules, and commentary.  This legal culture makes the sangha community very legalistic. Some 
Lankan monks were so respected for their legal knowledge that the king certified their rulings 
on lay cases as of equivalent validity to those of a lay judge of his own court.38  
 
For Theravada Buddhism, vinaya is a serious issue because it is what defines Theravada 
identity. According to a well-known story, in the Second Recension, roughly a century after 
Buddha’s death, a dispute arose whereby some monks wished to amend some vinayas. Those 
who refused became Theravada, the followers of the word of elders, while lenient monks 
became Mahayana.39 Theravada is proud of its strict adherence to vinaya, sometimes too pre-
occupied with it. Some vinaya disputes lasted over many decades, calling attention from the 
king whose duty is to upkeep the sangha’s unity. A dispute on how to wear a saffron robe 
eventually attracted the involvement of a Burmese king, but still unsuccessfully.40 It took 
several kings before the dispute was dissolved. Such a sectarian dispute could possibly lead to 
a breakaway into a new lineage which has its own interpretation of certain vinayas. 
Interestingly, dhamma disputes have not garnered as much attention or rigorous engagement 
as vinaya disputes have. The Theravada sectarian division is therefore the result of orthopraxy, 
not orthodoxy.41 When Prince Mongkut founded a new sect of Thammayuttikanikaya, his 
emphasis was not on orthodoxy, but orthopraxy. He wished to establish a sect subject to a 
stricter interpretation of vinaya, not of dhamma.42 The colour of robes is still a hotly debated 
topic.43 It is common for Theravada Buddhists to evaluate good or bad monks by their strict 
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adherence to vinaya. Again, focus on vinaya leads to criticism of the preference of form over 
substance.44 
 
Theravada’s strict adherence to vinaya is subject to two exceptions. First, the rule-maker is not 
bound by rules. Buddha forbade monks from performing miracles. Yet when he was challenged 
by non-Buddhists, he performed miracles on the grandest scale by showing his twin-images in 
the two contrasting acts, standing and reclining, walking and sitting, awake and asleep, in fire 
as well as steam, awing his challengers who in turn criticized him for breaking the rule. When 
questioned, Buddha explained that a ruler-maker was above the rules like the owner of a mango 
orchard, who forbade all from picking his fruits, was free to collect his mangoes.45 Whether 
this analogy is correct is debatable but it shows that vinaya cannot bind its maker.  
 
Another exception is the monarchical exercise of power over the sangha. Despite the vow not 
to amend, monks generally accept monarchical control as a fact of life. Vinaya is not complete, 
so the king, in the quest to take care of the sangha, may issue more rules to govern them.46  
 
Intended for monastic life, vinaya’s influence eventually reached a wider audience. When 
Buddhism was introduced to Southeast Asia, vinaya provided local rulers with the model of a 
codified law more complex than their own. Offences were systematically listed, segmented 
into details, and procedures were much more structured. Besides, it came with rich 
commentaries from Indian and Lankan scholar monks. It thus became a prototype for ancient 
legal codes of Southeast Asian kingdoms. Through its indirect contribution, vinaya trained 
lawyers, and a life in the sangha groomed lawyers through its legalistic culture. Many Burmese 
lawyers received their training during their time at temples.  
 
C. Dhammasastra  
 
Andrew Huxley described three laws of the ancient Buddhist kingdoms which derived from 
dhamma, each governing a group of residents of that kingdom.47 Kings had to follow 
                                               
44 Shravasti Dhammika, Broken Buddha. 
45 Yamaka Patihariya, Atthakatha Book 23: Dha.A.6 atta-kodhavagga.  
46 Pluem, Lecture on Law of the Sangha 30.  




rajdhamma, which was dhamma for rulers. Monks abided by vinaya, while the rest, the 
ordinary subjects, were subject to the Buddhist code of dhammasastra.  
 
Dhammasastra is unique to Southeast Asia, the common heritage of Thais, Burmese, Laotians, 
and Cambodians. Buddhism bred this specific genre of Buddhist-inspired law, which, until the 
19th century CE, spread from the Bay of Bengal in the west to the Cambodian empire in the 
east, as far north as Assam and Southern China, to the Upper Malay Peninsula.48 The name is 
very telling as ‘dhamma’ is never used to refer to secular law in the Indian context.49 Even Sri 
Lanka, the Theravada Buddhist partner-state, did not have an equivalent for it.50 Lingat 
proposed that dhammasastra first emerged as a legal code in the Mon Kingdom in what is 
today’s Southwest Myanmar, the ancient centre of Southeast Asian Buddhism.51 
Dhammasastra may have originated from the Law of Manu, the Hindu code, but the Mon had 
‘buddhi-ized’ as well as ‘indigenized’ it into the local form.52 The first copy appeared in the 
13th century CE although some experts believe that the law may have existed much earlier 
around the late first millennium.53  
 
What exactly is dhammasastra? Dhammasastra is not a single specific book of laws, and there 
is no original copy. Rather, it is better understood as a regional cult with each ancient kingdom 
having its own version. Unsurprisingly, given its widespread adoption, it inspired countless 
local variations. Huxley proposes three sub-categorizations of Western, Eastern, and Northern 
dhammasastra. Western refers to the area along the eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal where 
today lies Myanmar, the ancient home of the kingdoms of Mon, Ava, and Burma. Western 
Dhammasastra was developed mainly by specialized lawyers, focusing on caselaw; hence, 
Huxley’s term ‘common law Buddhist.’54 Eastern dhammasatra centred on the central basin of 
Chao Praya River where the Kingdom of Ayuthaya was located, spreading eastward to Laos 
and Cambodia. Huxley calls the Eastern sub-type the state-centred Dhammasastra because of 
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the dominant role of the king and his legal peers.55 Northern dhammasatra concerned the 
landlocked area and countries to the north of Myanmar and Southern China. Perhaps because 
these Tai kingdoms were constantly attacked by warring superpowers from all sides, and their 
kings played a limited role in developing dhammasastra, their dhammasatra development was 
led by monks, who authored the texts as well as tried cases.56  
 
Although vinaya is the most important work of legal literature in monastic Buddhism, 
dhammasastra is more complicated than being a secularized version of vinaya. Lingat and 
Huxley saw dhammasastra as an amalgamation of dhamma, vinaya, and local customs. It 
generally begins with the story of Manu’s quest for perfect justice. In Hindu’s Manusamastri, 
Manu is the first human, the ancestor of all men but in Buddhism’s dhammasastra, he is a judge 
in the court of Mahasamata, the first king of the world according to Agganyasutta.57 Manu was 
upset by his own incompetence so he travelled to the end of the universe, where he discovered 
the text of dhammasastra written on the Universe Wall. After learning the text, he flew back to 
the palace and composed the law called dhammasastra.58 Details of the story may differ but the 
essence remains the same.59 Dhammasasra, similar to dhamma, was discovered and then 
revealed to the populace. There is no author of dhammasastra.  
 
Dhammasastra is organized into lists of various topics. After the opening story, it covers types 
of manslaughters, debt, thefts, wives, and prejudices that judges had to avoid, among other 
lists.60 These lists are drawn from several sources. Lists from vinaya probably contributed to 
the law on crimes, property, and theft while dhamma came in the form of stories of Buddha’s 
incarnations and the role of the king and judges.61 Others, such as family and estate laws, were 
said to come from local norms.62 At least in Northern Thailand, the story of when Buddha was 
born to become a young genius named Mahosadha who used his wit and wisdom to judge justly 
became a hypothetical precedent for premodern lawyers.63 
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However, Christian Lammerts is able to show that, at least in the seventeenth century Burma, 
monastic commentators labelled dhammasastra as a heterodox literature, not coming from the 
wall of the universe. Still, their acceptance of dhammasastra as law was rooted in the 
understanding that all the Buddhist kings, from the Great Elect and other kings in Jatakas, 
legislated rules that were harmonious with dhamma.64  
 
Thus, dhammasastra is another category of a sacred law of the ancient Southeast Asia. It 
bridges a gap between dhamma and the king’s law. A Buddhist ruler faces a dilemma when a 
man commits a crime. Should kamma punish him or will the king? Dhammasastra offers a 
punishment according to dhamma, the true law, handed down by the worldly ruler.65 A 
description of punishments in the Siamese dhammasastra mirrors those in hell; a criminal may 
have his skull pierced open and burnt with hot iron, or his skin peeled, his lips and tongue 
hooked, his torso buried in the ground or he may be burned alive, eaten alive by hungry dogs, 
or deep-fried alive before being fed his own flesh.66 It is doubtful whether any listed 
punishment had ever been implemented but symbolically it resembles the description of hell 
in the ancient stories that described the Buddhist cosmology i.e. Trai Phum Phra Ruang and 
Phra Malai.67  
 
Dhammasastra was not the only source of law. Another type of law, Rajsastra, was often 
mentioned. As the name suggests, Rajsastra is king-made law. Although the king may not 
rewrite the sacred dhammasastra, he was the ultimate ruler and judge. By exercising his 
administrative and judicial power, he could issue a decree provided it was not contrary to 
dhammasastra.68 A subject dissatisfied by the court’s ruling could try to appeal a case before 
him. That case then turned into a legal precedent to be recorded and collected.69 Therefore, the 
king could make laws too. This collection was thought to be supplementary to dhammasastra. 
However, the distinction between the two laws was not always clear-cut. In reality, rulers often 
tried to share the sacred aura of dhammasastra with their orders. Several dhammasastra 
contained the name of a specific kings as the author, or titled as the royal dhammasastra, 
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blurring the line.70 In the case of Siam, evidence suggests that rajsastra succeeded in overtaking 
dhammasastra.71 Huxley categorized Siamese dhammasastra as the state-centred law meaning 
the king actually led the making of the so-called dhammsastra. Therefore, despite being known 
as Buddhist law, the king played no less important role in making dhammasastra. Actually, 
Baker and Pasuk suggest that dhammasastra might arrive in Siam significantly later than Lingat 
and Huxley had believed. The name ‘dhammasastra’ was mentioned in the inscription from the 
fourteenth century CE but they find no concrete evidence of dhammasastra anywhere.72 
 
The problem is that much written evidence from the Ayutthaya era was lost when the city fell 
to the Burmese army in the seventeenth century CE. But in the beginnings of Bangkok, when 
King Rama I heard an appeal on divorce, he opined that the law which allowed divorce without 
any cause was absurd. Although he followed that law in order to uphold legal certainty, he 
complained that the downfall of Ayutthaya left only a corrupt version of dhammasatra.73 He 
declared legal reform as his next mission after the recension of Tipitaka. This statement is very 
telling as it showed the connection between dhamma and law as the two necessary pillars 
holding the kingdom together. He thus ordered the law recension in 1805. As king of the new 
dynasty, this recension provided him the good opportunity to insert his own rules into the 
sacred book.74 Nevertheless, he was careful not to proclaim the new code, known as the Three 
Seals Code, as his legislative product. He insisted that it was a mere correction of an old lost 
law. Nonetheless, in comparison with Burmese dhammasastra, the Three Seals Code contained 
more lists from king-made law.75 The Three Seals Code commenced with the usual narrative 
of Manu, the servant of Mahasammata King, discovering the law at the universe’s end. Only 
this first chapter was called dhammasastra. Then it was followed by the Four Prejudices which 
reminded judges the importance of impartiality. The rest went in a very random order, from 
the Palace Law, to the ranking system, to procedural laws, to marriage, slavery, estates, 
obligations, and many criminal offences.76  
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Over a millennium, dhammasatra had served as the main source of law in Southeast Asia for 
any disputes above village-level. Within the kingdom of Siam, copies of the Three Seal Code 
and other older dhammasastra have been retrieved from throughout the country, suggesting 
that local rulers must have often consulted the law when local customs failed to settle disputes. 
However, it was kept out of the hand of peasants. King Rama III confiscated print versions of 
the Three Seal Code, reasoning that knowledge, if in the wrong hands, could be harmful.77 This 
prohibition reflected the notion of dhammasastra as a sacred law that was only accessible by 
the meritorious elites.  
 
Alongside the idea of law came legal personnel. The highly legalistic monastic culture 
produced premodern legal specialists who were trained to interpret law, reason cases, and write 
commentaries. Some of these learned men went on to become secular judges. This culture was 
more prevalent in the western region where the role of lawyers was most prominent. Some 
even had their names recognized as authorities.78 The role of lawyer was least important in the 
northern region where the influence of Indian civilization is comparatively limited. There, 
monks were the key actors in dispute settlement and the education of rulers.79 Only in the 
Siamese kingdoms in the east did the monarchs seem to have more control over dhammasastra. 
Here, the titles of premodern judges suggested that judgeship had once been assigned to 
brahmins.80 The Brahman cult probably originated from the Khmer Empire from where 
Ayutthaya inherited the cult of divine kingship. The Brahman became part of the Siamese 
bureaucracy. Unlike in Burma, legal training in the ancient Ayutthaya and early Bangkok was 
never robust enough to the point of producing authoritative legal scholars. Furthermore, the 
administrative organization prevented the professionalization of legal careers as often the 
bureaucrats were entrusted with the judicial function.81 Administrative agencies also acted as 
courts. Thus, there was no incentive for specialization. Still, as the only educational institution 
available, Buddhist temples produced literate men who went into the bureaucracy, including 
judgeship.    
 
                                               
77 Sawaeng, Thai Legal History 128-129.  
78 Huxley, Pali Buddhist Law in Southeast Asia 170-181. 
79 Huxley, The Traditions of Mahosadha 325.  
80 David M. Engel, Law and Kingship in Thailand During the Reign of King Chulalongkorn (University of 
Michigan Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, 1975) 60. 




The years of dhammasastra have passed, but this amalgamation of law and religion has still 
left an imprint on the consciousness of Thais. After 1932, the People’s Party founded a 
university specializing in legal study which they named Thammasat University.  
 
D. Modern Positive Law  
 
By the mid nineteenth century CE, the idea of Buddhist law started to feel the wave of change. 
Partly the change came from within; the Three Seals Code had fallen behind the advances in 
society. Bangkok kings began to issue laws to address emerging problems that the Three Seals 
Code had failed to tackle. King Rama I began to assert royal legislative power by issuing, for 
example, ten laws on the behaviour of monks. His successors followed suit, but the most 
prominent legislator-king was King Mongkut. Mongkut had spent three decades as a Buddhist 
monk during which he had had regular communication with Christian missionaries whose 
criticisms of traditional society must have influenced the prince-monk.82 During what is 
considered among the first Thai enlightenments, he constructed a Buddhism with elements of 
humanist liberal ideas. Throughout his reign, Mongkut issued a large amount of dispositions. 
Some were long and law-like,83 while others were shorter and might read more like 
complaints.84 Some decrees merely asked for cooperation. Topics ranged from the trivial 
personalized issues of the choice of words to be used with the king himself, to concern over 
sanitation or tax or interaction with foreign merchants and dignitaries.85 However, one thing is 
obvious. Mongkut was the law-maker. More remarkable was the way he decreed these laws; 
they were written in an easy-to-understand vernacular tongue and accompanied by reasons.86 
Moreover, he tried to make his law appear more rationalistic and compassionate. His method 
was to convince rather than coerce his subjects. His decrees came with reasons, and he spoke 
openly of which behaviour he liked or disliked. He blessed and thanked those who complied 
and wished ill on the disobedient few.87 His style reflected how he perceived himself, 
portraying himself as an original version of a Buddhist king according to the text, ruling by 
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compassion and dhamma, not violence, the product of the two worldviews he had learned. 
Unfortunately, his measures appeared inadequate. Rarely were his orders observed and 
evidently, he sometimes repeated the same order several times.   
 
Another initiative of Mongkut was the Royal Gazette publication to announce his laws. 
Mongkut’s laws were no longer circulated only among the elites. It had to be announced 
according to protocol in order to come into in effect. Mongkut even allowed American 
missionaries to print and sell copies of the Three Seal Code.88 By doing so, the notion of law 
shifted from the sacred natural order only known to the meritorious ruling class to legislation 
that all subjects had the right to know. The Royal Gazette continues until today. 
 
However, pressure from colonization also played a role. To outsiders at the time, Siam’s legal 
system must have appeared barbaric. Dhammasastra was an entanglement of law and religion 
where no specialized training institution could produce a legal specialist who would exercise 
the law professionally. In the 1850s, King Mongkut’s Siam entered into trade treaties with 12 
western nations plus Japan. The deal forced Siam to concede extraterritorial rights, meaning 
that the subjects of these 13 nations no longer came under the Siamese courts’ jurisdiction.89 
This legal enclave was due to the disdain of Siam’s archaic legal system. Rationality was not 
a strongpoint of dhammasastra. Also, the law was not publicly accessible, and there was no 
separation between criminal and civil law. Procedure was also confusing.90 Trial was by ordeal 
and punishment cruel, while judges were incompetent and corrupt. In summary, the Three Seal 
Code was ill-equipped for a more cosmopolitan Siam. The enclave was extended to cover not 
only Europeans but also their colonial subjects, in other words, the Chinese, Indians, and 
Malays. Soon, hundreds walked the streets of Bangkok with special protection as granted by 
their consuls.91 This privilege contrasted sharply with local Thais. This concern prompted the 
authorities to consider legal reform. 
 
Mongkut’s successor, King Chulalongkorn, continued reform in the quest to regain Siam’s 
sovereignty. The necessity of Chulalongkorn’s administration having a modern legal system 
was more pressing than ever. Burma, Indochina, and Malaya, some areas of which were Siam’s 
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former tributary states, all fell to British and French powers who claimed to bring civilization 
to backward nations.92 In 1896, he ordered the Judicial Reform Committee of foreign experts, 
mostly European, and his trusted ministers, to draft Thailand’s law codes.93 
 
The codification was thorough. The Judicial Reform Committee repeatedly warned itself not 
to simply copy one western law; local custom was taken into consideration and comparison 
was made with codes from various European nations as well as the jurisdictions of similar 
backgrounds, India as well as Japan.94 First came the Penal Code in 1908, and then chapters of 
the Civil and Commercial Code were gradually promulgated from 1925 to 1934.95 One by one, 
a chapter replaced a section of the Three Seals Code. By 1935, the last codes on civil and 
criminal procedures were out, terminating the service of the Three Seals Code for good. The 
codification was no small task for it took over 30 years and three kings to complete. By that 
time, Siam was able to renegotiate treaties to abolish the unfair extraterritorial rights 
provisions.   
 
Not only did these new codes replace the Three Seal Code, but also other regional 
dhammasastras. Chulalongkorn’s reign saw a period of nation-state building. Bangkok 
abolished the tributary state system, turning them to provinces under the central administration, 
and the newly drafted legal codes.96 In the newly acquired provinces, Siam behaved similarly 
to how the British or French did, enforcing its modern law there.97   
 
The westernization of Siam’s legal code was only part of Chulalongkorn’s larger judicial 
reforms.  Prior to the reform, the judiciary was considered part of the administrative function. 
Each department had its own court which it regarded as a good source of income.98 Moreover, 
jurisdictions often overlapped with one another.99 Also, in provinces, the backlog was huge.100 
Dissatisfied parties would try to appeal decisions to the king. In 1894, the judicial function was 
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then reassigned to the Court of Justice which came under the new Ministry of Justice.101 The 
Supreme Court was established in 1908 as the final arbiter so no one could appeal any longer 
to the king. Judicial staff comprised professional lawyers trained and tested for the job. This 
new system was shouldered by King Chulalongkorn's son, Prince Ratchburi.  
 
Prince Ratchburi was sent to study law in the UK.102 Upon his return, he was then appointed 
Minister of Justice. He also founded the first western-style law school where he lectured, wrote 
textbooks, and examined students who would later became judges and attorneys.103 Thus, a law 
school had been created to produce professional lawyers. The young prince offered a radical 
understanding of law and justice as he warned his students not to confuse law with justice, 
which was then very much a new concept. For him, law could only come by way of an order 
from the sovereign regardless of morality.104 His positivistic teaching contrasted sharply with 
the religious view of the old regime. It is unclear how successful his radical view was received. 
However, later, more Thais were sent abroad to the west: the UK and the Continental Europe, 
to study law. Indeed, Prince Ratchburi’s half-brother, Vajiravuth, graduated in law from 
Oxford as well as authoring several books on international law.105 
 
The third wave of modernization came in 1932, when the People’s Party, the progressive 
revolutionists, ended the absolute monarchy and introduced democracy to Siam. A written 
constitution formally replaced the traditional political order with democratic liberal ideals. 
Gone was the era of the king as law-maker. Although permanent democratic consolidation 
never happened, at least, parliamentary legislative procedure was installed. A law became a 
law when approved by the Parliament where representatives of the people convened. The 
democratic protocol further steered away the traditional notion of law. 
 
E. Buddhism and Law in Contemporary Thailand 
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At first glance, there appears to be no Buddhist influence. The eras of dhammasastra and the 
vinaya legal culture have long passed. Civil and criminal codes contain lists that differ vastly 
from the ancient lists in the Three Seal Code, which is now solely an object of antiquity studied 
by historians. Vinaya legal culture is confined to within the monastery, and modern-day 
lawyers go to law schools, not monasteries. Yet closer examination reveals that one set of rules 
is still in operation in this Buddhist-majority country — the eternal law of dhamma. The 
question is whether Buddhism still plays any role in the modern world of law. Is Buddhist legal 
thought entirely a relic of the past? 
 
(a) Public Perception of Law  
 
Chulalongkorn’s legal reforms presented a conundrum. The Three Seals Code was replaced 
with modern legal codes and the concept of law upended in Thailand. Prior to the reform, the 
law was the derivative of the higher norm of dhamma. The dhammic origin makes the ancient 
law sacred, eternal, and constant. At least, in principle, no one was authorised to make any 
change. On the contrary, post-reform law is understood as an order of the sovereign, legislated 
according to a prescribed procedure.106 Hence, law is man-made and its content is not a 
temporal imitation of Buddhist truth but a response, prepared by experts, to political, economic, 
or social need at a certain moment. However, the positive law is far more efficient than the 
ancient sacred law. Mysteriousness was part of dhammasastra’s legitimation so only a few 
people gained access to it. By contrast, modern positive law is publicly accessible in the Royal 
Gazette. Its sanctions come from legal sanctions, e.g. imprisonment and fine, and not kamma. 
Furthermore, it is enforceable by professional judges who are systematically trained in the 
western legal tradition. Buddhists are compelled to address the efficiency conundrum if the 
Buddhist legal tradition is to be continued into the modern world.  
 
Although the Three Seals Code has been replaced by modern legal codes, the idea of dhamma 
as higher law has not. On one hand, modern law offers legal certainty, and it is a written rule 
accessible by the public. Changes are known in advance and stakeholders may voice their 
concerns in the process. On the other hand, western law has no religious aura; it is simply the 
will of the ruler and it can be changed at will. Therefore, it is artificial. The history, that such 
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law was transplanted into Thailand, makes it alien where the law is supposed to conform to the 
much higher law of dhamma. While the legal texts are borrowed from the Western legal 
tradition, the objective of that law and the manner of how it is used are influenced by Buddhism. 
In other words, the Thai legal system can be perceived as Western hardware with Buddhist 
software. 
 
While the Buddhist world understands ‘law’ as referring to four different rules, only dhamma 
is the true law. The other three are man-made and therefore naturally inferior to dhamma. It is 
more difficult to say if vinaya or dhammasastra has a higher position in the hierarchy than 
others. Vinaya was promulgated by Buddha, but it was clearly incomplete. A king may override 
or alter it as he pleases. Although Theravada Buddhists are obsessed with vinaya, by the 
twenty-first century CE vinaya has become so obsolete that many aspects are no longer 
compatible with modern life. Dhammasastra, by contrast, is considered sacred. It is not 
legislated but discovered by a sage with celestial power so it cannot be amended and it is 
assumed that deities help enforce the law. However, dhammasastra could not withstand the 
pressure of modernization and gave way to modern law. By this standard, despite its efficiency, 
modern law functions with the lowest hierarchy. Prince Ratchburi’s positivistic approach to 
law never became firmly established in the Thai legal consciousness.   
 
The notion of the superiority of dhamma over law is clearly reflected in the work of P. A. 
Payutto, such as ‘Buddhist jurisprudence’, and he is considered to be the leading authority on 
the topic of Buddhism and law. He attacks western law as lacking the wisdom to fully 
understand human nature, and so it will never lead to an ideal life.107 The concept of a person 
as a right holder is individualistic so it can only teach people selfishness.108 It emphasizes 
consumerism which is the wrong goal in life. He predictably sees a law as a symptom of social 
illness.109 The more laws there are, the worse the society has become.110 His conclusion is that, 
by adopting Buddha’s dhamma, one will no longer need law. Buddhist precepts are superior, 
finer, and more nuanced; better to build a perfect society, peaceful and harmonious.111 Thus, 
Payutto is asserting the claim of Buddhist superiority over positive law and urging positive law 
to imitate the right social order.  
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Payutto’s animosity toward western law reveals Thailand’s ambivalence about modernization. 
On the one hand, Thailand is proud of itself for being able to adapt in time and manage to 
safeguard its independence.112 The modern legal system is particularly the beacon of that pride. 
The legal code manifested Siam’s civilization so it later retrieved the lost judicial power from 
an unfair treaty.113 On the other hand, Thais are taught that the experience is bitter and painful. 
The royalist-nationalistic narrative tells of threats that Siam has faced.114 Involuntarily, it severs 
ties with centuries-old customs and traditions, precious heritage, and was forced upon modern 
law. Surely no one misses the ancient law of caning and other ordeals. Still, it convinces many 
Thais that a western transplant is in general foreign and, therefore, incompatible.115   
 
Much evidence abounds on how dhamma has captured positive law. The inferiority of positive 
law to dhamma is confirmed by an oft-cited speech by a man of the highest merit, King 
Bhumibol. The king had long taken justice seriously. He had visited many courts and even 
heard actual trials as an honorary judge.116 Supreme court judges were appointed his Privy 
Council, the private advisors.117 Most importantly, he gave audience to all new judges before 
they commenced their judgeship. King Bhumibol always reminded newly-graduated barristers 
that law (kod-mai) and justice (kwam-yui-tham) were two different things. The former may or 
may not lead to the latter so he encouraged young lawyers to use law for justice.118 He 
explained that the law is only a tool and justice has wider meaning than law; it extends to 
morality.119 Here the certainty of the written law is compromised by subjective morality or 
natural justice. This idea has been widely received and eventually adopted at the constitutional 
level. The 2007 Constitution, for the first time, mandated that, under the king’s signature, the 
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judiciary must decide cases according to justice, the constitution, and laws.120 Also, judges 
must be independent in deciding cases correctly, timely, and fairly.121 The order of wording in 
this conservative constitution suggests that justice (kwam-yuti-tham) came before even the 
constitution, the highest order of the written law. However, the justice clause was later dropped 
from the 2017 Constitution, although the fairness clause remained.122 Unfortunately, no reason 
for the removal has been given. 
 
(b) Rule of Law vs. Nititham 
 
Another case of dhamma’s superiority over law is the rise of nititham. Nititham is a Thai 
translation of the term ‘rule of law’ but, despite the origin from the western legal tradition, 
nititham has been localized and has built its own peculiar meaning as a response to the local 
context.  
 
Nititham is the dhamma of law, or the law of laws. The idea of the rule of law was introduced 
into Thai legal consciousness as early as after the Second World War. Often, credit was given 
to A.V. Dicey’s idea as the origin of the Thai rule of law.123 Lawyers began proposing that the 
concept was vital to building a proper democracy; that the use of law must be governed by 
higher, inviolable, principles. There was broad consensus that these principles were, at least, 
(1) judicial independence, (2) the supremacy of law, and (3) guarantee of rights and liberties. 
However, nititham’s success was very limited. After WWII, Thailand had been under 
authoritarian regimes most of the time, which hindered the proliferation of nititham. At best, 
only a few court cases on unlawful detention could claim to be evidence of the rule of law but 
there was no further review of the undemocratic governments. It was not until the attempt of 
the 1997 Political Reform to establish democracy that nititham entered into the wider public 
consciousness. There it competed with other similar notions i.e. nitirat (rechtsstaat) and 
thammaphiban (good governance). Only the terms with tham (dhamma) were adopted into law. 
Nititham prevailed when the 2007 Constitution adopted the term. It mandated that, for the first 
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time, all state apparatus must act according to nititham (the rule of law).124 Thammaphiban was 
translated into a good governance decree that later became a parliamentary act.125  
 
How did Buddhism creep into the secular rule of law? One of the key contributors was Thanin 
Kraivixien, the royalist conservative judge and privy councillor. His reputation for honesty and 
integrity made him the voice of morality for the Thai legal community.126 Trained as an English 
barrister, Thanin was able to indigenize the western concept to fit the local context. He is a 
regular speaker to judges on judicial morality where he repeats the importance of dhamma. 
Indeed, he was the first who coined the term nitithammavinaya, which was later shortened. 
Concerning nititham, he argued that the Buddhist equivalent, the kingly virtue of uprightness 
(avirodhana), is superior to the original western concept because even in times of emergency 
when national security trumps the rule of law, avirodhana still requires a ruler to always act 
rightly.127 Thanin supported his argument by quoting Bhumibol’s speech that lawyers must be 
courageous to serve rightly, both by law and morality.128 He recommended the government 
promote the rule of law by educating government agencies about hiri-otappa (shame over 
moral transgression) and the law of kamma.129 According to Thanin, the 2007 drafters chose 
nititham because Thais are more familiar with tham.130 His view has become a standard 
guideline. 
 
Another leading advocate of nititham is a French-educated scholar and constitution drafter, 
Borwornsak Uwanno. As a response to the 2007 Constitution, he explained nititham in terms 
of the supremacy of law, judicial independence, equality, rights and liberties, and procedural 
fairness.131 However, in 2016, while he still suggested that Thailand needed a better rule of 
law: supremacy of law, natural justice, and separation of power,132 Borwornsak ultimately 
concluded that the rule of law concerns only the outward aspect, of form, behaviour, and 
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structure.133 He therefore proposes that dhamma must be brought in to fulfil the essence of 
democracy, ‘dhamma constitutional democracy.’134 His ideological change coincided with 
national politics which intensified and became defined as a good vs. evil moral battle.  
 
Both Thanin and Borwornsak are rightly sceptical of the thin version of democracy, of having 
a periodic election without democratic culture.135 However, the solution, that the law must 
command the rulers and the ruled to observe dhamma, is, at best, very abstract, and at worst, 
outright indoctrination, verging into theocracy. Notwithstanding the extremity, their ideas are 
highly influential.  Thanin’s writings are widely circulated among judicial personnel and civil 
servants. Compared to Thanin, Borwornsak focuses more on structure and law, less on personal 
virtue. He has been a regular leading figure in drafting Thailand’s many constitutions. Notably, 
in the 2015 drafting, he actualized his vision by demanding politicians and citizens to be 
moralistic and observant of their duties. The draft was criticized as ultra-moralistic.136 
 
Unfortunately, the consequence of the emergence of nititham is not natural justice but legal 
confusion, almost an anarchy. Nititham vests in the judiciary almost unlimited power to 
intervene in the government affairs. The judiciary portrays itself as the protector of democracy. 
On the one hand, the court, especially, the Constitutional Court, cites nititham to abolish laws 
that violate an individual’s rights and liberties. On the other, the court aggressively asserts its 
judicial power over democratically elected governments. It has dissolved major parties and 
dismissed three prime ministers, together with banning hundreds of other politicians from 
politics for five-year periods.137 It turned down the plan to amend the constitution.138 It justified 
aggressive judicial review by claiming to battle corruption and restore transparency, part of 
nititham.139 Nevertheless, it should be noted that the court has never applied the same standards 
to authoritarian regimes, both of 2006 and 2014. This put the sanctity of nititham into doubt as 
nititham is accused of sacrificing the more objective principles such as separation of powers 
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and legal certainty for justice, which is more subjective. The Constitutional Court even offers 
a diploma on nititham and Thai democracy where its judges preach their version of nititham to 
politicians, businessmen, and civil servants.140 
 
(c) Professional Ethics and Training  
 
Dhamma provides a guide to a judge’s professional as well as personal life. The main question 
in the judicial profession is how to judge rightly, that his decision delivers justice and fairness, 
and that failure to do so may bring doom upon the kingdom, according to the ancient belief. 
Here, the residue from the era of dhammasastra is reiterated by generations of lawyers, that he 
must avoid the four prejudices (aggati), of anger, of love, of ignorance, and of fear that will 
cloud his judgement.141 In order to be rid of the four prejudices, a judge is advised to practise 
dhamma, to observe sila and meditate.142 Dhamma becomes the main theme in judicial 
personnel training. All new judges must undergo month-long training, during which they learn 
how to proceed with a trial as well as how to behave as a good judge. He must take a dhamma 
course as well. By learning this old wisdom, a young judge is mentored about deciding on the 
matter of life and death.  
 
In actuality, death presents the awkward problem of how a Buddhist judge should deal with 
capital punishment. One answer from a famous Buddhadasa is often quoted; that a judge, if 
doing his duty without bias, is only the agent of kamma; he is not harming a convict out of his 
own intention so he is not implicated in the cycle of cause and effect, of harm and revenge.143 
By invoking an exception on the state of mind, this is a clever compromise with the principle 
of non-violence that Buddhism holds dear. The view is widely accepted by the judiciary. This 
shows how the Thai judiciary picks some versions of dhamma to overcome moral problems. 
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Buddhadasa played a key role in connecting a judge to dhamma. He was a good friend of Sanya 
Thammasak, another President of the Supreme Court (1963-1967). Sanya invited Buddhadasa 
to speak to young judges or take them to visit the monk at his temple, where he reminded 
judges to serve rightly by observing dhamma.144   
 
Dhamma also provides guidance for a judge’s life outside the courtroom. In the Code of 
Judicial Conduct, a judge must ‘behave morally, live in solitude, live a simple life, be polite, 
have good manners, be amicable, and also behave in a trustworthy way to the general public.’145 
Interestingly, in a training handbook, while behaving morally is said to not follow any 
particular religion, living in solitude is elaborated by teaching from the Sangha Raja. Solitude 
means สันโดษ in Buddhism which is explained as being that an ideal judge must be content with 
what he honestly earns.146 Moreover, he must be humble and frugal.147 A judge must stay clear 
from worldly temptation (อบายมุข).148 Strikingly, the ideal life of a judge is an ascetic one 
resembling that of a monk. This similarity is confirmed by several role models of judges, 
including Thanin Kraivixien, whose biographies display many Buddhist virtues.149 Thus, it 
seems as if religiosity, not professionalism, is what defines the judicial career. 
 
(d) Kamma and Law 
 
Of all dhamma, kamma is one of the most powerful and best-known concepts for laypeople. 
Buddha teaches that any deed, good or bad, triggers consequences, perhaps within this life or 
next. Those who escape temporal law can never escape the true karmic law. Tipitaka told the 
story of Angulimala, a fearsome bandit who killed 999 victims and made a garland from their 
fingers.150 Buddha succeeded in showing him the right way so he abandoned his wicked ways 
and was ordained. Shortly afterwards, he became arahat and the king agreed to drop all charges 
against him. Nevertheless, Angulimala the arahat still suffered a great deal when angry 
villagers beat him with sticks and stones, which Buddha explained to him was the consequence 
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of his bad kamma ripening.151  The story is remarkable not only at showing how kamma works 
but also at how insignificant the king’s law is. Interestingly Buddha did not discuss how the 
victims and their families would cope with their loss. There was neither revenge nor reparation, 
only personal salvation.  
 
In the case of Thailand, the work of David Engel introduces readers to the legal consciousness 
of rural Northern Thailand where customary justice remains in existence. Injury is explained 
in terms of kamma so people still sometimes prefer traditional dispute settlement, a mediation 
by respected figures, to a modern justice system which is imposed upon them from the central 
authority.152 Justice is entertained through mutual agreement. Compensation is relative and 
might not be able to fully cover the whole damage. However, Engel limits his study to the rural 
north. He is convinced that traditional ideas of justice are being usurped by more modern ones, 
implying a different, western, understanding of justice in more urban areas.153 However, there 
is plausible to imagine that a similar idea exists even in the city and among more educated 
classes.  
 
Given the widespread belief in kamma and their training background, there is little wonder that 
kamma discourse makes its way into the courtroom. Judges adopt a similar narrative to explain 
injury to the parties and convince them to settle disputes with partial compensation before 
going to full trial.154 It is not clear if an incumbent judge genuinely believes in his reasoning or 
he just uses it as a pretext to avoid a burdensome task. In one famous, and highly politicized 
case, the Military Court acquitted Phra Pimoltham, a senior abbot who was wrongly accused 
of being a communist to thwart his rise to the Sangha Raja position. In its closing remarks, the 
court reminded Phra Pimoltham that the legal façade was no one’s fault but the result of his 
own kamma and that he should embrace it without anger.155 Similar conversations sometimes 
happen in more ordinary cases too although their frequency is unknown. An accused also 
employs kamma to his or her advantage. Some become ordained to show remorse so they can 
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ask for leniency in sentencing. Whether the tactic is actually successful remains to be found 
out. There has yet to be a systematic empirical study of the role of Buddhism, especially 
kamma, in the courtroom, but Buddhism is evidently there.  
  
Kamma help explains both the cause and effect of the wrongs people encounter in life. Injury 
is the consequence of bad kamma, perhaps even from a previous life. Kamma will always 
punish a villain even when he escapes the hand of temporal justice. This belief is exacerbated 
by socio-economic reasons; that the modern law is difficult to understand and costly to use; 
most importantly, it often fails if a suspect has political connections. It is not uncommon to see 




An absence of a written Buddhist code of law may suggest that Buddhism no longer has any 
connection with the current law of Thailand. However, that view is too simplistic. Thai legal 
consciousness has never broken away from religion. On the other hand, Buddhism has also 
never produced a revolution similar to the Papal Revolution in the eleventh and twelveth 
Century CE Europe when Pope Gregory VII established the new tradition of canon law and 
proper legal study. Buddhist law does not come in the form of written law. Dhammasastra is 
gone. Yet Buddhist legal thought, especially that of dhamma’s superiority, is in training 
materials and commentaries as well as ingrained in the popular perception of what the ideal 
law is. The Buddhist law of dhamma is the ultimate governing rule of how legislators and 
judges should correctly understand and use the law. On the bright side, this provides Thai 
lawyers a guiding star in the profession that often deals with morally challenging questions, 
instructing lawyers on how to deliver justice. The downside is that it can lead to a more 
arbitrary and vague legal system. 
 
The relationship between Buddhism and modern positive law has yet to be fully explored. The 
above section is just an initial attempt to probe into an area rarely ventured into by most 
lawyers. For example, there are many other statutes, in addition to the constitution and the 
sangha law, which are influenced by Buddhist morality. At least in three policies, Buddhist 
rationale overrides economic advantage or political reasons: alcohol, gambling, and abortion. 




Several governments have contemplated plans to de-criminalize abortion and legalize casinos, 
but have withdrawn the projects after protests. While alcohol is not outlawed, its sale and 
advertisement are regulated. Alcohol advertisements must not be too enticing. Alcohol cannot 
be sold on Buddhist holidays. When Thai Bev was about to enter the stock market, Buddhists 
protested so the company moved to Singapore’s stock market. This area definitely merits more 
attention.    
 
Beyond the different historical roots, Buddhist and modern laws are built upon very different 
premises. The next chapter will explore this foundational difference further by questioning 





VIII. Traditional Buddhist Constitutionalism: Theories of Natural Rights 
 
The question of human rights is at the forefront of current debate on Buddhist ethics. Although 
the concept of rights is relatively new, most people nowadays tend to think of their legal 
relationship with the authorities from the perspective of rights; the state is constrained in its 
treatment of citizens by their inherent, universal, and inalienable rights.1 This is how people 
understand how rules and public institutions work. Since the spread of the idea of universal 
human rights far and wide after WWII, it has come to stand for the basic standard of treatment 
of human beings. Human rights are regarded as being natural and inalienable for every 
individual. Within a short period, the concept has gained acceptance as the common language 
of modern constitutionalism. 
 
In an age when human rights have become a universal norm, Buddhism attempts to play along. 
Prominent Buddhist leaders insist on the compatibility of the two, that Buddhism can co-exist 
with human rights. Leaders claim to adopt the Buddhist way of fighting against human rights 
violations. Aung San Sui Kyi, for example, rejects the Asian Values argument which questions 
the compatibility of the western-inspired concept in the East Asian context.2 Against the 
atrocities committed by the military junta, Sui Kyi sees the goal of Buddhism, of peace, 
toleration, and respect for human life, concurring with that of human rights, in other words, 
human dignity, quality of life, and development of the world. The Dalai Lama invokes the 
language of human rights to call for support from Tibetans and the world community against 
oppression by the Chinese government.3 Post-Khmer Rouge Cambodia is reported to employ 
similar Buddhist ideas to teach citizens the value of human rights.4 However, despite making 
regular references to the shared goal, these Buddhist leaders do not clearly demonstrate how 
Buddhist ethics can accommodate human rights. This weakness might contribute to many 
human rights violations in the region. As Keyes has shown, leaders of Sri Lanka, Myanmar, 
and Thailand have constantly ignored human rights and targeted non-Buddhist minorities in 
the name of Buddhism.5 Khmer Rouge had promised social nirvana to Cambodians but 
delivered a human rights catastrophe.6 Even Aung San Sui Kyi has lately been condemned for 
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her endorsement of Buddhist extremists’ genocidal campaign against Rohingya Muslims. 
These violations suggest that, deeper below the universalistic rhetoric, Buddhism, especially 
Theravada, contains elements which could be used against as well as for human rights. 
Buddhism is still struggling to reconcile a huge philosophical gap between the two ideas. This 
chapter thus asks how prevalent is the human rights language embedded in Thai Buddhism? 
More importantly, what role does it actually play in practice?  
 
In Thailand, the transition from a traditional concept of law to a rights-based one occurred as 
recently as two decades ago. It is true that the idea of human rights in Siam had its origins as 
early as the late nineteenth century CE among more progressive aristocrats. For example, King 
Mongkut prohibited the sa le of a wife and children to slavery, complaining that such 
practice discriminated against women, and King Chulalongkorn abolished slavery and corvée 
labour entirely in 1905.7 However, it was only in 1932, when the People’s Party revolted 
against the absolute monarchy, that the political and civil rights of Thais were officially 
recognized in a constitution.8 Still, little had changed in people’s perceptions of law and rights. 
One limiting factor was that Thailand was still under some form of authoritarian rule up until 
the 1990s. When the student activists and union leaders demanded rights and liberties in the 
1970s, the military dictatorship quickly and violently crushed the budding attempt. Yet in 1992, 
an emerging middle class finally rose against the military dictatorship of General Suchinda 
Kra-Prayoon. Against the background of political liberalisation, people suddenly became 
aware of their human rights, which became ingrained into everyday language.9 The 1997 
Constitution further promoted this transformation by recognizing a long list of rights for Thai 
citizens and creating several bodies, the Constitutional Court, the Administrative Court, the 
Ombudsman, and the National Human Rights Commission, for example, to enforce them.10 
Individuals and civil society organisations invoked their rights to question the government. 
Although the 1997 democratization was later ended by the 2006 and 2014 coups, human rights 
have become firmly established in the mind of the public. At the very least, it is still fuelling 
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today’s resistance against the military government of Prayuth Chan-Ocha. At the same time, 
the 2006 and 2014 coups are reminders that old anti-rights ideas also remain strong.11 
 
There is a fundamental problem in the debate on Buddhism and human rights; that, due to the 
novelty of the concept, there is no canonical source on this issue. Buddha never taught about 
rights, so Buddhism makes no explicit mention of the issue in the canon. Although this absence 
is unsurprising, as all major religions originate in ancient times much earlier than the 
proliferation of human rights, it poses a problem for studying Buddhist legal ethics. The debate 
is left to contemporary thinkers, and materials are scant. The problem is acute in the Theravada 
tradition, the conservative orientation of which limits a more creative approach to the topic. 
The absence of canonical reference also presents another problem. Unlike political order or 
law, about the essence of which Buddhists hold a broad consensus, the understanding of human 
rights is less homogenous. The narrative of human rights in Thai Buddhism is less coherent 
than that of political and legal order. 
 
This chapter examines the Buddhist theory of human rights through three perspectives: content, 
concept, and ideology. It asks what Buddhism and human rights have in common, and, more 
importantly, how they differ. Then, it probes how the Buddhist theory of human rights plays 
out in practice.  
 
A. Content of Human Rights in Buddhist Teaching 
 
One of the easiest, and also crudest, ways to prove Buddhism’s compatibility with the concept 
of human rights is to match each specific right to the content of Buddhist teaching. Often the 
object for comparison is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). L. P. M. Perera 
is one of the earliest to pioneer the approach of matching each article from the UDHR with 
Buddhist teachings.12 His work is circulated only among a narrow band of scholars so this oft-
mentioned scholarship is not easily available. Luckily, a similar means of matching was 
repeated by Hoffman, who relied principally on Perera’s work and other supplementary 
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sources, allowing a wider audience to learn about Buddhism’s pairing with the content of the 
UDHR. 
 
Perera and Hoffman’s choice of source is random. Only a few rights are directly supported by 
the canonical source: the first precept of non-killing is linked to the right to life (art 3): the 
Great Elect King is linked to the democratic model and the right to participation (art 21): and 
the Wheel-Turning Monarch to the right to welfare (art 25). The right to ownership of property 
is more disputed; while Buddhism prohibits stealing, the sangha community believes in 
collective, not private, ownership.13 Perera and Hoffman cite the monastic code of conduct and 
disciplinary procedure as the model for the rights to justice (arts 8, 10, and 11). As the matching 
continues, the two scholars increasingly use more distant, less relevant references. Mostly, they 
refer to the general spirit of loving-compassion, non-injury, or non-discrimination against the 
caste system, for example, in support of the right against torture (art 5), the right against 
arbitrary detention (art 9), or the right to family (art 16). Others are even more far-fetched. 
Freedom of religion and expression are said to be compatible with Buddhism’s spirit as Buddha 
demonstrated by manifesting his enlightenment to the public.14 The Dalai Lama’s escape from 
Tibet is portrayed as the right to asylum.15 Finally, some rights are just unmatchable, i.e. the 
right to the presumption of innocence, privacy, and nationality (arts 11, 12, and 15). It is 
doubtful if their subjective interpretation of Buddhism is acceptable or accurate, for example, 
reading Buddha’s act of manifesting his enlightenment as the evidence in support of the right 
to manifest religious belief, or seeing the Great Elect King model as a democratic and 
participatory form of government.  
 
The weakness in their methodology is that there seems to be no systematic way to fulfil the 
task they have set themselves. Perera and Hoffman draw matchings from various sources: the 
Tipitaka canon of dhamma and vinaya, commentaries, Buddha’s life story, and even 
contemporary incidents. Perera and Hoffman’s order of selection is very random. Only a few 
rights are referenced to Tipitaka. Their choices of sources indicate that Buddhism did not 
originally envision such ideas. More importantly, these sources carry varying degrees of 
authority. Tipitaka is considered the most authoritative, and then the commentaries. Buddha’s 
life story, the general spirit, and contemporary incidents carry dubious weight. However, to 
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complicate the matter, most Thais are least familiar with the canon compared with the life story 
or the general idea of Buddhism. Contemporary incidents, especially from another branch of 
Buddhism, should not be considered acceptable sources for Theravada at all.  While the UDHR 
proceeds from the first to second, and eventually third generation of rights in an orderly manner 
without discriminating between each right, Perera and Hoffman picked their matching sources 
in a very random and questionable manner. In sum, their efforts to match the UDHR with 
Buddhist ethics are rather tendentious.  
 
Furthermore, the problem is such tendentiousness is exacerbated by the lack of consensus 
among Buddhists. There seems to be little consensus on what matches with what. Other works 
by Thai scholars which offer alternative matchings demonstrate how variable this exercise can 
become. Theirs are less thorough and even more confusing. Most would agree that the right to 
life, and the right to property, match the first precept of not killing, and the second precept of 
not stealing, respectively.16 That is where the consensus ends. Most would not consider vinaya 
to be a model justice system or the sangha the ideal democratic society. Some work simply 
refers to the general idea of loving-kindness (metta) to encompass all kinds of human rights 
while others liken Buddha’s fair treatment of individuals to the idea of equality and human 
dignity.17 These interpretations stretch too far. Besides, it is questionable if such interpretations 
represent the majority view of Thai Buddhism as they rely on less familiar canonical passages. 
At best, many Thai scholars insist that Buddhism’s spirit is generally supplemented with that 
of human rights.18 They would offer a list of basic dhamma which they claim to support or 
encourage human rights, but they do not pinpoint the exact passage.   
 
One Thai who adamantly argues that Buddhism already contains human rights is Sulak 
Sivaraksa, a well-known Thai Buddhist thinker and a radical conservative. Sulak sees human 
rights as indigenous to traditional Thai society and later corrupted by Western ideas.19 He 
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describes traditional Thai society as tri-partite; the sangha, the people, and the king.20 Sulak 
imagines a village-based agrarian community where members live according to Buddhist 
dhamma. He identifies the Five Precepts as the basis of Thai human rights without specifying 
how. The sangha acts an exemplar of an ethically ideal society where human rights naturally 
follow goes the line of thinking. The king guides his people to attain ideal ethical standards. 
The people’s duty is to pledge the king their allegiance and the sangha their reverence. If this 
arrangement functions well, there will not be any human rights violation. However, this 
structure fell apart with the 1932 democratic revolution that ended absolute monarchy.21 Since 
then, no political leaders have come to replace the role of the public moral exemplar of the 
king. With no moral enforcers, the arrival of the Western ideas is actually the death knell to 
indigenous human rights. It is posited that only if Thais return to their true selves can human 
rights be restored.22 For the academic Sulak, human rights are a consequence of, and dependent 
upon, following dhamma. Once every member fulfils his responsibility as Buddhism dictates, 
then there are human rights.  
 
Sulak’s theory, however, contains errors. First, his traditional Thai society is an imaginary 
community. This ideal image of the good old days is disseminated and expressed widely among 
conservatives without any supporting evidence that Siam had once been as claimed. His theory 
is reactionary to the consumerism of the modern Thailand, yet such an ideal ethical society has 
never existed. He admits that there are surely some historic human right violations, slavery for 
example, but he dismisses them as minor. This view is rejected by more critical observers who 
acknowledge the systematic exploitation of powerless commons. In addition to slavery, there 
was tax-farming and corvée labour, as well as other mistreatments.23 Actual historical evidence 
reports poverty, desertion, and even rebels against the powerful lords as the result of abusive 
relationships, which explained why the 1932 Revolution eventually happened.24 Sulak’s 
second mistake is to confuse liberal democracy with military dictatorship. Thailand has never 
completed democratic consolidation. Royalist conservatives were actually able to seize power 
back with the help of the military so post-absolute monarchy Thailand has mostly come under 
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military dictatorship.25 It is in this context that Sulak appears to criticize the ‘western’-style of 
government of corruption and violation of human rights without distinguishing democracy and 
dictatorship.26 Sulak would prefer traditional small-scale human rights violations to large-scale 
ones under westernized dictatorships. His subsequent work still shows his categorical 
disapproval of all things western, even though liberal, and his fondness of returning to an 
absolute monarchy. This anti-westernization theme keeps recurring throughout the debate on 
Buddhist values and human rights. 
 
Many Buddhist Thais, Sulak included, adopt a consequentialist approach. Human rights are 
not necessary if everyone follows dhamma. Two most often cited teachings are the Five 
Precepts and the Six Dimensions. The Five Precepts or sila are the minimum standard of proper 
conduct for Buddhists. A person should refrain from: (1) taking life, (2) taking property not 
freely given, (3) sexual misconduct, (4) lying, and (5) intoxication.27 The scope varies. Some 
would understand lying to include swearing or even talking nonsensically. Some see adultery 
as misconduct but not premarital sex or polygamy. The five silas form Buddhism’s moral code 
of conduct. The Six Dimensions designate proper roles in six relationships: to parents, spouses, 
friends, monks, teachers, and servants.28 Basically, a person must treat people of senior 
positions i.e. parents, teachers, and monks, with respect and obedience. These are obligated to 
reciprocate with appropriate caring, upbringing, education, and advice in good faith. Spouses 
must care for each other with material and emotional support and fidelity. Friends must 
maintain their friendship. Lastly, those of lower status, a person must treat with compassion 
and kindness, food and wages, medicine and holidays, so they return the favour with their 
loyalty and service. For Buddhists, human rights are a natural consequence once they satisfy 
these dhamma. These definitely help create a peaceful society but, as the matching experiments 
have shown, the Five Precepts and the Six Dimensions still fall far short of the full coverage 
of human rights as set out in the UDHR. Adultery and intoxication might be immoral but they 
breach no human rights. Buddhism’s tolerance of other religions should not be understood 
exactly as freedom of religion in the modern sense. Nor does the fair treatment of a wife equate 
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with gender equality. These terms e.g. freedom, dignity, equality of life have a precise meaning 
defined by historical and political circumstances. The dhammas come from a very different 
origin; therefore, they yield very different results.  
 
B. The Conceptual Framework of Buddhist Human Rights 
 
The content-based approach is not valuable to the debate on Buddhism and human rights 
because there are many flaws in making a direct match between the two sets of values which 
are made in totally different settings. It is perhaps more fruitful to ask if human rights could 
find a theoretical foundation within Buddhism’s vision of individual and social good.29 To 
understand Buddhist ethics on human rights, the discussion must begin with the concept of 
rights. What are rights from the perspective of Buddhism? Which characteristic of rights does 
Buddhism lack or share with the West? The topic is discussed more extensively in the study of 
classical Buddhism while Thai Buddhist scholars often focus on the topic of human rights. 
Therefore, only by a reverse engineering technique is one able to deduce Thai Buddhism’s 
understanding of rights. 
 
In the West, the journey of the concept of rights lasts over a millennium. In the ancient world, 
from Greece to the Middle Ages, right, or ius, has the objective meaning of the state of affairs. 
Through reasoning or God’s revelation, what is right is what is the proper state of affairs, 
legally, politically, and morally.30 Violation of this natural law results in the transgression of 
the proper order. When Europe entered into the late Middle Ages and eventually the 
Enlightenment, the notion of rights changed from an objective to a subjective meaning.31 
Philosophers began to consider rights not as the proper state of affairs but as power of an 
individual.32 It focused not on the whole community but on a person as an owner of rights. A 
person naturally owns a right which must be legally enforceable. The notion of natural rights 
has repeatedly been confirmed through historical events such as the Enlightenment, the 
American Revolution, and the French Revolution, from which natural rights were made 
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manifest. After the WWII, such an idea of natural rights became the universal norm known as 
human rights.  
 
What does rights refer to? There are two main camps in this debate: the will theory and the 
interest theory.33 According to the will theory, rights are a form of power. The right-holder has 
a legitimate power over another individual’s action, to compel them to act or forbid them from 
such action.34 This entitlement pre-empts any further discussion about the usefulness or 
appropriateness of the invocation of rights.35 This view is simple and straightforward. Yet it 
reveals very little about why that entitlement should be recognized as a right.36 The interest 
theory, on the other hand, believes that a right will advance the holder’s interest, making one 
better off.37 Imprecise as it is, the interest theory is useful to explain why a person does not 
always have total control over their rights. Some rights which confer the most important 
interests to a person, e.g. the right to life, cannot be waived at will.38 Also, it justifies how an 
incompetent individual could still enjoy rights even when they are not capable of exercising 
them by themselves.39 How does a Buddhist ethics of rights position itself between the two 
camps?   
 
The above debate notwithstanding, a right is largely understood as comprising four basic 
components as proposed by Wesley Hohfeld.40 People use the term “right” according to four 
different definitions. A right is a liberty so the holder is under no duty to act. He is free to 
exercise or not exercise that choice. A right confers a claim that the holder can demand others 
to perform their duty to the right holder. A right holder also enjoys a power to alter his rights 
e.g. waiving or releasing a duty-bearer from his due. Lastly, a right entails immunity. No other 
entity has the power to alter his right. 
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Damien Keown asks if Buddhism has the concept of right. He admits that Buddhism does not 
talk about right but argues that it contains similar ideas in different presentation.41 Keown 
makes reference to dhamma, which sets the normative relationship of an individual to society. 
Each individual has a specific set of duties under a specific role, as parent, partner, offspring, 
master, disciple, etc. Keown translates dhamma, in this context, to due, which offers two 
meanings.42 Dhamma assigns what one is due to deliver as well as what is due to one. Thus, 
although Buddhism may speak principally of duty, it clearly has the idea of entitlement in mind. 
According to Keown, when a person must refrain from killing, it implies the right to life of 
others.43 Dhamma offers a myriad of interpersonal relationships from which the idea of right 
can be drawn. 
 
Keown’s central argument for compatibility with human rights is Buddhism’s respect for 
human life. The human being is a precious life form.44 A sentient being must accumulate a very 
high level of merit in order to be born human. That possibility is slim. In addition to scarcity, 
human life is precious because only in the form of human life can one reach one’s maximum 
potential, understanding the noble truth and ending his suffering.45 This respect forms the 
foundation of human dignity and the equality on which natural and inalienable rights rely. 
 
Keown’s suggestion on Buddhism’s implicit rights theory is challenged by Craig Ihara. Ihara 
cites Joel Feinberg’s work to show that while a right entails duty, the opposite is not necessarily 
true.46 Duty can originate from other causes, e.g. moral duty. It is possible that some duties are 
mutual as two persons are due to perform reciprocal tasks but none is entitled to a claim should 
the other fail.47 In such a case, failing to fulfil one’s duty does not constitute an injury to 
another, who is unable to claim remedy. If, Ihara argues, dhamma is understood in term of a 
claim-right, as it has to be for Keown’s argument to work, that would seriously change the 
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nature of Buddhism.48 He is not convinced that Buddhism has already contained a seed of the 
theory of right. Nonetheless, Ihara is aware that the language of right is useful in an increasingly 
pluralistic world and Buddhism might be able to construct the concept of right from materials 
such as a sense of human dignity.49 
 
Thai Buddhism focuses on the question of human rights. The most comprehensive and accepted 
interpretation of human right is that offered by P. A. Payutto.50 Payutto considers human rights 
a useful idea but not the ultimate goal. Human rights are necessary to regulate a peaceful 
human-to-human relationship.51 However, it is only a compromise. Men respond to division, 
segregation, and competition by making practical compromises, by abiding by human rights.52 
In his view, human rights is a negative or passive concept as it simply prevents violation by 
other individuals.53 Yet Payutto’s real goal is to foster true harmony and peace, which human 
rights alone are insufficient to do. The human being should maximize his potential, following 
dhamma and striving for the best possible outcome.54 Dhamma is a positive concept as it 
actively advances the appropriate behaviour of a person which results in better living 
conditions.55  
 
Besides the flawed origin, Payutto criticizes human rights as merely a social convention. 
Human rights are artificial because the concept was created by men.56 Thus, he is unconvinced 
that human rights are natural rights. Because human rights are not based on the eternal truth of 
dhamma, they cannot last.57 Another criticism is that human rights deal only with social 
behaviour. It cares not about mental advancement.58 Payutto would prefer dhamma to human 
rights because of its finer qualities dealing with inner peace and wisdom.  
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Payutto identifies the root of the shortcomings of human rights in humanity’s ‘hard 
relationship’ with the world.59 Hard relationship assumes that western knowledge, of natural 
science, social science, and humanities, is built on an egoistic presumption, so it fails to 
apprehend true human nature, which can be understood only if approached holistically and 
humbly, without fear or hatred.60 In other words, Western ideas are anthropocentric. A man is 
placed wrongly as the master of the world. Not only do men have a faulty relationship with 
other humans, but also with themselves and nature. He warns of two extremes to be avoided, 
that of the total disregard of rights, and the obsession with rights. Those who disregard rights 
bring about chaos and violence. Those obsessed with rights will be occupied with making 
claims — a behaviour considered selfish.61 Under such a condition, it is argued, society will 
disintegrate. 
 
How can a Buddhist avoid the two extremes? A person must be mindful of dhamma, which 
Payutto understands as true nature. If a man understands the natural order, he will improve his 
relationship with others, with himself, and with nature. He will treat others with genuine 
respect.62 He will reach inner peace and freedom, which is true freedom from worldly or 
materialistic hindrance.63 Moreover, he will be a harmonious part of the natural world. Payutto 
stresses the importance of education in teaching dhamma in equipping an individual with the 
correct knowledge and values.64 
 
Payutto’s criticism of an obsession with rights hints at influence from his senior fellow, another 
famous scholarly monk, Buddhadasa. Buddhadasa expressed his dismay that the mindless 
exercise of rights disrupted the traditional social order, which he deemed proper. He stressed 
that liberal democracy had to be contained by dhamma. However, Payutto does not go as far 
as Buddhadasa, who controversially advocated introducing a dhammic dictatorship form of 
government to actualize true peace and harmony.65 
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Despite their anti-Western sentiment, Payutto’s understanding of right is markedly different 
from Sulak’s. Payutto is basically a Thai nationalist. Rights are not a by-product of dhamma. 
Fpr Payutto, it is an introduced Western means of advancing a person’s interest. However, it is 
an inferior means to dhamma, which yields supposedly a more long-lasting result. Clearly, 
Payutto fails to separate the realm of law from morality. His strong point is that he confirms 
Buddhism’s compatibility with the modern values of human rights while asserting Buddhism’s 
superior quality. Human rights are just one means but only dhamma is the true solution to a 
sustainable end. This interpretation of human rights is widely received, not least by the 
President of the National Human Rights Commission, Saneh Chammarik (2001-2009). Saneh 
admitted that his view of human rights was inspired by Payutto.66 While he valued human life, 
he warned of the individualism that inevitably came with liberalism.67 Saneh preferred dhamma 
which could bring the greatest good to the public in the form of internal liberation.68   
 
Payutto’s interpretation resembles the interest theory. He considers rights as a tool to advance 
a holder’s interest in living in a non-violent environment. He criticizes the idea of rights as 
entitlement, as selfish, as too individualistic for maintaining a harmonious society. However, 
his interpretation of interest is narrow and rigid; it must comply with Buddhism’s ideals. He 
does not approve every kind of interest. In his view, Buddhism’s interest goes beyond the 
secular interest of life, property, and liberties. The ultimate interest is (1) for a person to have 
internal freedom, which is considered the real freedom, liberation from desires and suffering, 
(2) for society, the permanently peaceful social order, and (3) an appropriate relationship with 
the world.69 Buddhism does not deny consideration for secular interests but discourages people 
from being fixated with them, and promotes the aiming for higher, finer interests. 
 
Thus, the dominant way in which Buddhism is articulated in Thailand has not broken away 
from the world of antiquity. It considers rights as the proper state of affairs in conducting a life 
with other members of society and the world. A right is not a power within oneself to decide 
one’s own path but the ideal way of living, legally, politically, and morally. This view deprives 
Buddhism’s version of rights from the preemptory force which the will theory considers the 
essential component. With very narrow goals in mind, a man has potential and a duty, not 
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freedom, to utilize that potential for that specific goal which Buddhism considers a good life. 
Buddhism will not approve an exercise of right in a harmful or useless manner, not even in a 
selfish manner. At least, an exercise of a right must not violate the Five Precepts or ignore the 
Six Directions principles. This is not liberty in the normal sense. Buddhism is concerned not 
with the liberty to do whatever one wishes within the limit of law, but with the liberation from 
desires and suffering which actually limits the choices of that individual. Thus, Buddhism does 
not believe in the legitimacy of a right as a sphere of individual freedom.  
 
Another notable shortcoming of the Buddhist theory of rights concerns the idea of claim. 
Claims makes rights stand out from other moral commitments. Again, the absence of a claim 
originates from the anti-anthropocentric view. However, a claim is an essential component of 
rights. Being able to make a claim means that rights can be realized. Having an ability to make 
a claim gives the concept of right moral significance because it allows a claimant to stand up, 
look at others in their eye, and feel equal to everyone else.70 An ability to make a claim gives 
the claimant a sense of human dignity that is essential to the idea of a human right.71 Making a 
claim confirms that each and every person is equal in his capacity to enjoy that entitlement.72 
It roots the ground of rights in the value of the human right-holder as an end in themselves. 
Keown does not discuss what a person could do if someone fails to deliver his due. Ihara, in 
criticizing Keown’s ideas, indicates that making a claim when someone fails to fulfil his duty 
would seriously change the nature of Buddhism.73 Sulak mentions briefly that if a king fails in 
his role in the tri-partite model, that he has been unable to enforce dhamma upon his subjects, 
then the people may oust him.74 However, Sulak has never addressed the problem of what 
happens if a person is wronged. Payutto warns of obsession with entitlement. His warning 
implies that making a claim to one’s entitlement is not encouraged. It can easily become a 
selfish act which leads to argument and social disintegration. In principle, regardless of law or 
right, which is only a social arrangement, a proprietor will surely be punished by the true law 
of karma. That might explain why many discussions about rights in Buddhism seem to 
overlook the question of claim. The Dalai Lama, for example, does not attempt to make a claim 
over Tibet’s independence. Instead, he prefers to make a plea to the Chinese government to 
                                               
70 Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights 252.  
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid.  
73 Ihara, Why There Are No Rights in Buddhism 48. 




stop the abuses and surrender Tibet to his people.75 Yet this leaves open one big question; how 
can Buddhist ethics be considered in terms of rights if it rejects the concept of making a claim? 
 
C. Ideological Foundation of Rights 
 
Given the above discussion, although Buddhism shares the same goal with human rights — to 
bring dignity and peace to humans, as well as further induce development of the world — this 
embryonic theory is still markedly different from the modern theory of rights. Buddhism’s 
version of rights lacks the characteristics that empower the individual to control their life. Such 
a discrepancy stems from their differing ideological standpoints which is addressed in this 
section. One of the most essential differences is the view on the nature of human beings, that 
is, on their underlying moral anthropologies. While human rights are based on the idea of 
human dignity, equality, and liberty, Buddhism does not adopt the same view.  
 
(a) Dignity vs. the Buddhist Cosmology  
  
The theory of rights is based on the idea of inherent dignity which places man at the centre of 
everything. The sense of human self-authorship demands respect from others and empowers 
humans to claim their entitlements. While Buddhism prizes human life highly, it rejects such 
anthropocentricity. Buddhist scholars often warn against the danger of individualism, of 
arrogance and selfishness which are attached therewith, if a person is convinced that he is the 
master of himself.76 On the contrary, Buddhism places humans not at the centre but as a part 
of a larger scheme of things dictated by dhamma.77 A human being is connected with other 
humans, animals, and nature through a modest and humble ‘soft’ relationship. On the one hand, 
this provides the basis for human rights, especially for the later generation of human rights that 
move beyond the individual person e.g. animal rights or the right to good environment.78 It 
argues that we have responsibility over these matters whereas anthropocentric thinking easily 
convinces humans to overlook these duties to non-human beings. This anti-anthropocentric 
view is the strongpoint of Buddhist ethics. On the other hand, this position enables the idea of 
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human rights to be more easily challenged, particularly in Theravada cosmology. In 
Theravada’s multi-fold universe, a human world is just one world. There are lower worlds, of 
several levels of hell, and higher worlds, of several levels of heaven. A man can ascend or 
descend through these many worlds depending on his karma. It is only within the present world 
that a man is placed at the highest recognition. Yet still, above a man there are many higher 
levels of being that he should strive for and he may attain the higher world only by dhamma, 
not through rights. The right is only a fictionalized idea applicable to this man-world, but 
rendered meaningless elsewhere. 
 
(b) Equality vs. Theory of Karma  
 
Within this human world, not all men are born equal. Although Buddhism rejects the idea of 
caste, the Buddhist world divides people into classes according to karma, perhaps the most 
significant impediment to the realization of human rights in Thailand. In practice, this means a 
hierarchical social structure; monks over laypeople, nobles over peasants; senior over youth, 
and men over women. Similar to Buddhadasa’s and Payutto’s understanding of human rights, 
the notion of equality, too, is only created by humans so it is a relative or conventional truth. 
The state of equality does not exist at the ultimate level. According to Thai Buddhist cosmology 
discussed in earlier chapters, the ultimate truth is that each individual is born into different 
conditions, of family, physique, and destiny, according to his inherent karma. The law of karma 
cannot treat all human beings equally. Meritorious souls are born into nobler families while 
sinful ones suffer the consequences. The arrangement is quite rigid, hence the belief in path 
dependence. It justifies the existence of social classes. The idea of human rights thus works 
only in certain situations but it should not claim to be natural or inalienable. Disdain of equality 
is exacerbated by Payutto’s misunderstanding of the concept. He cautions that, if we are to 
create an egalitarian world, the government must materially provide everyone with the same.79 
Again, this material equality is selfishness, leading to bickering for materialistic gain. 
 
In reality, the karma theory is translated into the world where each individual may enjoy 
different levels of rights according to their rank.80 Sitthi, a Thai translation of rights, originally 
means power, and is a very apt choice. The higher one is in the social and political ranking, the 
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more power and rights, he possesses. Thus, peasants, youths, the poor, and other marginalized 
groups, are not supposed to be treated the same as lords, seniors, the rich, and other powerful 
people. Duties befall those of lower rank while high-ranking individuals have leeway to 
circumvent or ignore the rights of others. 
 
(c) Liberty vs. Liberation 
  
Lastly, without dignity and equality, the idea of liberty can hardly be conceived. The modern 
view of rights asserts that a man, as the master of his fate, within the designated sphere, makes 
his own decisions, regardless of how good or bad that decision is. However, Buddhism, 
although it allows a being to stray for countless reincarnations, ultimately expects a man to 
walk the path of enlightenment. A life should have a purpose. Buddhism places emphasis not 
on liberty, but on liberation, as the ideal goal of liberating oneself from feelings that cause 
suffering.81 Therefore, the choice of a man is much more limited.  
 
Buddhism’s anti-anthropocentricity, social hierarchy, and self-liberation pose a challenge for 
the acceptance of human rights in a Buddhist society. It fails to understand that the concept of 
human rights is essentially a political and legal claim to construct a relationship between an 
individual and the state. Human rights are not replacements for ethics. Buddhism seems to 
assert a fundamental continuity between personal and public morality, and so cannot 
countenance the idea that someone has the legal right to be morally wrong. 
 
D. Buddhist Human Rights in Practice 
 
The above sections demonstrate that Thai Buddhism is familiar with human rights, though it 
misinterprets the idea. The next question is what has the Buddhist version of human rights done 
to the human rights situation in Thailand? 
 
Thai political history is rife with human rights abuses. Decades of military dictatorship and the 
war against communism resulted in massacres, assassinations, and torture committed by the 
state. Only after the 1992 Black May Uprising did Thais demand better protection of rights and 
liberties, which led to the 1997 Constitution. First and foremost, the 1997 Constitution tried to 
                                               




prevent further violations by incorporating a very extensive bill of rights that covered all the 
three generations of rights. Andrew Harding observes that the bill of rights in the 1997 and 
2007 Constitutions are up to North American and European standards, and so are a very 
successful accomplishment.82 Among the many mechanisms to promote and protect human 
rights, the 1997 Constitution established new independent agencies, notably, the Constitutional 
Court, the Administrative Court, and the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). The 
new courts were assigned to safeguard the rights and liberties of Thais through judicial review 
while the National Human Rights Commission would investigate and report the abuses, 
including referring a case to an appropriate court.83   
 
The outcome received mixed reactions. The judiciary has found a number of statutes 
unconstitutional because they violated the right to a fair trial, presumption of innocence, the 
right to occupation, and gender equality.84 However, it endorsed the legality of two coup d’etats 
and refused to review the exercise of emergency power that left many anti-government 
protesters dead and injured.85 The NHRC has suffered from weak powers and considerable 
interference. It had a rocky start because the first commission (2001 — 2009) had only advisory 
power, which was inadequate to investigate the government’s abuses such as the war on drugs 
(2003-2004) and the Deep South violence.86 Later, the second (2009 — 2015), and third (2015 
— present), commissions appeared to side with the government, refusing to investigate the 
army’s deadly crackdown of the anti-government protest in 2010, and torture and unlawful 
detentions under the 2014 military regime.87 The NHRC was further tampered with by the fact 
that the current commission was appointed by the junta’s rubber-stamp National Legislative 
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Assembly so the commissioners were probably already biased against dissidents.88 There 
appear to be some areas in Thai politics where human rights are not applicable.  
 
The following sections address three topics that illustrat the problematic relationship between 
state, human rights, and Buddhism. This section shows how the Buddhist theory of human 
rights actually endorses or exacerbates human rights abuses in Thailand.  
 
(a) The Culture of Impunity  
 
In 2018, Human Rights Watch (HRW), reporting on Thailand’s human rights situation, pointed 
out the deeply embedded culture of authoritarianism. It reported widespread abuses, mostly by 
the army and other security forces.89 The military periodically carries out coups, the latest in 
2014. The army is responsible for suppressing people’s political and civil rights, with secret 
detention, torture, intimidation, courts-martial, and forced disappearance. Freedom of 
expression is specifically mentioned as being severely restricted. Marginalized people are 
hardest hit, the Muslim minority in the restive Deep South, and refugees, asylum seekers, and 
migrant workers. Migrant workers are extorted and beaten. Asylum seekers are deported back 
to their country of origin, putting their lives at risk. Most importantly, all of these human rights 
violations have gone unpunished. Thais appear to accept such rogue behaviour as normal. The 
culture of impunity remains very strong.  
 
The HRW Report is only the tip of a much larger iceberg. It accurately portrays Thailand’s 
pattern of human rights violations. The Thai state, especially after WWII, has engaged in the 
all activities described above. There were five massacres in 1973, 1976, 1992, 2009, and 2010 
when the government crushed anti-government protests.90 In addition, there are widespread 
records of torture, detention, forced disappearance of student activists, union leaders, ethnic 
Malays, etc.91 Two incidents that drew international attention are the war on drugs in 2003-
2004 and the Deep South insurgency from 2004. In both incidents, the armed forces were 
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involved in extrajudicial killings and the torture of thousands of innocent people. Despite the 
fact that these crimes are well-documented, no perpetrator has even been brought to justice.92 
There has been no serious probe and no government official ever indicted.93 Nor have the above 
human rights protectors seriously challenged the state’s invincibility. Perpetrators were 
lawfully exonerated.94 The judiciary cautiously dismissed the cases of human rights abuses on 
various legal technicalities.95 Tyrell Haberkorn observes that these crimes have become part of 
the public duty of many state apparatuses and that there are legal as well as cultural mechanisms 
to shield the perpetrator from accountability.96 The feeling of invincibility enables human 
rights violations to continue unabated.97   
 
Thongcahi Winichakul identifies the Buddhist idea of social hierarchy as a major contributing 
factor to perpetuating the culture of impunity, and ultimately, human rights violations. In an 
unequal society, men of higher social ranking, i.e. holding high position in the government or 
possessing large wealth and power, enjoy so many privileges while those of lower status 
receive much less.98 According to this moralistic thinking of merit-equating-power, the more 
power one acquires, the less corrupt one becomes. It basically upends the general assumption 
that more power tends to lead to corruption more easily. As a result, the marginalized groups 
are vulnerable to abuses as they cannot question the powerful ones, whose privileges protect 
them from accountability. Thongchai argues that the Buddhist organic society idea has 
survived Siam’s modernization and is still ingrained in today’s thinking of Thais.99  
 
Another factor that negatively contributes to human rights violations is Buddhism’s scepticism 
towards human rights as an absolute idea. Payutto’s caution about an obsession with rights is 
translated into blatant disregard by the state. Instead of going beyond the minimum standards 
of human rights, it allows the state to ignore the bill of rights altogether. Because Buddhism 
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regards human rights as interests, violations may be justifiable if there is a more compelling 
interest than dignity, equality, and liberty. Because Thai Buddhism is wary of individualism, 
the question of compelling interest is determined from the perspective of collectivism. Two 
questions are often asked when a person attempts to invoke his rights; first, whether the 
invocation of right is done with a wholesome motive, and second, whether the invocation of 
right is beneficial to the community. These interests are, for example, national security, 
government stability, or social unity. Victims are sometimes asked to forego their rights to 
justice in order to maintain social harmony.100 In reality, that means an individual sacrifice for 
communal interests, which helps suppress any challenge to the status quo. 
 
The role of individual monks in supporting human rights violations cannot be underestimated. 
In 1976, a famous monk Kittivuttho urged the killing of left-wing students, claiming that an 
act for the greater good was not sinful.101 A similar idea was repeated in 2010, when another 
famous monk Vajiramedhi claimed that wasting time was more sinful than manslaughter.102 
The infamous 1970 speech was given to the right-winged militias to fight left-leaning 
university students and the 2010 speech was circulated amidst the growing call for the 
government to use deadly force against anti-government protesters. In both cases, many Thais 
were killed but the government were not held accountable. The Sangha Council even refused 
to discipline Kittivuttho, lamely citing a lack of evidence.103 
 
In recent years, even the masses who had once advocated the end of dictatorship and demanded 
better protection of rights and liberties have regrettably begun to change their view. This 
mentality grows more conspicuous with the upsurge of moralism and conservatism that 
accompany democratic backsliding. 
 
(b) Democratic Backsliding  
 
One of the biggest contestations between Buddhism and human rights concerns democracy, 
which most people equate to human rights. It is not coincidental that human rights flourished 
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only after the democratic liberalization in 1997 and declined steadily after the 2006 coup. The 
2006 coup, the watershed moment for Thailand’s democratic decline, ousted Thaksin 
Shinawatra. This controversial PM won the 2001 election and was massively popular. 
However, he had abused his popularity to paralyse the separation of power, silence critics and 
enrich his cronies.104 Moreover, Thaksin challenged many traditional institutions, in other 
words, the monarchy, Buddhism, and the judiciary, attempting to control them.105 Thaksin 
presents a classic dilemma for the liberal democratic model of government when an election is 
held periodically but the rule of law has not been firmly established.106 Constitutionalism is 
abused to legitimize the authoritarian regime.107 Thaksin’s opponents, mostly those in the upper 
middle classes and royalist elites, formed an anti-Thaksin alliance which called for an extra-
constitutional intervention.108 The anti-Thaksin group constructed their identity by contrasting 
themselves with Thaksin; they claimed to be a group of righteous people.109  They demanded 
the Thaksin-affiliated governments suspend the constitution, resign, and install a third party to 
run the administration.110 
 
Soon, the anti-Thaksin alliance evolved into an anti-democratic one.111 They mistakenly held 
Thaksin as the embodiment of democracy so they concluded that democratization should be 
undone. The campaign against democracy rested on a simple premise that Thais are not born 
equal.112 Democracy would have worked if Thais were equally literate. However, when there 
is no social equality, there should not be political equality. Better-educated classes are deemed 
to make better decisions than those of lower-educated classes who voted overwhelmingly for 
Thaksin.113 This thinking strongly reflected that of Theravada Buddhism’s hierarchical social 
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structure.114 Thus, democracy is wrong in treating all people alike. The conclusion is that since 
the majority have failed to exercise their rights correctly, their rights should be retracted. Only 
some people should be given political and civil rights. The narrative invited the traditional 
oligarch to rule without the people’s consent or respect for their rights. Ironically, the alliance’s 
choice goes to the military as their representative of a benevolent ruler.   
 
Juntas, especially the 2014 National Council of Peace and Order (NCPO), are the great 
violators of human rights. Over five years, the NCPO arrested, tortured, and even allegedly 
murdered dissidents causing a mass exodus of political activists.115 It also devised a programme 
to invade citizen’s privacy through an online surveillance scheme as well as public 
indoctrination.116 Meanwhile, the NCPO pledged to make human rights the national agenda, 
and the 2014 Interim Charter guaranteed the rights and liberties of Thais according to 
constitutional law and international obligation.117 The bleak reality and the goodwill gestures 
suggest that the junta’s understanding of rights does not align with the universal concept but 
resembles that of Thai Buddhism.  
 
Very notable is the Thai Premier’s view on election. Prayuth Chan-Ocha, the junta leader and 
the prime minister, often blamed the citizens for failing to take care of their own affairs so that 
he was forced to involuntarily stage a coup and become prime minister.118 His roadmap back 
to democracy has been delayed for more than four years but whenever his opponents have 
reminded him, he has dismissed the request by citing the abuse of democracy, of chaos and 
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corrupt politicians.119 With an election coming up in early 2019, Prayuth and his cabinet 
repeatedly cautioned Thais not to make the same mistake. Politicians must not fight over 
elections and people must cast their votes for the right candidate.120 This message was 
strengthened on the eve of the election day; the Palace issued a proclamation urging Thais to 
vote for the ‘good guys.’ Besides, the Army Commander warned that he could not guarantee 
that the army would not intervene should Thais misbehave in exercising their political 
freedom.121 In other words, he might stage another coup if he deemed the election result 
undesirable or it was carried out in an unruly manner. Thais must show that the expression is 
beneficial to the society in order to be able to enjoy their political rights. The rights language 
is still used in an objective sense. 
 
In addition to being a political enemy of the traditional elites, Thaksin is seen by many 
conservative Buddhists as demonic. His behaviour, corruption and human rights abuses, are 
unlawful as well as immoral. As a result, he, and his affiliates, were deprived of a fair trial. 
Many cases were investigated by biased bodies and his objections dismissed by the court.122 
As a result, there were reports of many procedural irregularities. The new procedural code for 
a corruption case bars a fugitive from the right to appeal and corruption cases will have no 
statute of limitations.123 These measures can be understood as the attempt to prevent Thaksin 
from returning to Thailand and Thai politics. His supporters, too, are considered as choosing 
the ‘wrong’ side and therefore falling down the political hierarchy. They have been harassed, 
charged with feigned criminal offences, and many have had their bail denied.     
 
(c) Freedom of Expression 
 
One area where human rights is severely limited is freedom of expression. While this freedom 
has not been totally banned, Thais understand the concept very differently from what is 
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generally understood. For example, there are two overlapping frameworks regulating how 
Thais should express their opinions. In the Five Precepts, the third precept forbids Buddhists 
from lying, swearing, gossiping, or talking nonsense.124 Thus, freedom of expression in 
Thailand must only be invoked if it conforms with the Third Precept that freedom must be 
exercised only if it advances the public’s interest. Otherwise freedom of expression can be 
forsaken for the sake of a more compelling interest. The most common compelling interest is 
the preservation of Thai-ness, which includes respect for traditional values and institutions. As 
a result, Thai-ness becomes the pretext to silence unwanted criticism. A young woman who 
complained about public transport was condemned for being unpatriotic and causing disunity, 
and eventually pressured to retract her statement.125 Another student activist who challenged a 
flag salutation and prostration ceremony, which conservatives deem a symbol of Thai-ness, 
was labelled provocative and useless.126 He was then subjected to physical assaults as well as 
online bullying campaigns.  
 
However, freedom of expression is most severely limited when it concerns the monarchy, 
which many Thais consider the zenith of Thai-ness. In recent years, Thailand has witnessed a 
significant surge in the use of section 112 of the Penal Code, the crime of lèse majesté.127 
Anyone who defames, insults, or threatens the king, the queen, the heir-apparent, or the regent, 
is subject to three to fifteen years of imprisonment.128 Because of the revered status of the 
monarchy, criticism to the monarchy, as David Streckfuss observes, is an equivalent to 
treason.129  
 
Section 112 is already the harshest among those countries that still retain the lèse majesté 
law.130 Its implementation further increases the suffering of those accused, whose basic rights 
are denied. There is no certainty in this draconian law as the extent of the crime, originally 
covering only the living king, queen, the heir-apparent, and the regent, has been expanded to 
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cover the entire idea of monarchy. Sentencing has become even harsher lately.131 An accused 
will also have his bail denied, meaning that the trial itself turns into an ordeal and defending 
himself in court is almost impossible.132 Many of the accused have decided to plead guilty to 
end the suffering.133 Moreover, although in principle the law should indiscriminately prohibit 
circulation of slanderous items regardless of intention, in reality, conviction and punishment 
seem to be conditioned by the motive of the proprietor. Only those who are identified as 
Thaksin’s supporters or sympathizers get the worst possible treatment. The anti-Thaksin group, 
generally considered royalists, receive greater leniency. Once a royalist newspaper published 
the slanderous speech of an anti-royalist speaker, who was later sentenced to 15 years in prison. 
The editor received bail and later had his imprisonment suspended.134 Thus, in addition to the 
overly broad application and unfair procedure, the law is abused to harass political opponents 
rather than protect the royal family. Unsurprisingly, the Thai crime of lèse majesté has been 
subject to heavy domestic and international criticism.135 
 
Defending the lèse majesté law, Borwornsak Uwanno, a royalist legal scholar, adopts the 
relativistic argument that it is a unique feature of Thai democracy. Claiming to be speaking on 
behalf of all Thais, Borwornsak portrays the king as the dhammaraja and the father figure of 
the nation.136 The king is beloved because of the House of Chakri’s contribution to the 
prosperity of Thailand.137 When someone verbally attacks the king, it is as if a miscreant son 
mistreats his father.138 Borwornsak likens such an act to the defilement of a Buddha statue.139 
Even if the king might not want to press charges, it is the duty of all Thais to protect their father 
by punishing that ungrateful son.140 His reasoning reflects a strong belief in the Buddhist 
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organic society, that the king is the head while his subjects are the inferior parts and parcels of 
this body. Borwornsak’s view echoes that of other royalists, who describe such an act as the 
equivalent of causing Buddha to bleed, the gravest crime a man could ever commit.141 
Ironically, Borwornsak admits that the lèse majesté law has been abused for political purposes 
and might need more safeguards, but he is convinced that leniency from the courts and the 
royal pardon can help those convicted.142 The Constitutional Court repeated Borwornsak’s 
rationale to affirm the constitutionality of the law. The king gains respect from his righteous 
behaviour. He displays the ten kingly virtues according to Buddhism. Thus, he is revered and 
inviolable as guaranteed in every constitution.143  
 
It is clear that freedom of expression is not absolute. Still, the limits placed upon Thais are 
much greater than the universal standard permits. Discussion of the monarchy is off-limits 
because the king is in a revered position and shall not be violated. He is the embodiment of 
Thai-ness, so harming his reputation is putting the nation at risk. The court is authorized to 
determine the boundary, which, empirically, shows obvious signs of arbitrariness. However, 
this arbitrariness is justified by the necessity to safeguard the monarch. Lèse majesté is a prime 
example of how a law is abused as an instrument to preserve the traditional socio-political 
hierarchy, the utmost important interest to Thai society that no freedom may interfere with. In 
one word, criticizing the sacred centre of the traditional Buddhist cosmology is treason. 
 
E. Conclusion  
 
Despite the shared goals of peace and development, there is little else that the current 
understanding of Thai Buddhism and human rights agree upon. The two differ markedly about 
the nature of rights and its ideological foundations. Although contemporary Thai Buddhism 
does mention human rights, it does not lead to a better appreciation or protection of such.  
 
Classical Buddhism may rest its support for human rights on the belief in the preciousness of 
human life and potential for self-development. Yet Thai Buddhism holds a much more negative 
view. Sulak overlooks it while Payutto and Buddhadasa express scepticism, and even disdain. 
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Theravada Buddhism emphasizes rather a rigid political, social, and moral structure based on 
merit. A man’s rights depend on his position in this hierarchy. Clearly this is distrust of a man’s 
potential. As a result of this juxtaposition, Thai Buddhism cannot develop a theory, 
explanation, or interpretation that is compatible with the modern theory of human rights.  
 
At best, Buddhism’s theory of rights is porous. Buddhism still holds to an ancient view of rights 
as a proper state of affairs, but not as an entitlement to advance an individual’s interests. 
Buddhism therefore still places emphasis on conducting an ideal life rather than enjoying 
freedom over one’s own fate. It does not acknowledge the essential components of modern 
rights such as their preemptory force or claim. For example, Payutto’s emphasis on the right 
way to exercise a right means a disregard of their preemptory force, which is fundamental to a 
right. When a right is not translated from an objective value to a subjective freedom, this leads 
to a very contradictory result, that a man should possess a right but have no liberty to exercise 
it. Buddhism’s liberation means voluntarily refraining from exercising a right, a perplexing 
stance. 
 
Thai Buddhism’s negative view of human rights has a great impact upon their protection. In 
reality, the language of human rights in Buddhism is not translated into action. Indeed, it 
actually serves to constrain people’s political and civil liberties.  
 
However, as Ihara suggests when he criticizes Keown’s view on human rights, Buddhism must 
begin to contemplate how to reinterpret Buddhism in order to make it more compatible with 
such modern universal values. The next, and final, chapter will discuss how Thai Buddhism 




IX. Rethinking Buddhist Constitutionalism 
 
The first half of the final chapter summarises the work from the previous eight chapters, which 
attempted to answer the two questions posed at the beginning of this dissertation. What is Thai 
Buddhist constitutionalism? Is Buddhist constitutionalism compatible with the liberal 
democratic constitutionalism of the modern day? The second, longer, half sets the agenda for 
further research. It asks if the discrepancy between traditional and universal values can be 
amended.  
 
This study is built upon previous work on Buddhist political and legal ethics, which address 
specific aspects of Buddhist constitutionalism. However, it is the first study that attempts to 
unravel the myth of Buddhist constitutionalism in full. It insists that there is such a thing as 
Buddhist constitutionalism, which is overlooked by many scholars of law and religion. It draws 
from a wide variety of sources on the discussion of political governance, law, and natural rights. 
Focusing on Thailand, it brings to light some lesser known works by Thai scholars and thinkers 
whose ideas represent mainstream contemporary Thai thinking as regards political Buddhism. 
Most importantly, many of them are by prominent lawyers whose works are normally 
overlooked in the study of Buddhism and law. Also, the recent surge of interest in the role of 
Buddhism in politics means that there are a number of books and articles being produced, most 
of which are included in this dissertation. Thus, it bridges the two fields of law and Buddhist 
studies and goes further than other works in establishing the modern relevance of the unfamiliar 
concept of Buddhist constitutionalism.   
 
A. Traditional Buddhist Constitutionalism 
 
One theme that is prominent throughout the thesis is the supremacy of dhamma, understood as 
the eternal cosmic law. The last three chapters address the three key subjects of 
constitutionalism: political governance, the notion of law, and human rights. All of them 
identify the strong belief in dhamma, that it provides an ideal model of governance, law, and a 
guarantee of human rights , which the Thai state strives to follow. Yet they also disclose that 






Buddhist constitutionalism is premised on a positive view of the state. Agganyasutta describes 
the necessity of rules and governance in order to avoid violence and restore order. Through the 
interpretation by Trai Phum Phra Ruang and other local works, the result is the merit-based 
socio-political pyramid where the king sits at the zenith. Despite the idea of republicanism in 
a monastic life, Buddhist political governance is based on absolute monarchy. The king is the 
arbiter, chosen by the consent of society, and the conqueror of the world, through dhamma and 
not force. Ultimately, the king is sacred because he is an aspirant to be the future Buddha. 
Kingship has never been institutionalized, so there is no public-private distinction. His personal 
well-being is tied closely to the prosperity of the kingdom. Born from such belief is the king-
sangha relationship that the ruler must patronize the sangha as part of his merit-making scheme. 
This thesis shows that the Mongkut-Chulalongkorn religious reforms did not modernize the 
Buddhist kingship idea. Therefore, the three images of the king are still revered in Thailand as 
shown in the case of King Bhumibol whose benevolence, in addition to religious ceremonies, 
earned him respect as the modern dhammaraja.   
 
The theory of dhammaraja caused friction when it interacted with the concept of constitutional 
monarchy after the 1932 Revolution. The political hierarchy was challenged by egalitarianism; 
that human beings are equal and that anyone can become the ruler by popular consent. 
However, depending upon elections and coups as they do, politicians lack the same legitimacy 
that monarchs enjoy. Constitutional monarchy offers a partnership between democratic leaders 
and the Buddhist king, who acts as the stabilizing core of the new politics. However, this 
partnership is fragile and highly dynamic as the traditional force constantly attempts to usurp 
the less popular partner. The concept of the benevolent and pious king clashes with the idea of 
an elected leader who appears fraudulent by comparison, with accusations of corruption and 
infighting. The most recent political conflict is a good example of the culmination of traditional 
political authority. Thais witness the rise of a rhetoric of benevolent autocracy that undermines 
the democratic regime. It also raises the unresolved question of violence, which is necessary to 
help preserve the socio-political hierarchy.    
 
The Buddhist world of Southeast Asia is divided into three realms: of the king, the sangha, and 
the ordinary people. The king is subject to rajdhamma while the sangha is under vinaya. 
Commoners are regulated by ordinary law. Buddha realizes the benefit of having rules to 
govern humans but he provides no specific code for lay people. This study proposes that the 




revealed to the world by Buddha. As the universal rule, understanding and living according to 
dhamma can help the individual reduce their sorrow and suffering. The second law is vinaya, 
the monastic code given to the sangha in a piecemeal manner. Many Thais believe that vinaya 
derives from dhamma, and serves as a necessary component in the dissemination of Buddhism. 
The third type of law is dhammasastra, the customary legal code of mainland Southeast Asia. 
Since Buddha never promulgated a codified Buddhist law, local rulers were free to produce 
their own, which was a marriage of vinaya, Buddhist teaching, and local custom. As the origins 
of dhammasastra are claimed to emanate from the mythical sage who was affiliated with the 
first king of the Buddha lineage, the law was deemed sacred. Dhammasastra was deemed 
another derivative of dhamma. Law and Buddhism were deeply intertwined; therefore, the king 
theoretically could not make law. He only enforced karma on violators of dhammasastra. 
Dhammasastra had long gone with the arrival of the fourth type of law, modern positive law, 
in the early twentieth century CE. However, the reception proved problematic when Siam was 
forced to adopt the new system without consent. Beyond the codified laws, the idea of dhamma 
as the true law still has profound impact on the Thai legal community. 
 
Although modern positive law is more easily accessible and efficient, it lacks the sacred quality 
of dhamma which continues to dominate the Thai legal mindset. On the one hand, dhamma is 
the goal and morality of law; dhamma denotes justice, fairness, and the rule of law as expressed 
in legal jargons. It is then higher in the hierarchy than man-made legislation. On the bright side, 
it provides guidance for legal personnel. Judicial training is heavily infused with Buddhism, 
teaching and practice. Dhamma answers a judge’s professional and ethical problems as well as 
his personal conduct outside the courtroom. When the justice system fails, the victim is 
sometimes offered consolation by the thinking of karma. On the other hand, the supremacy of 
dhamma over man-made law challenges the sanctity of law itself. Many of the Thai 
intelligentsia and acclaimed monks dismiss law as an inferior or unnecessary invention so law 
is then only instrumental in achieving the higher goal of dhamma. In many cases, dhamma is 
cited to ignore the text of the law, causing tension among different political camps. The biggest 
question is how dhamma is defined. 
 
This anti-Western intellectualism and the supremacy of dhamma are accentuated in the 
discussion of human rights. Despite the fanfare that Buddhism and human rights share similar 




view ranges from positive, that Buddhism contains some elements of human rights, to 
scepticism, to negative – that human rights are not necessary.  
 
This conclusion conflicts with what many Buddhist scholars conventionally hold. When the 
world operates under the true law of dhamma, human rights actually earn little respect. Scholars 
have struggled first to match the two values, then to subjugate human rights under dhamma. 
However, the foundational difference, in ideology and concept, is still too great. Its view on 
human nature clashes with the anthropocentric view of the West so Buddhism approaches 
dignity, equality, and liberty differently. For a private individual, Buddhism encourages 
internal liberation from suffering so it does believe in exercising one’s rights but only in the 
right manner. In other words, Buddhism still understands rights in the objective sense, not the 
subjective. Since modern human rights perceive rights in the subjective sense, it is vulnerable 
to abuse and inferior to dhamma. Here, the real meaning of the dhamma rhetoric can be better 
understood. Dhamma is used to encourage individuals to forego their rights in exchange for 
the greater good of the whole, in effect, preserving the traditional socio-political hierarchy.  
 
In summary, Buddhist constitutionalism clashes with liberal democratic constitutionalism. 
Buddhism offers a rigid hierarchical political structure while democracy needs an egalitarian 
society. Buddhism’s rule of law differs from the rule of law of the West; it is less certain and 
more arbitrary. Ultimately, the guarantee of rights and liberties is undermined by dhamma.  
 
The tangible product of Buddhist constitutionalism is described in Chapter 3, which is further 
evaluated through the lens of universal international human rights in Chapter 4. When the 
supremacy of dhamma influences the formation of the constitutional and legal system, it 
produces, at the top, a problematic state-religion relationship, and at the regulatory level, 
discrimination and restriction. With Buddhism as the state ideology and identity, the 
constitutional system demands that the king and the government share the responsibility of 
taking care of the faith. Although they are tolerant of religious minorities, attention goes 
unequivocally to the Buddhist majority. This weak establishment is getting worryingly stronger 
through recent campaigns by Buddhist zealots.    
 
When the weak establishment is translated into a regulatory scheme, it produces a multi-tier 
system that is subtly, yet systematically, discriminatory. Buddhism receives the most attention, 




constitutional mission to ‘promote and protect Buddhism and other religions’ does not view 
religious affairs from the aspect of freedom aspect but from that of regulation. It assumes that 
religion is not the personal matter of each individual to pursue his spiritual goal, but an 
important component of the social structure that must be rigidly preserved. As a result, 
privilege comes with control. Buddhism, the most privileged religion, is surprisingly the most 
restricted. There is an extensive regulatory scheme to ensure that the beliefs and practices of 
monks and lay followers are in line with the orthodoxy and orthopraxy of Thai Buddhism. 
Deviants from the official order face legal hardship. This mindset works less well with religious 
minorities, especially Islam. The absence of religious equality raises the question of whether 
non-Buddhists can ever enjoy full religious freedom. The tension is particularly high in the 
deep South where Muslim Malays fight against what they perceive as encroachment upon their 
identity. Security concerns force the Thai government to provide greater accommodation to 
Islam. Regrettably, accommodation heightens tensions among Thai Buddhists who fear losing 
their dominant status.  
  
This thesis gives a preliminary view of Thai Buddhist constitutionalism and a framework for 
future study. There remain many more questions that may further enhance an understanding of 
the concept. For example, studies on the role of Buddhism in the judicial personnel training 
and justice system, or on Buddhist morals on the legislation of various subjects, are needed. 
They merit future research.  
 
B. Synthesising a New Buddhist Liberal Democratic Constitutionalism  
 
In summary, Buddhist constitutionalism is about the sacred king who occupies the top of the 
socio-political pyramid. Based on the notion of barami, this pyramid is the foundation of 
Thailand’s absolute monarchy. Buddhist constitutionalism emphasizes the supremacy of 
dhamma, understood as the ultimate natural law. Dhamma provides the king with political 
objectives as well as restraints. Therefore, modern values such as human rights or the rule of 
law are respected only as far as they are compatible with dhamma. These modern values are 
simply means to promote dhamma, but the king is ready to abandon them. This theory is 
problematic as the content of dhamma is decided by the king himself, leaving his subjects with 
no meaningful way to keep his power in check. Inevitably Buddhist constitutionalism clashes 





Liberal democratic constitutionalism is defined by an egalitarian political structure, the sanctity 
of written law, and respect for human rights. However, the hierarchical political pyramid which 
supports absolute monarchy is directly contrary to the notion of equality, which demands a 
government by popular consensus. The supremacy of dhamma as the true law results in a 
Buddhist-infused justice system and Buddhist-style rule of law that undermine the modern 
positive law as well as the Western-style rule of law. Lastly, dhamma lacks several critical 
characteristics of human rights so the two ideas are not interchangeable despite the claim by 
several acclaimed Buddhists. Dhamma actually hinders the enjoyment of rights.  
 
Thailand is the product of the two constitutionalisms. The conception of Buddhist 
constitutionalism began as early as the thirteenth century CE when King Li Thai penned Trai 
Phum Phra Ruang. All subsequent kings honoured the tradition of Buddhist kingship up until 
the Bangkok era. With the arrival of Western powers at the end of the nineteenth century CE, 
Siam faced an existential threat in forms of Christian and scientific ideas. Siam survived by 
metamorphosing the traditional kingdom into the modern nation state. Western technology and 
knowledge were adopted, but the Buddhist political theory was kept untouched. The reform 
process was assisted by Buddhism which explained modernization as part of the Buddhist 
king’s traditional duty. Thus, Thailand’s modernization happened without secularization. 
 
The most serious challenge to Buddhist constitutionalism was the 1932 Democratic Revolution 
that ended the absolute monarchy. The revolution was the low point of Buddhist kingship that 
could have ended it for good. Nonetheless, the People’s Party was willing to compromise. It 
introduced a democratic constitution, elections and human rights, while the king became a 
constitutional monarch, with only symbolic status and very limited power. Unfortunately, the 
democratic initiative collapsed within 15 years. The following period of military dictatorship, 
aided by the Cold War politics, fostered the resurgence of Buddhist constitutionalism. The 
modern dhammaraja was portrayed as a pious and benevolent ruler in contradiction to elected 
politicians who were seen as corrupt and selfish. This moral high ground made King Bhumibol 
the stabilizing figure of very volatile and unstable democracy during 1980s to 1990s. 
 
In 1997, the liberal camp launched another attempt to consolidate Thailand’s democracy. The 
1997 Constitution focused on strengthening rights and liberties, empowering public 




supported by the conservatives were evidences that Buddhist and liberal democratic 
constitutionalisms failed to coexist peacefully. The following decade was all about dismantling 
the democratization project. But liberalism and democracy would not wither easily. A 
significant portion of Thais are still advocating for another round of democratization. The 
ongoing political crisis in Thailand is the fall-out from incompatibility between the two forces.        
 
Ascertaining the essence of what traditional Thai Buddhist constitutionalism is, and how it 
poses an obstacle to liberal democratic constitutionalism, this section, the very final part of the 
dissertation, asks if Thai Buddhism can reinvent itself to bridge the ideological gap between 
its current theology and the universal norm. Religious tension is only one of the many 
symptoms of that incompatibility when the two traditions collide. Buddhism becomes a 
challenge, or even a hindrance, to Thailand’s democratization. It justifies an arbitrary use of 
law, human rights abuses, and authoritarian rule. Can – or must – Buddhism retreat into the 
confined private sphere of the individual and eventually become obsolete? 
 
Clearly, should Thai Buddhism choose to reconnect with the modern world, some work must 
be done. An extensive ideological overhaul might even be needed. This section sets the stage 
for further research on this task. Thai Buddhism Reform began as early as when King Mongkut 
met Christian missionaries. Realizing that changes were coming, he initiated reform. However, 
such reform was limited to Buddhism as religion, for example, the study of the Pali canon, 
reinterpretation of scriptures, and the sangha administration. There were no reforms concerning 
Buddhist political ideology. Today, modernisation and westernisation have arrived and settled 
in, but Buddhist intellectuals lag behind. How should Buddhist scholars identify new ways to 
synthetize a new type of constitutionalism? Can there be a Buddhist liberal democratic 
constitutionalism?    
 
Buddhist liberal democratic constitutionalism is not impossible. A liberal state need not be 
strictly secular. It does not have to sever all ties with religion. There are strands of liberalism 
that allow for religion in the public sphere. Liberal egalitarianism, for example, differentiates 
between the kind of religion that the state must avoid and the kind that it can embrace.1 It must 
abandon some aspects of that religion, leaving only some that are compatible with liberalism. 
Thus, a religion is acceptable as long as the state satisfies the minimal criteria to be liberal, 
                                               




namely, that a reason behind any state law must be accessible to the public, religious as well 
as dissidents and non-believers; that the law does not infringe on personal liberty by forcing 
itself on those who ethically oppose it; and that the law respects equal citizenship.2 Then, the 
state can even establish an official religion, promulgate religious-inspired laws, or have religion 
in a school curriculum, without violating the freedom and equality of anyone. However, in 
order to satisfy the notion of minimal liberalism, Thailand must forge Buddhist 
constitutionalism anew. At least, Buddhism must reconcile itself with human rights, emphasize 
equality among women and men, and support a limited government under a written law. Most 
critically, it must rethink the definition of being a Buddhist state.     
 
Comparative studies of constitutional law show a spectrum of possibilities for keeping religion 
as part of a liberal state. There are numerous large-scale surveys on categorizing state-religion 
relationship models. Looking for the best model to advance religious freedom, these works 
demonstrate that a number of countries are able to guarantee religious freedom while honoring 
their religious identity; they neither totally reject religion, as some socialist dictatorial states 
do, nor uncritically embrace one faith so as to become a theocratic polity. Among them, 
Temperman recognizes an acknowledgement model which is subtler than positive 
identification. Religion is acknowledged for its historical role or predominant status. 
Acknowledgement may come in the form of the recognition of God in a constitution or by other 
religiously-derived symbols.3 Moving further away from positive identification is 
accommodation and even non-identification. An accommodative state provides support to 
religions indiscriminately.4 Accommodation may come in the form of direct political 
representation for religious delegates, advisory roles for churches, financial aid, or other forms 
of cooperation.5 Non-identification refers to neutrality. A non-identification state avoids 
showing any signs of preferential treatment of a particular religion.6 Another comprehensive 
survey is that by Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh. In addition to the establishment of state religion, 
they identified the pluralist model which recognizes the importance of religion in citizens’ 
lives. Thus, the state chooses to embrace all religions even-handedly in the public sphere. 
Society is full of equally autonomous and independent spheres of religious and non-religious 
institutions which work together for the common good. In principle, the government then has 
                                               
2 Ibid, 151-159.  
3 Temperman, State-Religion Relationship and Human Rights Law 73-90. 
4 Ibid, 94. 
5 Ibid, 94-103. 




to pay equal respect to all groups.7 Even an establishment can be de facto or de jure, depending 
on the degree of intimacy between the two entities. Establishment could be de jure, formal8 
and symbolic or de facto, deep and complex.9 De facto establishment of a state religion is often 
a matter of tradition combined with the state’s strong moral commitment to protect the spiritual 
welfare of the nation. The last work to be included here is that of Ran Hirschl. His model of a 
weak religious establishment is most common in European countries with Protestantism as 
their national church. However, the establishment is largely ceremonial. In Germany a weak 
establishment means several religious communities are designated as public corporations and 
thus deserve state support for their social services.10 These models of a ‘thin’ or ‘shallow’ 
establishment, as opposed to a ‘thick’ or ‘deep’ establishment that Thailand is heading towards, 
are drawn from Europe and East Asia. They serve as a reminder that a balance between 
liberalism and religion is possible. 
 
The task is not unique to Buddhism. In the de-secularized age, other religious traditions have 
been on similar quests, as the previous paragraph has shown, from which Thai Buddhism might 
be able to learn.11 However, a new constitutional relationship requires a new interpretation of 
religious doctrine. It is necessary that Thai Buddhism broaden its horizons. For example, the 
Roman Catholic Church’s view on human rights is well advanced after the Vatican II Council 
shifted the Church’s attitude.12 It calls for respect for human dignity, and the state to help its 
citizens, especially the marginalized. This change does not mean that the two traditions, of 
human rights and Roman Catholicism, will align perfectly. There is still much to discuss about 
autonomy, truth, and responsibility but at least the Roman Catholic tradition is open to further 
dialogue. Meanwhile, scholars of Islamic legal tradition are trying to find a non-secular, yet 
non-theocratic, solution. There are many works that try to offer a rights-friendly version of 
Islamic law. Looking for new possibilities, one solution is to untangle the religious law-making 
structure from the lay government in the hope that a more independent body might be able to 
produce laws and ordinances which accord to various schools of faith.13  
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Another solution is to think of a religious tradition from a different perspective. Israel has been 
struggling with the constitutional clause describing it as a Jewish state, the only Jewish state in 
the world. It has to find a balance between the two constitutional mandates of being Jewish and 
democratic.14 As Jewishness denotes multi-faceted qualities, ethnicity, religion, and culture, 
the term is open to opportunities to choose a more democratic choice. Jewishness as heritage, 
symbol, and language, though religious, is acceptable as it still respects rights of the non-Jewish 
minority.15 This exercise can encourage Thai Buddhism to redefine being Buddhist. Can 
Thailand discard some aspects of Buddhism while keeping others?  
 
In addition to the rich examples from other religious traditions, is there an answer within the 
Buddhist tradition? Matthew Walton’s study shows Buddhism’s plasticity to support a wide 
range of ideologies, from communism, to imperialism, to democracy.16 One can go deep, 
digging into the past. The state has been supporting the current version of Buddhist 
constitutionalism because it justifies a particular type of regime, which descended from the 
traditional absolute monarchy. In 1932, however, the People’s Party ended such tradition and 
introduced democracy. That was also when the new interpretation of Buddhist 
constitutionalism was spawned. The most prominent member of the People’s Party was Pridi 
Banomyong whose understanding of Buddhism radically differed from traditional notions. He 
employed the Buddhist principle of non-permanence, anicca, to justify his abolishment of the 
absolute kingship; that society naturally evolves over time, from the primitive, to the feudal, to 
the absolute monarchy, and eventually to a democratic society.17 He also re-interpreted the 
concept of Buddhist utopia, the period when the next Buddha, Mettrai, would arrive and all 
dhamma would be restored. Pridi argued that it was possible for men to create that utopia 
without waiting for the Mettrai Buddha if men are liberated and equal.18 Pridi firmly believed 
in the state’s role in providing welfare, as the ideal Buddhist king would tend his subjects with 
fair distribution of resources.19 He further advocated strongly for dhammavijaya, victory by 
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(2013) 2 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion119. 
15 Daphne Barak-Erez, ‘What Does It Mean for a State to be Jewish’ in Christine Hayes (ed) The Cambridge 
Companion to Judaism and Law (Cambridge University Press 2017) 365. 
16 Matthew Walton, ‘Buddhism, Nationalism, and Governance’ in Jerryson, Oxford Handbook of Contemporary 
Buddhism. 
17 Pridi, Impermanence of a Society 6-13.  
18 Phra Chanipit Surasak, นายปรีด ีพนมยงค์: แนวคิดและบทบาททางพุทธศาสนา [Pridi Banomyong: His Thought and Role 
Concerning Buddhism] (MA Thesis, Thammasat University, 2007) 53-56; Suraphot Taweesak, “ปรีดี พนงยงค์ กบัการ
ตีความพุทธศาสนาสนับสนุนประชาธิปไตย” [Pridi Banomyong and Democratic Interpretation of Buddhism] Prachatai (16 
February 2012) at <https://prachatai.com/journal/2012/02/39286> accessed 19 September 2019.  




dhamma, by avoiding violence in conflict resolution.20 Most importantly, Pridi experimented 
with the Sangha administration by restructuring it according to the separation of temporal 
power. His Sangha Law tested how monastic republicanism, which many Buddhists were 
proud of, would play out in practice.21 It is clear that Pridi approached Buddhism from the 
socialist democratic point of view. His works demonstrated how Buddhism might be re-
interpreted to be more compatible with liberal democratic constitutionalism. Pridi was not the 
only member of the People’s Party who read Buddhism in a new light. Other members of the 
1932 Revolution shared the same inspiration that Buddhism could lead to political liberation, 
and a fair economic and social development.22 Unfortunately, the resurgence of the royalist 
conservatives ended this brief but exciting experiential period.23 Pridi’s Buddhist legacy is 
understudied and thus revival of interest in his lifework may be useful to the present task.  
 
In more recent times, new Buddhist movements sprang up in the nineteen-eighties. Again, the 
blossoming of fresh ideas coincided with the liberalization of politics after the Cold War ended. 
As they all tried to break away from rigid orthodoxy, some of them, such as Santi Asoka or the 
Bhikhuni movements offered new readings on Thai Buddhism. Santi Asoka became 
independent from the official Sangha. Bhikhuni had to challenge the archaic understanding of 
vinaya to assert women’s rights to ordination. It is worth examining whether these marginalized 
Buddhist groups may hold alternative theories of governance, law, or human rights. 
 
One can search further afield too. This research focuses on Thai Buddhism, a branch of 
Theravada. It touches very little upon the other main tradition, that of Mahayana of the East 
Asian countries. The story of Mahayana Buddhism follows a completely different trajectory. 
When Buddhism entered the region, it was brought under the patronage of rulers in China, 
Japan, and Korea. However, eventually, Buddhism lost its prestige. Mahayana had to cope with 
a number of pressures; competition with other faiths, i.e. Shinto and Daoism, and later 
Christianity; suppression from Communism, especially during the Cultural Revolution, or 
Imperialism; and lastly, modernization.24 These countries became secularized for different 
reasons, i.e. democratization as in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, or Communism as in 
                                               
20 Phra Chanipit, Pridi Banomyong: His Thought and Role Concerning Buddhism 32-34.  
21 Ibid, 87-92.  
22 Suraphot Taweesak, จากพุทธศาสนาแห่งรัฐสู่พุทธศาสนาทีHเป็นอิสระจากรัฐ [From State Buddhism to Buddhism Free From 
State] (Kled Thai 2017) 103-107. 
23 Jackson, Buddhism, Legitimation, and Conflict 79-82.  
24 In general, see Chapters 4,5, and 6 on Buddhism in China (Taiwan included), Korea, and Japan, respectively, 




China. The constitutions of China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan grant no special place for 
Buddhism. Buddhism remains culturally important but not politically. In this pluralistic world, 
it is treated no differently from other religions. Monks belong not to a special class as in 
Theravada Southeast Asia, but they are ordinary citizens. No longer is there a single entity to 
control the sangha. Many large Buddhist organizations are led by lay persons. Do these reflect 
a more egalitarian thinking? How does Mahayana Buddhism respond to such changes in its 
socio-politico status? A comparative study might provide some clues and insights useful for 
Theravada’s problem. 
 
Yet one thing is certain. New ideas cannot be born out of a monopoly position. When Buddhism 
resides under the state’s patronage, especially when the mutual relationship becomes 
increasingly intimate as it currently is, the result is a localized, amicable, and submissive 
relationship with the state. The understanding of Buddhist constitutionalism is therefore 
dictated by the state whose survival is at stake. Unsurprisingly, it discourages more radical 
interpretations and focuses on maintaining the undemocratic status quo. However, if Thai 
Buddhism is ever to find modern relevance, it must be willing to embrace doctrinal 








Aggati    prejudice 
Anicca   impermanence 
Arahat   a monk who reaches enlightenement or sainthood  
Asarnhapuja   the remembrance of the first monk, falling into a fullmoon of 
    eighth month of the lunar calendar  
Barami    perfection, charisma, or authority 
Bhikkhu   a Buddhist monk  
Bhikkhuni a female Buddhist monk, often confused with Mae Chi which is 
commonly translated to a nun 
Bodhisatta  a person who is determined to make merit to become the next 
 Buddha  
Bun    merit 
Chakkavattin a wheel-turning monarch, who conquer the world and defeat 
other lesser monarchs through his barami, considered a temporal 
equivalent of Buddha 
Dasavidharajadhamma ten royal virtues for a king, including dana (charity), sila 
(morality), pariccaga (altruism), ajjava (honesty), maddhava 
(gentleness), tapa (self-controlling), akkodha (non-anger), 
avihimsa (non-violence), khanti (tolerance), and avirodhana 
(uprightness), also totsapitrajadhamma 
Dana  donation or giving, one of the ten royal virtues 
Datok  an expert in Sharia law 
Devaraja  the theory of divine kingship in Siam 
Dhamma  the natural law, ultimate rule of being, and the teaching of  
 Buddha 
Dhammaraja a monarch who rules in accordance with the Buddhist notion of 
ideal kingship, in general, the ten royal virtues 
Dhammasastra  ancient legal cult of Southeast Asia 
Dhammavijaya  a victory by benevolence, not by violence 
Gothama   the present Buddha  
Hiriotappa   shame over moral transgression 




Kod mhai a thai word for a written law 
Mahasamata  the great elect, the first monarch who was elected to rule in order 
to restore peace and order 
Mahayana the school of Buddhism that is practiced mostly in East Asian 
countries, the characteristic of it emphasizes on Bodhisatta to 
help the greatest amount of beings, the great vehicle across the 
sea of sufferance 
Makhapuja  the remembrance of Buddha’s birth, enlightenment, and death, 
 falling into a fullmoon of the sixth month in the lunar calendar 
Mandala   sphere of power 
Mettrai   the future Buddha who will arrive at the end of this eon 
Pali an ancient language from India, used almost exclusively in 
Theravada Buddhism 
Parajika the most serious crimes in Buddhism: sexual intercourse, theft, 
homicide, and falsely claiming to possess mythical power, a 
proprietor of which will immediately lose his monk status 
Parian a title for a monk who passes the Pali examination 
Phra a title for a monk 
Pondok A traditional Islamic religious school 
Rajadhamma dhamma for the monarch 
Rajasastra king-made law 
Sakdina a traditional system of social ranking 
Sangha a gathering of monks, the Sangha, however, refers to the official 
order of Thai Buddhism 
Sangha Raja the supreme partriarch overseeing the official Thai monasti order  
Sasanuphathamphok the patron of religions  
Sila    precept 
Sima a boundary that separates the monastic territory from the outside, 
which is a prerequite for validity of any Buddhist ritual 
Tadika a local Islamic religious schhol for young children 
Theravada the school of Buddhism that is practiced mostly in Sri Lanka and 
Southeast Asia, known for its strict interpretation of teaching and 
practices 




Uppajja a preceptor, a learnt senior monk who is authorised to ordain 
others 
Vihara  a chapel 
Vinaya   monastic legal code 
Visakapuja the remembrance of Buddha’s most important sermon to 1,250 
arahat monks, falling to a fullmoon of the third month in the 
lunar calendar 
Wat  a temple, in a legal sense, a fully authorized, with the blessing 







1239 (?)   King Sri Indraditya founded the Sukhothai kingdom. 
 
1279 (?) King Ramkhamhaeng ascended the throne.  
 
1347  King Lithai crowned himself the first great Buddhist king. 
 
1438 Sukhothai was annexed to the Ayutthaya Kingdom. 
 
1688 The coup broke out against King Narai, expelling Catholic priests from 
the kingdom. 
 
1767 Ayuthata failed to the Burmese army.  
 
1767 King Taksin founded the Thonburi kingdom. 
 
1782 King Rama I founded the Chakri dynasty of Bangkok.  
 
1788 King Rama I organized a recension of Tipitaka 
 
1805 King Rama I ordered a compilation of the Three Seals Code. 
 
1839 Prince Mongkut established the Thammayuttikanikaya school of 
Buddhism. 
 
1851 Prince Mongkut was crowned King Rama IV. 
 
1891  King Rama V began the modernization of the Thai legal system. 
 
1902 King Rama V promulgated the first Sangha Law, establishing the 
official order of Thai Buddhism.  
 
1909 The Anglo-Siam Treaty divided the Malay Peninsula and the Sultanate 
of Patani was handed under Siam’s control.  
 
1932 The People’s Party ended the absolute monarchy of King Rama VII, 
introducing Thailand’s first modern constitution. 
 
1941 The second Sangha Law was promulgated. 
 
1946 The military junta staged a coup, ending the 15 year period of 
democracy initiated by the People’s Party, and beginning the period of 
military dictatorship. 
 
1962 Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat passed the 1962 Sangha Law.  
 





1972 On 14 October, the deadly crackdown of university students, who were 
protesting for democracy, backfired. The military junta relented its 
power, the beginning of the short-period of liberalisation.  
 
1975 Santi Asoke was created.  
 
1976 Right-wing militias massacred left-wing student activists on 6 October, 
an incident marked the return of the conservative.  
 
1992 Black May Uprising ended the long era of military dictatorship.  
 
1997 The 1997 Constitution, the People’s Constitution, came into effect, the 
beginning of Thailand’s democratization.  
 
2001  Thaksin Shinawatra became the prime minister. 
 
2004 Violence broke out in the Deep South region.  
 
2006 The first anti-Thaksin Shinwatra demonstration was held before 
Thaksin was ousted by the 19 September Coup.  
 
2007 The 2007 Constitution was promulgated. 
 
2008 Samak Sundaravej, Thaksin’s proxy, won the general election, 
prompting another anti-Thaksin demonstration until the Constitutional 
Court dissolved Thaksin’s party, People’s Power Party. The Democrat 
Party, the representative of the anti-Thaksin conservative wing, 
became a government.   
 
2010 A mass protest by Thaksin’s supporters, the Redshirts, broke out in 
Bangkok but subsequently was cracked down.  
 
2011 Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s youngest sister, won the general 
election, becoming the first female prime minister.  
 
2013 The Supreme Patriarch, the Sangha Raja, passed away. 
 
2014  On 22 May, Prayuth Chan-ocha staged a coup against Yingluck 
Shinawatra, abolishing the 2007 Constitution.  
 
2016 King Bhumibol passed away on 13 October. King Vajiralongkorn 
succeeded the throne.  
 
2017 King Vajiralongkorn signed the 2017 Constitution into effect. 
Dhammakaya Temple was raided. The amendment to the 1962 Sangha 
Law placed the appointment of Sangha Raja under the king’s authority. 
 
2018 Another amendment placed an appointment of the Sangha Council to 





2019 Prayuth Chan-ocha won the general election, transforming the 
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